Current research
My currrent reaech is related to the activities of the TIPPS (2023–2027), funded by the Croatian Science Foundation. The info on the project can be found here.
The main line of research concerns the interface problem and its manifestation across three domains of inquiry: philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, philosophy of psychiatry, and philosophy of law. My understanding of the interface problem, and the approaches to it, is based on Bermúdez (2005). The interface problem refers to the question of how different levels of explanation of the mind—especially the personal and subpersonal levels—can be integrated, and whether such integration is possible or fruitful at all (see also Drayson 2024).
The hypothesis I am exploring is that a proper approach to the interface problem may depend on the domain of inquiry. For example, in cognitive science and many areas of psychiatry, functionalist or co-evolutionary approaches seem most appropriate, as they allow that concepts from the personal level can inform how we think about states and processes at subpersonal levels of explanation. In contrast, I am inclined to think that in practical or normative domains, such as criminal law, autonomist approaches—which hold that the interface problem does not have a solution, or that the personal and subpersonal levels should be seen as offering independent types of explanation—may be more adequate.
The project has produced several significant results in this respect. In the paper “The personal and the subpersonal: three desiderata and a pragmatist proposal”, we offer a relatively neutral account of personal and subpersonal explanations, which can serve as a background framework for formulating the interface problem.
In the paper “Are mental dysfunctions autonomous from brain dysfunctions? A perspective from the personal/subpersonal distinction”, I explore how different approaches to the interface problem in psychiatry can lead to contrasting views about the relationship between mental and brain functions.
In the paper “How general are Marr’s levels of analysis? An assessment of Bermúdez’s view”, I investigate whether Marr’s levels of analysis can be used in cognitive science to provide a framework for explaining the unity of the mind—and, in doing so, offer a potential solution to the interface problem in that domain.
The project also involves the use of Carnapian explicationist methodology. Currently, I am working on revising a paper in which we examine how the concept of mental disorder should be explicated in criminal law.
References
Bermúdez, J. L. (2005). Philosophy of psychology: A contemporary introduction. Routledge.
Drayson, Z. (2024). Personal/subpersonal distinction. In M. C. Frank, A. Majid, & A. Alsmith (Eds.), Open encyclopedia of cognitive science. MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.21428/e2759450.8593aeda