My research lies at the intersection of philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and their applications to practical issues in ethics, neuroethics, and what I term the philosophy of psychopathy. I am particularly interested in the relationship between commonsense psychological concepts and their subpersonal counterparts in cognitive science. In applied contexts, my work addresses questions concerning the moral and legal responsibility of psychopathic individuals, the nature of mental disorder, and appropriate societal responses to psychopathy. My initial foray into professional philosophy was through an interest in the nature of normative reasons, a topic where I still intend to make some contributions.
See my list of publications here.
Overview by research domains
Neuroethics and philosophy of psychopathy
In the area of study I like to call philosophy of psychopathy, we investigate the following questions: Are psychopaths morally and/or criminally responsible for their wrongful actions? Are psychopaths mentally disordered? Are psychopaths rational? What would be an appropriate societal response to problems caused by psychopaths? Answering these questions requires, on the one hand, acquaintance with the neuropsychological studies investigating the bio-cognitive profiles of individuals with psychopathy, and on the other hand, knowledge of the relevant legal and moral frameworks that apply to these cases. Moreover, an appropriate solution to these issues requires thinking about how to translate neuropsychological studies and bio-cognitive constructs they presuppose into the common-sense psychological vocabulary that is presupposed by our ordinary moral and legal practices.
Foundations of cognitive science
In this area of research, I am working on the general problem of how to integrate common-sense psychological constructs with their supposed counterparts in cognitive science. This is a foundational problem in philosophy of psychology and cognitive science and stems from the fact that the nature of the mind can be investigated at multiple levels of description. To specify the general function of the mind, we need to start with the top level where we talk about the explanation and prediction of the behaviour of a person as a whole. This level of description is couched in the vocabulary of commonsense psychology. Cognitive (neuro)sciences offer explanations at the subpersonal levels where the commonsense psychological constructs are replaced by concepts referring to causal mechanisms, their parts, and relations such as neurons, electrical discharges, and so forth. Here, the challenge is to find an appropriate bridge principle that would enable us to integrate the commonsense psychological explanations characterizing the personal level with (neuro)scientific explanations characterizing the subpersonal levels of functioning.
Metaethics and moral psychology
Metaethics is a philosophical discipline that investigates the nature of morality, moral concepts, and the psychological underpinnings of moral practices. Here, I am interested in questions how the normativity of morality (the fact that it tells us what is permissible, impermissible, and what we ought to do) can be reconciled with a naturalistic (essentially non-normative) picture of the world as revealed by science. I am interested in providing an account of the nature of moral/normative thought that can be grounded in psychological/cognitive and social facts about human beings.