Second letter to Chiang Kai-Shek, November 1931

Japanese Aggression

Growing Presence in Manchuria: Japan had long been expanding its influence in northeastern China (Manchuria), a region rich in resources and strategically important.The Kwantung Army, Japan’s military presence in Manchuria, frequently clashed with Chinese forces

Mukden Incident and Invasion: On September 18, 1931, Japanese forces staged the Mukden Incident, using it as a pretext to launch a full-scale invasion of Manchuria.By November 1931, Japan had seized control of much of Manchuria, setting the stage for the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932.

Weak Response from China: The Nationalist government’s policy of “non-resistance” toward Japan, influenced by its preoccupation with internal conflicts, sparked outrage among the Chinese population and the overseas Chinese community.This perceived passivity eroded public trust in the government and intensified calls for stronger national defense.

International Context

League of Nations and Diplomacy: After the Mukden Incident, China appealed to the League of Nations for intervention, leading to international condemnation of Japan’s actions.However, the League’s response was limited to diplomatic protests, failing to prevent Japan’s aggression.

Western Powers’ Influence:The Western powers maintained their concessions and spheres of influence in China, complicating Chinese efforts to assert sovereignty.The global focus on economic recovery from the Great Depression left China largely isolated in its struggle against Japanese expansionism.

Rising Nationalism

Public Discontent and Nationalist Movements:The Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the government’s ineffective response fueled nationalist sentiments among the Chinese people.Intellectuals, students, and urban elites increasingly advocated for stronger resistance against Japan and reforms to strengthen the nation.

Boycott Movements: Anti-Japanese sentiment led to widespread boycotts of Japanese goods, organized by civic groups and student organizations, as a grassroots form of resistance.

介公主席： 

首都會見，未獲長談，即夕放洋，遄歸新陸。而國難作矣，東三省一朝全失，南北一致主戰而卒不能戰。僑情憤慨，詆為怯敵。不侫一介書生，在野又在外，真所謂不謀其政者。獨念匹夫有責，既發書警告日本政府與國民。複向歐美輿論界暨各公團講說宣傳，俾明真相如何。又念主席身秉國鈞當此存亡一髮，不忍緘默無言，自幹懷寶迷邦之誚。夫對日根本計畫，固非寸墨尺楮所能盡。至於當下治標之策，則以為兩言可定之：一曰絕交而不宣戰，一曰死守而不進攻，如是而已。 

日寇挑釁，固當奮鬥，然而門戶洞開，軍需竭獗，一旦自我宣戰，彼必長驅直入，不但沿海諸省盡去，即南北兩都亦不保旦夕。遷避河洛，退守關隴，則偏安成矣，末路近矣。但國聯制裁既不足恃，直接交涉尤不忍言，則第一步自當毅然決然，宣布斷絕邦交。一、通告日本及各國，表示國際道德，抵抗決心，但聲明尊重國聯公意及非戰條約，絕對不先宣戰。二、撤回駐日公使、領事。三、委託友邦公使、領事，代我保護在日僑民。四、護送日本公使、領事出境。五、勸告日本僑民出境，其願留者，則保護監視之。六、調查日本在華商業財產，登記保管。七、停止對日一切公私交通。八、政府監督人民，貫徹經濟杯葛政策。對內對外，不激不隨，一時應付，莫便於此。 但不宣戰，非不備戰也。東三省既誤於不抵抗主義，如燕雲十六州，無橫磨十萬劍，不能取回之，此後惟有集中軍力於山海關及東南沿海，為永久相持之計耳。一面試行徵兵制，並令全國青年，平素練習兵操，輪流服務兵役。一面專力養成飛機人才，趕緊製造並購办軍用飛機，比之海、陸，是有四利：一收效速，二成本輕，三調遣易，四功用大。往者不可諫，來者猶可追，即海、陸軍之整頓，亦刻不容緩，所謂七年之病求三年之艾也。今日不必高談進攻，恢復滿蒙，但當先謀保全本部疆域，堅守效死勿去之義，尺寸之地，誓不再拱手讓人。如此以逸待勞，以退為進，天下事尚可為也。（下略)

To the Chairman: 

When we met in the capital, we did not have the opportunity for a long conversation. That same evening, I set sail and quickly returned to a new land. Yet, a national crisis has erupted. The entire three provinces in the northeast have fallen overnight. Although the north and south were united in calling for war, in the end, no war was fought. The overseas Chinese community is indignant, condemning it as cowardice in the face of the enemy.

