Aristotle's Metaphysics: An Analysis of the Language of Metaphysics

The focus of this essay will be how Aristotle defines what metaphysics is. Central to Aristotle’s understanding of metaphysics is the study of being qua being and the properties belonging to being qua being. To gain a thorough understanding of being qua being, I will be looking at Aristotle’s conception of substance, other sciences which have attempted to gain an understanding of being qua being, and the science of first principles and causes. A problem which arises from Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics is the use of predicates in evaluating the role of substance as the foundation of reality. In doing this, Aristotle relies on language to form a system for understanding being qua being. However, language is inherently limited. Our perception of reality and how we come to define being may reflect our language, rather than provide a definitive portrayal of existence.

The Greek word katēgoriai translates to ‘categories;’ it is derived from the verb meaning ‘to predicate.’ Aristotle’s work, Categories, may be used or viewed as the pretext to Metaphysics, which gives an account of predicates, the application of language to things in the world. Ousia translates to ‘substance; it is defined as that which is primary and neither said of any subject or in any subject, and it is fundamental to Aristotle’s concept of reality.

For Aristotle, the structure of, or judgments produced by, language form a common relationship between beings. Aristotle’s Categories attempts to provide an account of predicates which is used to evaluate the role of substance as the foundation of reality. However, language is devised of assigning context to words to communicate meaning. Is language, then, an objective measurement when making observations about our world and forming an understanding of reality? Our perception of reality and how we come to define being may reflect our language, rather than provide a definitive portrayal of existence.

In this essay I will be discussing the “first philosophy,” which Aristotle considers to be metaphysics. In defining what metaphysics is, I will be evaluating the study of being qua being, and the properties belonging to being qua being. To gain a thorough understanding of being qua being, I will be looking at Aristotle’s conception of substance, other sciences which have attempted to gain an understanding of being qua being, and the science of first principles and causes.

The science of metaphysics gets a theoretical grasp on being qua being, the common attributes all beings have or what constitutes a being as a being. The study of being qua being refers to a study of a thing insofar as it is something, studying all “A’s” insofar as they are “B’s”: for example, the study of medieval manuscripts insofar as they are works of art rather than from a historical perspective as a portrayal of the time period. Therefore, the study of being qua being is the study of beings insofar as they are beings.

Being is said unconditionally of things in multiple ways, including those of which occur coincidentally.

There can be no theoretical knowledge for things of a coincidental sort for we cannot get a theoretical grasp on the consequences of practical, productive, or theoretical knowledge. For example, someone who produces a house does not also produce all the things which coincide with its coming into being. What may follow from this house being constructed is unknown and limitless. The consequences of producing this house are dependent on individual preferences: it may be a nuisance to some and beneficial to others.

That which is coincidental arises from what is neither always or for the most part. Some beings are always the way they are from necessity, meaning “it does not admit to being otherwise,” and some beings are the way they are for the most part. If a human is pale, it is a coincident, it is neither always nor for the most part, but a human is an animal necessarily. This, Aristotle explains, is the starting point and the cause of that which is coincidenta l(Metaphysics, 6.2, 1026b, 5-35). The coincidence belonging to being qua being are unity, plurality and conformity with the principle of non-contradiction. The science which gets a theoretical grasp on the coincidence belonging to being qua being is metaphysics.

Things are said to be in multiple ways, but all share a single essence. There are multiple sub-kinds of being to get a theoretical grasp on the what-it-is belongs to a single science; this same science gets a theoretical grasp on substance and its attributes. A thing may be said to be in many ways while referencing a single starting point. This is because things are said to be because they are substances, a feature of substances, a route to substances, or generative of substance (Metaphysics, 4.2, 1003b-10). A substance is that which is primary, it is “neither said of any subject, nor is it in any subject.” Examples of a substance are an individual man or an individual horse (Categories, 5, 10-15).

Aristotle explains that a science is that which is primary and other things are based on. If something which things are based on is substance, it is of substance we will gain knowledge of starting-points and causes. All things are said of primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. For example, animal is predicated of man and man predicated of individual man. There would not be anything if there was no primary substance, “primary substances are subjects for all other things, and all other things are predicated of them or are in them” (Categories, 5, 2b, 15-20). Secondary substances are the species which substances fall under. The individual man falls under the species, man, and the genus, animal.

Something is said to be in multiple ways, as previously discussed, primary among these is the what-it-is. For the what-it-is signifies the substance. When distinguishing whether something is intrinsically a being or capable of being separated from substance, things are beings of a higher degree when there is a definite underlying subject of them. Substance is primary in account, in knowledge, and in time. Substance is primary because if we know what a thing is, it follows that we know its qualities and quantities. Therefore, to ask ‘what is being?’ is to ask, ‘what is substance?’

