Karel van Oosterom

Welcome on my personal website.

Most information on my website is in Dutch.

On the occasion of the publishing in English of my book "With an Orange Tie, a year on the Security Council" I have added this page.

Via the order button in the banner you may order the English version of the book at Barnes and Noble (USA only) and Amazon (world wide); use order button in the orange banner at the home page.

Below you may find the photo's which are lacking (to keep the book affordable) in the English version of the book.

Please find this Spotify playlist to listen to the music mentioned in my book: https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fopen.spotify.com%2Fplaylist%2F77ANBqE2TL5uYXAKItwWKl%3Fsi%3D4Fy1DcfDRamZbCqrpNXeHQ&data=04%7C01%7C%7Cf5065910dc8c45c0307808d87dbf51ef%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C637397607943005771%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=alql2K%2FzeeNo7N5w0C73v%2Blp2SioYokrLOILtRIT1qU%3D&reserved=0

If you have any questions or comments, please email me at:

karelvanoosterom2020@gmail.com

I hope you enjoy my book.

Apologies that in the first edition of the English version some of the books contained a small print version of my book. That has been corrected in the current second edition.

If you have problems reading the first, please email me and we will discuss a solution.

if you scroll all the way down, you will find deleted parts of the book.

Karel J.G. van Oosterom

This is a chapter from “With an orange tie a year in the Security Council” that I deleted for the latest version when shortening the book.

"Weapons of influence"

A crucial aspect of any election campaign, including our Security Council campaign, is how to influence others. Part of that influence came through the capitals and at the political level. Part of it took place in New York in contact with fellow diplomats. For me, the book “Influence, the psychology of persuasion” by Robert Cialdini was an excellent basis. The first chapter of this book is entitled “Weapons of influence”. For a diplomat his book is an instrument because we diplomats do not use real weapons; we have ourselves, our behavior and our words to deliver results for our country. Cialdini recognizes seven influencing factors that are more and less relevant in our work. They were relevant, both in the campaign and during our membership.

Reciprocity

First, Cialdini mentions the principle of “reciprocity”. In any case, a key concept in diplomacy: the embassy of a country in your capital must treat a foreign diplomat correctly, otherwise diplomats of the country in question will also be treated badly. The Vienna Convention which regulates diplomatic and consular traffic is based on this. But it is also a policy that helps in interpersonal traffic. At its most basic level it is "I scratch your back, you scratch mine". Many presents are distributed in the campaigns in New York. Not too expensive as a rule, and often characteristic of the country in question. A notebook with the flag on it, a charger, chocolates. We added stroopwafels and tulips to this. Just ordinary presents are not sufficiently distinctive because the competition does too. During the campaign we have therefore consistently tried to give substance to being a real partner, as part of our slogan “The Kingdom of the Netherlands, Your Partner for Peace, Justice and Development”.

Two examples. To begin with, the Netherlands completely renovated the UN Delegates Lounge in 2012-2013, with input from Hella Jongerius and Rem Koolhaas. That is the place in the UN building where diplomats can talk informally between meetings, have a cup of coffee with each other, argue for candidacy. Unspoken: the Kingdom brings people together and promotes diplomacy.

And secondly, the booklet we made for missions to organize events at the UN. In total there were at least 17 entry points (catering, translation, technology, construction, water, etc.), which were easy for large missions but not traceable for smaller missions. With the book in hand, their job became much easier. Underlying message: the Kingdom provides a more level playing field.

All actions that matched our image as a Partner, but that also brought our diplomatic objectives (such as better cooperation within the UN, better functioning of the UN) closer. And gestures that unconsciously called on others to give us something back. The votes cast on election day cannot be directly related to this, but I am convinced that many colleagues “wanted to give something back”. This in addition to all the exchange of support that we had entered into in the years before.

We also continued this line during Membership. For example, we helped Equatorial Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire with resp. Maritime crime and with Peacekeeping; on the basis of "the cost comes before the benefit", this certainly helped us at later times in difficult moods.

