Law Notes

Law Notes

Reasonable Suspicion

Reasonable suspicion is a legal standard of proof in United States law that is less than probable cause, the legal standard for arrests and warrants, but more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'"; it must be based on "specific and articulable facts", "taken together with rational inferences from those facts", and the suspicion must be associated with the specific individual. If police additionally have reasonable suspicion that a person so detained is armed and dangerous, they may "frisk" the person for weapons, but not for contraband like drugs. However, if the police develop probable cause during a weapons frisk (by feeling something that could be a weapon or contraband, for example), they may then conduct a full search. Reasonable suspicion is evaluated using the "reasonable person" or "reasonable officer" standard, in which said person in the same circumstances could reasonably suspect a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity; it depends upon the totality of circumstances, and can result from a combination of particular facts, even if each is individually innocuous.

In Terry v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a person can be stopped and briefly detained by a police officer based on a reasonable suspicion of involvement in a punishable crime. If the officer has reasonable suspicion the detainee is armed, the officer may perform a "pat-down" of the person's outer garments for weapons. Such a detention does not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizure, though it must be brief. Reasonable suspicion does not provide grounds for arrest; however, an arrest can be made if facts discovered during the detention provide probable cause that the suspect has committed a crime. (Note: Probable cause cannot be after the fact. Any added probable cause after the fact would be inadmissible in a court of law.)

In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada the Court further established that a state may require, by law, that a person verbally identify himself or herself to an officer during a stop; some states (e.g., Colorado) require that a person detained provide additional information.

Traffic Stop

A brief, non-custodial traffic stop is considered a "seizure" for the purposes of the 4th Amendment and must therefore be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The investigating officer must weigh the totality of the circumstances to determine whether sufficient objective facts exist to create reasonable suspicion that the driver is engaged in criminal activity. If the investigating officer witnesses the driver commit a traffic violation (even if they are mistaken about what constitutes a violation, see Heien v. North Carolina), then said violation generally constitutes probable cause for the officer to stop the vehicle. The officer may detain the driver and any passengers of the vehicle for long enough to confirm and/or deny his or her suspicions.

If his or her suspicions are confirmed, then there may be probable cause to either search the vehicle and/or arrest its occupant(s), depending on the nature of the suspected violations. In Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court held that a drug dog may sniff the exterior of a vehicle during a traffic stop so long as any delay in calling the dog to the scene does not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop. The use of a drug dog is sui generis and a dog's sniff is not considered a search in and of itself under the 4th Amendment.

Police may also set up roadblocks and stop drivers without particularized reasonable suspicion that the stopped individual is engaged in criminal activity, so long as the plan for the stop is applied neutrally, for instance, driving while intoxicated - so long as all vehicles are stopped or every third vehicle is stopped, or some other reasonably neutral policy is applied for stopping vehicles. Note that some states also impose additional notice requirements for roadblocks, such as appropriate signage and/or flashing blue or red lights.

Examples

A police officer may briefly detain a person, without a warrant, if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime, and an officer may use reasonable force to effect that detention. Courts have recognized that an officer's safety is paramount and have allowed for a "frisk" of the outermost garments from head to toe if the officer reasonably suspects that the detainee is armed, and for an officer to stop an individual at gunpoint if necessary. In the city of New York, once a person is released from a reasonable suspicion stop, a "stop, question and frisk report" is filled out and filed with the command in which the stop occurs.

U.S. courts have held that a stop on reasonable suspicion may be appropriate in the following cases: when a person possesses unusual items (like a wire hanger) which would be useful in a crime and is looking into car windows at 2 am, when a person matches a description of a suspect given by another officer, or a person is seen fleeing from a home or business with a sounding alarm. However, reasonable suspicion does not apply merely because a person refuses to answer questions, declines to allow a voluntary search, or is of a particular race or ethnicity.

Probable Cause

In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard[1] by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when "whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."

It is also the standard by which grand juries issue criminal indictments. The principle behind the standard is to limit the power of authorities to perform random or abusive searches (unlawful search and seizure), and to promote lawful evidence gathering and procedural form during criminal arrest and prosecution. The standard also applies to personal or property searches.

The term comes from the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Probable Cause in this case may relate to statistical probability or to a general standard of common behavior and customs. The context of the word probable here is not exclusive to community standards, and could partially derive from its use in formal mathematical statistics as some have suggested; but cf. probō, Latin etymology.

In U.S. immigration proceedings, the “reason to believe” standard has been interpreted as equivalent to probable cause.

Probable cause should not be confused with reasonable suspicion, which is the required criteria to perform a Terry stop in the United States of America. The criteria for reasonable suspicion are less strict than those for probable cause.

Definition of Probable Cause

A common definition is "a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts are probably true".[6] Notable in this definition is a lack of requirement for public position or public authority of the individual making the recognition, allowing for use of the term by citizens and/or the general public. One nonlegal definition of probable cause is, “(A) reasonable ground for supposing that a charge is well-founded” (Merriam-Webster, 2019).

