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Depending on your browser click on the "Program Notes" down arrow at the upper right or the hash marks on the upper left to see the drop-down menu list of individual monthly program pages.
Depending on your browser click on the "Program Notes" down arrow at the upper right or the hash marks on the upper left to see the drop-down menu list of individual monthly program pages.
The January, February, and March 2019 LRT meetings will be focused on one of the war's most fascinating figures, Union General John Pope. And his signature battle, arguably the most interesting engagement of the entire war. Taking a page from Yogi Berra's "If you don't know where you are going, you will probably end up somewhere else" I want everyone to know where we are going.
The January, February, and March 2019 LRT meetings will be focused on one of the war's most fascinating figures, Union General John Pope. And his signature battle, arguably the most interesting engagement of the entire war. Taking a page from Yogi Berra's "If you don't know where you are going, you will probably end up somewhere else" I want everyone to know where we are going.
By the close of the March LRT meeting we should have an understanding of the events that led up to the pragmatic Lincoln mind turning back in Little Mac's direction, although not without reluctance. "Unquestionably, it appeared to him, McClellan had acted badly in regard to Pope. One of his subordinates had even been quoted as saying publicly, "I don't care for John Pope a pinch of owl dung". It seemed to Lincoln that they had wanted Pope to fail, no matter what the cost in the blood of northern soldiers. McClellan, when appealed to for counsel, had advised the President to concentrate all the reserves in the capital entrenchments and "leave Pope to get out of his scrape" as best he could. To Lincoln this seemed particularly callous, if not crazy: his mistrust of the Young Napoleon was increased. But early Tuesday morning, when Pope warned that "unless something can be done to restore tone to this army it will melt away before you know it," he did what he knew he had to do. "We must use what tools we have," he told his secretary. "There is no man in the army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as McClellan .... If he can't fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight."
By the close of the March LRT meeting we should have an understanding of the events that led up to the pragmatic Lincoln mind turning back in Little Mac's direction, although not without reluctance. "Unquestionably, it appeared to him, McClellan had acted badly in regard to Pope. One of his subordinates had even been quoted as saying publicly, "I don't care for John Pope a pinch of owl dung". It seemed to Lincoln that they had wanted Pope to fail, no matter what the cost in the blood of northern soldiers. McClellan, when appealed to for counsel, had advised the President to concentrate all the reserves in the capital entrenchments and "leave Pope to get out of his scrape" as best he could. To Lincoln this seemed particularly callous, if not crazy: his mistrust of the Young Napoleon was increased. But early Tuesday morning, when Pope warned that "unless something can be done to restore tone to this army it will melt away before you know it," he did what he knew he had to do. "We must use what tools we have," he told his secretary. "There is no man in the army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as McClellan .... If he can't fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight."
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“Let us understand each other. I have come from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an Army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our western armies in defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. Meantime I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking “strong position and holding them,” of “lines of retreat,” and of “bases of supplies.” Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance; disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever.”
“Let us understand each other. I have come from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an Army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our western armies in defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. Meantime I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking “strong position and holding them,” of “lines of retreat,” and of “bases of supplies.” Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance; disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever.”
John Pope July 14 1862
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To understand the elevation of Pope to command it is necessary to understand the relationship between Abraham Lincoln and George McClellan. Lincoln was a person who was often grossly underestimated, so much so that he encouraged such a perception and was secure enough in his identity that he did not resent people who underestimated him. He found such unperceptive people rather curious, but failing to make a proper assessment of him caused a person to fall in his estimation of them. When someone like Seward did finally "get" Lincoln, Lincoln was impressed by this ability to correct a flawed assessment. McClellan never "got" Lincoln and therefore Lincoln saw him as no more than a useful tool with fundamental limitations. Although Lincoln was perversely amused at how McClellan's huge ego and personal insecurities handicapped his judgment about almost everything. Interestingly, the three men had almost identical beliefs about how to preserve the union at the time Lincoln took office. But a year into the war Lincoln began to realize that his idealistic notions were unrealistic, while McClellan never deviated despite increasing evidence that his initial assessment was flawed - he was still using his initial belief when he ran for President in 1864.
To understand the elevation of Pope to command it is necessary to understand the relationship between Abraham Lincoln and George McClellan. Lincoln was a person who was often grossly underestimated, so much so that he encouraged such a perception and was secure enough in his identity that he did not resent people who underestimated him. He found such unperceptive people rather curious, but failing to make a proper assessment of him caused a person to fall in his estimation of them. When someone like Seward did finally "get" Lincoln, Lincoln was impressed by this ability to correct a flawed assessment. McClellan never "got" Lincoln and therefore Lincoln saw him as no more than a useful tool with fundamental limitations. Although Lincoln was perversely amused at how McClellan's huge ego and personal insecurities handicapped his judgment about almost everything. Interestingly, the three men had almost identical beliefs about how to preserve the union at the time Lincoln took office. But a year into the war Lincoln began to realize that his idealistic notions were unrealistic, while McClellan never deviated despite increasing evidence that his initial assessment was flawed - he was still using his initial belief when he ran for President in 1864.
It took some time for reality to disabuse Seward and Lincoln of the notion that with time a gentle response would see the states that had seceded voluntarily returning to the union. It took the southern states much longer to reach the conclusion that the north was committed long-term to forcefully nullifying their unilateral succession.
It took some time for reality to disabuse Seward and Lincoln of the notion that with time a gentle response would see the states that had seceded voluntarily returning to the union. It took the southern states much longer to reach the conclusion that the north was committed long-term to forcefully nullifying their unilateral succession.
Unlike McClellan, as the war proceeded Lincoln's understanding of what it would take to resolve it changed. On December 31, 1861 he summarized his conclusions in a letter to Buell: "I state my general idea of this war to be that we have greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility for concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail, unless we can find some way to making our advantage an over-match of his; and that this can be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points, at the same time; so that we can safely attack, one, or both, if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize, and hold the weakened one, gaining so much."
Unlike McClellan, as the war proceeded Lincoln's understanding of what it would take to resolve it changed. On December 31, 1861 he summarized his conclusions in a letter to Buell: "I state my general idea of this war to be that we have greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility for concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail, unless we can find some way to making our advantage an over-match of his; and that this can be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points, at the same time; so that we can safely attack, one, or both, if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize, and hold the weakened one, gaining so much."
And already Lincoln was looking for a general who would not only believe his "idea of this war", but would follow it, inexorably, to the end. Meanwhile it was becoming increasingly evident that, for all his gifts, for all his soldier's love of him, McClellan was not the man.
And already Lincoln was looking for a general who would not only believe his "idea of this war", but would follow it, inexorably, to the end. Meanwhile it was becoming increasingly evident that, for all his gifts, for all his soldier's love of him, McClellan was not the man.
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On August 1, 1862, nine days after Halleck's arrival in Washington from the west, Burnside was ordered to move from the Peninsula up to Fredericksburg. McClellan, too, was to be withdrawn as Halleck sought to unite the army in Northern Virginia.
On August 1, 1862, nine days after Halleck's arrival in Washington from the west, Burnside was ordered to move from the Peninsula up to Fredericksburg. McClellan, too, was to be withdrawn as Halleck sought to unite the army in Northern Virginia.
What was behind the decision to take the army from McClellan and give it to Pope?
What was behind the decision to take the army from McClellan and give it to Pope?
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