Commitment and consistency

Cialdini mentions the second human motivation that we want to be consistent with what we have done before and with what we have promised. In the campaign it was therefore important to get a promise of support as early as possible. This often happens in a conversation between the Ministers. Then it is important to record this as concretely as possible at work level. Before that we had the next escalation level, where when one step is finished we escalated to the next step:

1. Verbal commitment to support at the political level

2. Verbal commitment to support at official / diplomatic level

3. Record of support in diplomatic note

4. Return note with confirmation of support commitment

5. Diplomatic pledge support in all electoral rounds

6. Diplomatic commitment also in case of a dilemma vote (there are two candidates left for one place and the country in question has promised to vote for both) to continue to vote for the Netherlands

7. Commitment to vote only for the Netherlands

These steps also provided an excellent reason to keep starting new conversations with colleagues.

The harder the commitment is, the less easily colleagues are willing to come back to it. At the same time, New York is a marketplace where we all use similar techniques. In the end, around 20% of colleagues did not vote for us, despite firm commitments. And Italy and Sweden had the same numbers. Unfortunately, we don't know who lied, because these are secret ballots.

In the same way, by keeping in close touch with each other and getting promises early on, we have also tried to influence votes in the Security Council, and with success.

In addition, there is another aspect in the concept of “consistency”, which is somewhat underexposed by Cialdini. Say what you do and do what you say. In that respect, the reputation of the Dutch is good. We are known for being open and honest, sometimes to the point. As a rule, there is no doubt about our reliability. So even the fact that we were at the forefront of LGBTI rights within the UN (yet extremely controversial for many countries) and did not give up during the campaign was appreciated by colleagues: we apparently held on to our most fundamental values.

"Social proof, truths are us"

The third Cialdini factor is dealing with others. The behavior of others has a major influence on what we do ourselves. Cialdini gives fine examples of this in his book. Translated to New York, this means that "support channels" are of great importance. It has much more impact if others than yourself say about the Netherlands that we do what we promise, are a real partner, stand for peace, justice and development, do not make empty promises. Certainly the other Benelux countries and friends such as Australia and Canada helped us with this (a favor that we also gave back sooner or later).

The sympathy factor

Cialdini also mentions the sympathy factor. When I arrived in New York in 2013 I was taken under the care of my colleague from New Zealand. It really showed me around, also as a tool in their campaign for a seat on the Security Council at the time. I followed his example and in this way I gained a lot of sympathy from new colleagues. A second example was the moment after a colleague in the UN made a statement. I know from my own experience that I could feel completely empty. We make many statements in large halls, without direct visual contact with anyone else; the stage is far away, colleagues can only be seen from behind. It is really nice when a colleague comes by and repeats something substantive from the statement and goes on it and says something nice about it. Again: only effective when I really meant it.

In Lebanon I got my third example. I came there during my placement in Damascus, 1992-1996, almost every week because the Embassy in Beirut was closed in the civil war. The first times I was there in 1992, I felt very flattered. All my conversation partners were very enthusiastic about the Netherlands and about me. And not with one sentence, but repeated up to six seven times. That affected me during the first weeks. Until I realized after a longer stay and after many conversations, also with others, that this is part of the Lebanese culture. Flattery and ironing are part of the social discourse. In New York, that experience helped me to mentally arm myself against it, but also to be more positive towards others than I was used to in the Calvinist culture (“just do it, you're crazy enough”) in which I grew up. In a warm personal relationship, the "gun factor" is higher than if it does not exist; and it improves communication and reduces misunderstandings. At the same time, there is a direct relationship between nice behavior and whether the other person experiences it as genuine.

A fourth example were the National Days and other social events, of which there are a number of each working day at the UN, at noon or in the evening. With 193 countries that often organize something twice a year, as well as many social organizations, there are many of these. If there was only one event, I stayed a little longer to hear and share the latest information, and also to address specific colleagues who I needed what. But if there were multiple receptions, I tried to finish them all. After all, I also liked that colleagues came on our King's Day; it is a form of respect. In addition, I set my personal record at six receptions in one hour, but with some clever maneuvering, many knew I had been there and it was not noticed that I had to leave quickly. For example, I scored bonus points in the relationships, also because I always paid attention to the National Day in question via twitter.