In the context of warrants, the Oxford Companion to American Law defines probable cause as "information sufficient to warrant a prudent person's belief that the wanted individual had committed a crime (for an arrest warrant) or that evidence of a crime or contraband would be found in a search (for a search warrant)". "Probable cause" is a stronger standard of evidence than a reasonable suspicion, but weaker than what is required to secure a criminal conviction. Even hearsay can supply probable cause if it is from a reliable source or supported by other evidence, according to the Aguilar–Spinelli test.

In Brinegar v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court defines probable cause as "where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed."

Consent to search

If voluntary consent is given and the individual giving the consent has authority over the search area, such as a car, house, business, etc. then a law enforcement officer does not need probable cause or even reasonable suspicion. If the person does not give voluntary consent, then the officer needs probable cause, and in some cases, a search warrant may be required to search the premises. Unless another exclusion to the fourth amendment of the US constitution occurs, when the person withdraws their consent for searching, the officer has to stop looking immediately.

                                      CASE LAWS:

Terry v. Ohio

Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a police officer may stop a suspect on the street and frisk him or her without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that the person "may be armed and presently dangerous."

Terry vs Garner:
Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a police officer may use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect only if the officer has a good-faith belief that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.

Pennsylvania v. Mimms:
After police officers had stopped respondent's automobile for being operated with an expired license plate, one of the officers asked respondent to step out of the car and produce his license and registration. As respondent alighted, a large bulge under his jacket was noticed by the officer, who thereupon frisked him and found a loaded revolver. Respondent was then arrested and subsequently indicted for carrying a concealed weapon and unlicensed firearm. His motion to suppress the revolver was denied and after a trial, at which the revolver was introduced in evidence, he was convicted. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the revolver was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Maryland v. Wilson:
After stopping a speeding car in which respondent Wilson was a passenger, a Maryland state trooper ordered Wilson out of the car upon noticing his apparent nervousness. When Wilson exited, a quantity of cocaine fell to the ground. He was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Baltimore County Circuit Court granted his motion to suppress the evidence, deciding that the trooper's ordering him out of the car constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, that an officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle, does not apply to passengers. 

Brendlin v. California:

On November 27, 2001, police officers pulled Karen Simeroth (defendant) over to check on her vehicle’s permit. The state admitted that the stop was unfounded. One of the officers recognized the passenger, Bruce Brendlin (defendant), and thought he might be a parole violator. After verifying that Brendlin was a parole violator with an outstanding warrant, the officer ordered Brendlin out of the car and placed him under arrest. During a search, the officers found drug paraphernalia. The officers also found drugs and paraphernalia on Simeroth and in the car. Brendlin was charged with drug possession and manufacture. Brendlin moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the initial traffic stop was an unlawful seizure. The trial court denied the motion and held that Brendlin was only seized when ordered out of the car and arrested. Brendlin pled guilty and was sentenced to four years incarceration. The Supreme Court of California affirmed. 

Chimel v. California:

Police officers, armed with an arrest warrant but not a search warrant, were admitted to petitioner's home by his wife, where they awaited petitioner's arrival. When he entered, he was served with the warrant. Although he denied the officers' request to "look around," they conducted a search of the entire house "on the basis of the lawful arrest." At petitioner's trial on burglary charges, items taken from his home were admitted over objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. His conviction was affirmed by the California appellate courts, which held, despite their acceptance of petitioner's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid, that, since the arresting officers had procured the warrant "in good faith," and since, in any event, they had had sufficient information to constitute probable cause for the arrest, the arrest was lawful. The courts also held that the search was justified as incident to a valid arrest. 

Minnesota v. Dickerson:

Minnesota police spotted Dickerson (defendant) leaving a known crack house. When Dickerson saw the officers, he turned and walked in the other direction. Based on these facts, the officers stopped Dickerson, and one of them performed a patdown search. The officer found no weapons but did feel a small object in Dickerson’s jacket pocket. Believing this object to be crack cocaine wrapped in cellophane, the officer reached into the pocket to remove it. The officer found crack cocaine and arrested Dickerson for drug possession. At trial, Dickerson moved to suppress the evidence, but the Hennepin County District Court denied the motion, and Dickerson was convicted. The Minnesota Court of Appeals then reversed, refusing to adopt the "plain feel" exception and holding that the seizure of the cocaine violated the Fourth Amendment. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the ruling.