Among things that are, some are said of a subject without being in any subject, such as “man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject.” Some are in a subject but not said of any subject, what cannot exist separately from what it is in. Aristotle provides an example using grammar; grammar is in a subject, the soul, but it is not said of any subject. Some are said of a subject and in a subject. Again, Aristotle gives an example using grammar, knowledge is in a subject the soul, and said of a subject, grammar. Some are neither in a subject or said of a subject, things which are individual. A substance, the individual man or the individual horse, is an independently existing entity. Substance, as previously established, is that which is primary, it is neither said of any subject or in any subject.

Aristotle aims to investigate being qua being from a universal standpoint, unlike sciences such as the natural sciences and mathematics, which he argues mark of and study an aspect of being. The primary science is a theoretical science, such as the natural sciences and mathematics; however, it is concerned with things that are eternal, immovable, and separable. Other sciences fail to get a theoretical grasp on being qua being because their focus is on immovable or inseparable things.

Sciences, such as the natural sciences and mathematics, study a certain being or genus rather than being unconditionally. They do not account for what-it-is, rather they start from it, demonstrating what belongs intrinsically to the genus they are studying. In this way there is no demonstration of substance or of the what-it-is. The primary science is concerned with things that are separable and immovable.

Metaphysics gets a theoretical grasp on ‘axioms’ and on substance. These axioms hold for all beings, not for a specific genus. Aristotle asserts, that therefore those who study only part of being, the geometer, the arithmetician and natural scientist, do not discuss the validity of things qua being. Aristotle here concludes, “it belongs to the person who knows being qua being to get a theoretical grasp on them" (Metaphysics, 4.3, 1005a, 20-30). Natural scientists both investigate nature as a whole and being, however nature is one kind of being. It remains in the power of the philosopher alone to get a theoretical grasp on the nature of all substances and investigate the starting points of deduction (Metaphysics, 4.5, 1005b, 5).

Natural science is concerned with a being as it is capable of being moved. The natural sciences do not focus on whether a genus exist and what-it-is. It is concerned with “the sort of substance in which the starting-point of movement…” (Metaphysics, 6.1, 1025b2, 5-20). The focus of natural science is on inseparable but not immovable things. Some areas of mathematics get a theoretical grasp on objects insofar as they are immovable and separable. Mathematical sciences, such as geometry and astronomy, concern themselves on a specific aspect of nature, while universal mathematics is common to all. Therefore, the science which has the capacity to study that which is eternal, immovable and separable is a theoretical science, such as natural science and mathematics, but is prior to both.

Aristotle gives four areas of study which define metaphysics, one is the science of first principles and causes. Humans desire to know is described, by Aristotle, as our affinity for perceptual capacities. Specifically, our ability of sight is most valued for itself, because it allows us to “know most fully and make clear many differences" (Metaphysics, 1.1, 980a21). Metaphysics differentiates humans from other animals in our ability to peruse theoretical knowledge. All animals possess perception, additionally, some possess memory; these animals are more practically-wise and capable of being taught. Animals, excluding humans, live by appearances and memories alone, while humans live from craft knowledge and rational calculations. Craft knowledge arises through a universal supposition about similar things using experience. Some crafts were discovered in their relation to necessity, others for leisure and those which are neither for pleasure or necessity.

Aristotle characterizes the distinctions between different kinds of knowledge. Demonstrating “everyone takes what is called ‘wisdom’ to be concerned with the primary causes and the starting-points,” as the craftsman is considered wise for knowing causes (Metaphysics, 1.1, 981b, 25-30). Establishing that theoretical wisdom is scientific knowledge of starting-points and causes. Laying the framework for the causes and starting-points which are the concern of the science that is theoretical wisdom.

An investigation into the sort of causes and sorts of starting points is required in studying the science that is theoretical wisdom (Metaphysics, 1.2, 982a, 5). Things said to be causes in four ways, formal, material, efficient, and final causes. The formal being the substance, or essence, since the thing to which the ‘why’ leads us is the account and “the why that is primary is the cause and starting-point.” The material being matter or underlying subject. The efficient being that from which movement derives. The fourth cause is the for-the-sake-of-which and the good, this is the end of all coming to be and movement (Metaphysics, 1.3, 983a, 25-30).

Aristotle references previous philosophers’ concepts of starting point, stating those who first philosophized believed the starting point of all things to be material. However, even if all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be occurred from a single thing, it still begs the question ‘why does this happen and what is its cause?’ Since the primary science study that which is eternal, the underlying subject itself does not change. Aristotle gives the example of wood and bronze, neither is the cause of either of them changing, “nor does the wood make a bed or the bronze a statue, but something else is the cause of the change, and to look for this is to look for another starting point.” This would be called the starting point from which the movement derives (Metaphysics, 1.3, 984a, 15-25).

The arbitrary nature of language inflicts a bias onto Aristotle’s theory of being qua being and metaphysics. Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics relies on predicates to evaluate the role of substance as the foundation of reality. In doing this, Aristotle relies on language to form a system for understanding being qua being. However, language is inherently limited and may constrain our understanding of existence.

References

Cohen, S. Marc, Patricia Curd, and C.D.C Reeve, eds. Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy. 5th ed. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2016.