I am but a mere scholar, unaffiliated with government and living abroad. I am, as they say, someone without a voice in matters of governance. However, I still believe that every citizen has a duty. I have already sent warnings to the Japanese government and people, and I have spoken to public opinion in Europe and America and various organizations to clarify the true situation. Yet, I cannot help but think of you, Mr. Chairman, who holds the reins of the nation in this critical moment. In this life-or-death situation, I cannot remain silent, lest I be criticized as someone who possesses talent but fails his country.

As for a fundamental plan in dealing with Japan, it is not something that can be fully elaborated in a few words. However, regarding immediate remedies, I believe they can be summarized in two points: first, sever diplomatic relations without declaring war; second, defend resolutely without launching an attack. That is all.

The Japanese provocation must be met with resistance. However, with our doors wide open and military resources stretched thin, if we were to declare war unilaterally, Japan would surely advance without restraint. Not only would the coastal provinces be lost, but even the northern and southern capitals would be in peril. Retreating to the Yellow River or further west to the mountains would mean settling for a fragmented territory, bringing the nation to its end.

Since the sanctions of the League of Nations cannot be relied upon, and direct negotiations are even less bearable, the first step must be decisive: to announce the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan. Specifically:

1. Notify Japan and all nations, demonstrating our commitment to international morality and our determination to resist. However, make it clear that we respect the League of Nations’ principles and non-aggression pacts and will not declare war first.

2. Recall our ambassadors and consuls from Japan.

3. Entrust friendly nations’ ambassadors and consuls to protect our nationals in Japan.

4. Escort Japanese ambassadors and consuls out of the country.

5. Advise Japanese nationals to leave China; for those who choose to stay, ensure their protection but place them under surveillance.

6. Investigate Japanese commercial assets in China, register and safeguard them.

7. Suspend all public and private exchanges with Japan.

8. The government should oversee and enforce an economic boycott policy.

Internally and externally, without excessive provocation or passivity, this approach is the most appropriate temporary measure.

Not declaring war does not mean not preparing for war. The loss of the three northeastern provinces due to the policy of non-resistance is akin to the loss of the Sixteen Prefectures of Yanyun. Without sharpening ten thousand swords, they cannot be reclaimed. Henceforth, we can only concentrate our military strength at Shanhaiguan and the southeastern coastal regions for a long-term standoff.

At the same time, conscription should be implemented, requiring the nation’s youth to regularly practice military drills and serve in rotations. Additionally, efforts must focus on cultivating aviation talent and expediting the production and acquisition of military aircraft. Compared to naval and ground forces, aviation has four advantages: rapid results, lower costs, easier deployment, and higher utility.

 The past cannot be undone, but the future can still be pursued. The reorganization of the navy and army brooks no delay—it is, as the saying goes, “seeking a cure for a seven-year illness within three years.”

Today, it is unnecessary to speak grandly of offensives or the recovery of Manchuria and Mongolia. Instead, we must first focus on preserving the core territories of the homeland and firmly uphold the principle of defending to the death without retreat. Not an inch of land should again be handed over willingly.

In doing so, we can prepare at leisure for the challenges ahead, advancing through strategic retreat. With such an approach, there is still hope that the affairs of the nation can be salvaged.

 匹夫有责 (Pǐ fū yǒu zé)

Literal meaning: “An ordinary man has a responsibility.”

Contextual meaning: the rise and fall of the country is the responsibility of the people of the whole country.

Reference: first mentioned in Gu Yanwu's "Rizhilu." Volume 17. "Zhengshi": "To protect the world, how can a humble man be held responsible?" 

 治标之策 / 治本之策 (Zhì biāo zhī cè / Zhì běn zhī cè)

Literal meaning: “Remedial measures” / “Fundamental measures.”

Contextual meaning: These paired terms are central to traditional Chinese governance discourse. They distinguish between temporary fixes that address symptoms (治标) and systemic reforms that address root causes (治本).