Authority

Another difficult concept to handle is the theme "authority", the next of Cialdini's dimensions. He mainly talks about external characteristics, such as the white coat of the doctor, the title, the external characteristics of power and authority, such as expensive cars and so on. I am convinced that authority at the UN is mainly based on the quality of input and further activities. That is why it is so beautiful to represent the Kingdom of the Netherlands. When we say that emergency aid is needed for Yemen, we have a cabinet that does indeed transfer money to the UN emergency aid organization. We lead informal groups such as “Responsibility to Protect” and the lobby group for LGBTI rights; we stand up for vulnerable groups such as Christians and LGBTI; we are a great partner in development cooperation; our Constitution states that the government must promote the international legal order. When we in the UN stated that something was contrary to international law, we always listened carefully. That is influence based on authority.

Incidentally, the authority of Dutch diplomacy has not been high throughout the centuries. Varé writes in “The Laughing Diplomat” on page 501: “I am reading the diary of Christian IV of Denmark. On June 16, 1603, he wrote: "A trained elephant has arrived here. He can dance, fight and kneel. Two Dutch envoys have also arrived. They are not capable of anything. "

We have also made active use of the political authority that our ministers have in both the campaign and in the Security Council. The speech to the General Assembly of the King in 2014 and his presence had an enormous impact, although he did not campaign himself. Once in the Council, we once again had the advantage that our cabinet was really committed. Prime Minister Rutte, Ministers Blok and Kaag addressed the Security Council. Moreover, we also had the Ministers-Presidents from Aruba, Curaçao and St Maarten who addressed the Council. For example, when Prime Minister Romeo-Marlin spoke about Haiti in the Security Council session, she took authority from her opening statement that 10% of the population of St Maarten is from Haiti.

Furthermore, foreign policy is “a battle of ideas”. In close collaboration with The Hague and the missions, our statements were invariably pertinent, topical and relevant. As a rule, we pressed the right points. With good initiatives, clearly substantiated and with attention to the interests of others, we conquered a position of influence that was greater than normal for a country of our size. Authority does not come naturally, it requires investments; and that authority has also given us much influence.

Furthermore, we built up authority in the Security Council through detailed and operational knowledge of all procedures. As a partner, we have also been able to help smaller countries with this.

Scarcity

One of the more difficult concepts of Cialdini to operationalize in the campaign was “scarcity”. After all, there were three candidates for two places: scarcity was not with us ... What we have tried in that light is to define another aspect as scarce: attention. Every member state needs a friend in the Security Council. When MH17 was shot down and Minister Timmermans asked me directly to convene a special session of the Security Council the next day, with a minute of silence and room for me to speak on behalf of the government, I had to call someone. Fortunately, Rwanda was President at the time, with whose Permrep I had previously worked well. Based on that personal relationship, I was able to accomplish what my Minister wanted me to do.

So I promised colleagues from countries that had a major interest in the Security Council (either because the situation in their country was on the agenda or because a country situation directly concerned them) that I would be available if they were to be in an emergency. . I was very clear: I promised to be available and to listen to them, but immediately made it clear that the Netherlands itself is about its position. This promise was much appreciated: in New York there are many complaints that the moment a country enters the Council, the oyster closes. There is simply so much work, and so many internal SC meetings, that the other countries are forgotten. So my promise was appreciated. And so in 2018 I had many phone calls and visits from colleagues when something complicated was going on in the Council. Furthermore, I held an almost monthly work session for colleagues throughout the year to give substance to my pledge to remain connected with the “ordinary” member states in the Security Council as well. All employees were also available for information.

The great thing about Cialdini’s book is that he also immediately indicates how you can arm yourself against these kinds of influencing tactics for each aspect of influence.

Additions

There were also a few aspects that I missed in Cialdini's book. To begin with, authenticity. Others poke through behavior if it's not sincere or a trick. I have a colleague who starts every conversation with a compliment about the language, the appearance, the brilliant qualities of the other. At a certain point that becomes hollow and empty. Authenticity is close to what I call "reliability". The impact of social media is also lacking. Cialdini’s book is from 1984. But the influence we have had through Twitter and Facebook (and through the help we have given as a partner to a dozen missions in that area) cannot be underestimated.

How well we did in the campaign, the reader might think based on the above. Unfortunately, we came second in the first round of voting and ended up getting a #SplitTerm with Italy. So take the above with a large grain of salt. But the fact that we had real influence in the Security Council can also be seen against the background of this chapter.