Illinois v. Wardlow:

Riding in four separate cars, police officers entered a high drug area of the city to investigate drug transactions. The officers in the last car of the caravan witnessed Wardlow (defendant) standing by a building holding an opaque bag. When Wardlow looked at the car he began running away, and the officers in the last car gave chase and caught him. One of the officers immediately conducted a pat-down to search for weapons. The officer felt something that appeared to be a weapon and when he removed it he discovered it was a handgun. Wardlow was arrested for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The trial court held that the stop and frisk was lawful and allowed the gun to be introduced as evidence at trial. The court of appeals reversed Wardlow’s conviction, holding that the police had no reasonable suspicion to search Wardlow and the gun should have been suppressed. The state supreme court affirmed the court of appeals’ ruling and held that flight, even in a high crime area, does not amount to reasonable suspicion because it may be interpreted as an exercise of a citizen’s right to refuse to answer police questions when stopped on the street. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 

Graham v. Connor:

Graham (plaintiff) is diabetic. He had an insulin reaction on the day in question, and his friend Berry drove him to a store to buy juice. There was a long line at the store so Graham rushed out and asked Berry to drive him to a friend’s house. Officer Connor (defendant) became suspicious after seeing Graham rush in and out of the store and pulled Berry’s car over to make an investigative stop. Berry explained that Graham was having an insulin reaction, but Connor told them to wait there until he found out if something happened at the store. When backup arrived, Graham was handcuffed and shoved against the hood of Berry’s car face down. The officers refused to give Graham sugar and ignored his request that they check his wallet for his diabetic decal. During the incident, Graham sustained several injuries, including a broken foot and shoulder injury. He was finally released when Connor learned that nothing happened at the store. Graham sued Connor and the other officers under 42 U.S.C. §1983, charging them with using excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Connor moved for a directed verdict. The district court applied a four-factor test and granted Connor’s motion for directed verdict, finding that the force used was appropriate under the circumstances and applied in a good faith effort to restore order. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Florida v. J.L.:

Miami-Dade Police received an anonymous tip that a man matching J.L.’s (defendant’s) description had a gun at the bus stop. Officers stopped and frisked J.L. and found a gun. J.L. was charged with possessing a concealed firearm without a license and while under age 18. J.L. moved to suppress the gun on the grounds that it was found during an unlawful search. The trial court granted the motion. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the appellate court’s ruling and held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 

Maryland v. King:

In 2003, a man broke into the victim's house and raped her. Police were unable to determine the man's identity from the woman's description, but police were able to get the man's DNA. In 2009, Alonzo King was arrested for an unrelated assault. During booking, as was standard practice for serious offenses under Maryland law, the police used a cotton swab to take a DNA sample from the inside of King's cheek. The DNA was run through a law enforcement database, and officers found that it matched the DNA of the perpetrator from the 2003 rape. The state court admitted the DNA evidence and convicted King of the rape. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the cotton-swab procedure constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 

Mapp v. Ohio:

Police got a tip that a suspect wanted for questioning related to a bombing was hiding in Dollree Mapp’s (defendant) home. Officers forcibly entered the home without Mapp’s consent. When Mapp demanded to see the warrant, police showed her a piece of paper purported to be a “warrant.” However, when Mapp took the “warrant,” police engaged in a physical altercation to retrieve it from her. After searching the home, the officers found and seized books and photos that were introduced as evidence in Mapp’s criminal trial for possessing lewd and obscene materials in violation of Ohio state law. Mapp was convicted, even though there was no evidence that the police ever obtained a warrant to search Mapp’s home. The Ohio Supreme Court sustained the conviction, even though it concluded there was a reasonable argument for reversal due to the unjust manner in which the evidence was obtained. Mapp appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that her conviction was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure. 

Whren v. United States:

Plainclothes police officers pulled over a car for traffic violations after witnessing the driver make a turn without signaling and then speed down the road. Prior to observing these traffic violations, the police observed the two men in the car from a distance and became suspicious that a drug deal was taking place. Whren (defendant) was a passenger in the car and when the police approached the car they observed plastic bags of cocaine in Whren’s hands. Whren and the driver were arrested for illegal drug possession and convicted in federal court after the trial judge, over Whren’s objections, permitted the cocaine to be introduced into evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. 

Horton v. California:

The police obtained probable cause that Horton (defendant) was the one responsible for an armed robbery. The police obtained a warrant to search Horton’s home only for the proceeds of the robbery, though the affidavit for the warrant also described the weapons used in the robbery and not just the proceeds. Pursuant to the warrant, the police searched Horton’s home where they did not find the proceeds of the robbery but they did find the weapons used in the robbery lying in plain view. At trial, a police officer testified that he was interested in finding the weapons while he searched Horton’s home, so the weapons were not found “inadvertently.” The trial court allowed the evidence of the weapons to be admitted at trial and Horton was convicted. 

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada:

Larry Dudley Hiibel (defendant) repeatedly refused to identify himself to a police officer investigating a reported assault. The officer arrested Hiibel and charged him with obstructing a police officer from performing his duty in violation of Nevada law. Hiibel was found guilty in the Justice Court of Union Township and fined $250.