效死勿去 (Xiào sǐ wù qù)

Literal meaning: “Defend to the death and do not retreat.”

Contextual meaning: This phrase is both a moral appeal and a military principle, emphasizing unwavering commitment.

 七年之病求三年之艾 (Qī nián zhī bìng qiú sān nián zhī ài)

Literal meaning: “A seven-year illness cured with three years of treatment.”

Contextual meaning: A metaphor suggesting that resolving deeply ingrained problems requires time and effort, often used to critique procrastination or negligence in governance.

Reference: The seven-year disease refers to a serious and difficult-to-treat disease; the Ambrosia artemisiifolia was used to cure this disease however it took three years to dry for it to become potent. This saying is a metaphor entailing the importance of preparations during ordinary times. When things happen, it will be too late to think of solutions. 

拱手让人 (Gǒng shǒu ràng rén)

Literal meaning: “To hand over to others with folded hands.”

Contextual meaning: A metaphore for surrendering without resistance, often with a connotation of shame or dishonor.

以逸待劳 / 以退为进 (Yǐ yì dài láo / Yǐ tuì wéi jìn)

Literal meaning: “Use ease to wait for the weary” / “Retreat to advance.”

Contextual meaning: These are classic strategic principles in Chinese thought, rooted in Sun Tzu’s Art of War. They advocate for conserving resources and using tactical retreats to gain an advantage.

 燕云十六州 (Yānyún Shíliù Zhōu)

Literal meaning: “The Sixteen Prefectures of Yanyun.”

Historical context: Refers to a historically significant region ceded by the Later Jin dynasty to the Khitans during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, often symbolizing territorial loss and humiliation.

Critique of Current Governance

Failure to Act: The letter underscores the failure to effectively respond to Japanese aggression, blaming both internal disorganization and a lack of preparation. It also alludes to public dissatisfaction, particularly from overseas Chinese communities, who view the government’s actions as cowardice.

National Responsibility: The author emphasizes a shared responsibility among all citizens and leaders, while subtly criticizing the leadership’s inability to unite the country and effectively safeguard its sovereignty.

Strategic Proposals

A. Immediate Measures (“治标之策”)

Sever Diplomatic Ties Without Declaring War: The letter suggests breaking relations with Japan as a moral and political stance without immediately escalating to war. 

Concrete Steps: Detailed actions include recalling diplomats, investigating Japanese commercial interests in China, and implementing an economic boycott. These measures serve both practical and symbolic purposes, signaling China’s resolve while avoiding direct military confrontation.

Economic Boycott: The emphasis on government-led economic resistance reflects the understanding that non-military strategies can also weaken Japan’s position in China.

B. Long-Term Strategies (“治本之策”)

Focus on Defense Over Offense: Recognizing the limitations of China’s military, the letter advocates for a defensive strategy focused on preserving the core territories (e.g., Shanhaiguan and the southeastern coastal regions). This pragmatic approach contrasts with the unrealistic calls for immediate military offensives to recover lost territories.

Military Reorganization and Modernization:Implementation of conscription and youth military training to prepare for long-term resistance. Emphasis on developing aviation capabilities, which are described as cost-effective, versatile, and strategically advantageous compared to naval or ground forces.

Moral and Philosophical Appeals

A Call to Responsibility: Jiang Kang Hu invokes the principle that “every citizen bears responsibility for the nation’s rise and fall,” tying their personal actions to the broader national crisis.

Critique of Complacency: The letter criticizes silence and inaction, especially among those in power, positioning the author as a voice of moral clarity and duty.

Strategic Retreat as a Virtue: Rather than viewing retreat as weakness, Jiang Kang Hu frames it as a tactical necessity, emphasizing the importance of preparing “at leisure” for the next phase of the conflict.

 Rhetorical Strengths

Balanced Tone: While critical, the letter avoids direct personal attacks, maintaining a tone of respectful urgency. This makes it more likely to be taken seriously by the intended recipient.

Concrete Suggestions: The author combines abstract principles with specific, actionable steps, demonstrating both philosophical depth and practical insight.

Historical Awareness: References to historical failures (e.g., the loss of the Yanyun Sixteen Prefectures) provide a sense of continuity and lessons from the past, reinforcing the need for immediate action to avoid repeating mistakes.