Recent studies suggest that animals are capable of rudimentary forms of moral behavior. God isn't the source of morality, evolutionists say; Mother Nature is. The evolutionary answer, though, does not explain morality; it denies it.
Monkey Morality
Recent studies have attempted to show that animals exhibit rudimentary moral behavior. In one case, a group of chimpanzees "punished" one "selfish" member of their band by withholding food from it. Apparently, the moral rule was this: Chimps shouldn't be selfish.
Conduct, Motive, and Intent
There are some problems with this assessment. First of all, drawing conclusions about animal morality simply from external behavior reduces morality to conduct. Why should we accept that morality is exhaustively described by behavior? True morality entails non-behavioral elements, too, like intent and motive.
One can't infer actual moral obligations from the mere fact of a chimp's conduct. One might talk descriptively about a chimp's behavior, but no conclusion about morality follows from this. One can observe that chimps in community share food, and when they do they survive better. But you can't conclude from this that Bongo, the chimp, ought to share his bananas, and if he doesn't, then he's immoral because he hasn't contributed to the survival of his community. An eagle does not steal food from another eagle – it takes it.
Further, in fixing blame, we distinguish between an act done by accident and the very same act done on purpose. The behavior is the same, but the intent is different. We don't usually blame people for accidents: The boy didn't intend to trip the old lady.
We also give attention to the issue of motive. We withhold blame even if the youngster tripped the old lady on purpose if the motive is acceptable: He tripped her to keep her from running in front of a train.
Motive and intent cannot be determined simply by looking at behavior. In fact, some "good" behavior--giving to the poor, for example--might turn out to be tainted if the motive and intent are wrong: being thought well of with no concern for the recipient. Indeed, it seems one can be immoral without any behavior at all, e.g. plotting an evil deed that one never has the opportunity to carry out.
Morality informs behavior, judging it either good or bad, but it's not identical to behavior. Morality is something deeper than habitual patterns of physical interaction. Therefore, one can't draw conclusions about animal morality simply based on what he observes in their conduct.
Morality: Explained or Denied?
This leads us to the second problem, which runs much deeper. When morality is reduced to patterns of behavior chosen by natural selection for its survival value, then morality is not explained; it's denied.
The conscience doesn't make us feel bad the way hunger feels bad, or good the way sex feels good. It makes us feel as if we have done something that's wrong or something that's right. Guilty or not guilty. It is amazing that a process as amoral and crassly pragmatic as natural selection could design a mental organ that makes us feel as if we're in touch with higher truth. Truly a shameless ploy.
Evolutionists are ultimately forced to admit that what we think is a "higher truth" of morality turns out to be a "shameless ploy" of nature, a description of animal behavior conditioned by the environment for survival. We've given that conduct a label, they argue. We call it morality. But there is no real right and wrong.
Does Bongo, the chimp, actually exhibit genuine moral behavior? Does he understand the difference between right and wrong? Does he make principled choices to do what's right? Is he worthy of blame and punishment for doing wrong? Of course not. Bongo merely does in a primitive way what humans do in a more sophisticated way. We respond according to our genetic conditioning, a program "designed" by millions of years of evolution – say the evolutionists
The evolutionary approach is not an explanation of morality; it's a denial of morality. It explains why we think moral truths exist when, in fact, they don't.
Why Be a Good Boy Tomorrow?
This observation uncovers the most serious objection to the idea that evolution is adequate to explain morality. There is one question that can never be answered by any evolutionary assessment of ethics. The question is this: Why ought I be moral tomorrow?
One of the distinctives of morality is its "oughtness," its moral incumbency. Assessments of mere behavior, however, are descriptive only. Since morality is essentially prescriptive--telling what should be the case, as opposed to what is the case--and since all evolutionary assessments of moral behavior are descriptive, then evolution cannot account for the most important thing that needs to be explained: morality's "oughtness."
The question that really needs to be answered is: "Why shouldn't the chimp (or a human, for that matter) be selfish?" The evolutionary answer might be that when we're selfish, we hurt the group. That answer, though, presumes another moral value: We ought to be concerned about the welfare of the group. Why should that concern us? Answer: If the group doesn't survive, then the species doesn't survive. But why should I care about the survival of the species?
Here's the problem. All of these responses meant to explain morality ultimately depend on some prior moral notion to hold them together. It's going to be hard to explain, on an evolutionary view of things why I should not be selfish, or steal, or rape, or even kill tomorrow without smuggling morality into the answer.
The evolutionary explanation disembowels morality, reducing it to mere descriptions of conduct. The best the Darwinist explanation can do--if it succeeds at all--is explain past behavior. It cannot inform future behavior. The essence of morality, though, is not description, but prescription.
Evolution may be an explanation for the existence of conduct we choose to call moral, but it gives no explanation why I should obey any moral rules in the future. If one countered that we have a moral obligation to evolve, then the game would be up, because if we have moral obligations prior to evolution, then evolution itself can't be their source.
Evolutionists are Wrong about Ethics
Darwinists opt for an evolutionary explanation for morality without sufficient justification. In order to make their naturalistic explanation work, "morality" must reside in the genes. "Good," beneficial tendencies can then be chosen by natural selection. Nature, through the mechanics of genetic chemistry, cultivates behaviors we call morality.
This creates two problems. First, evolution doesn't explain what it's meant to explain. It can only account for preprogrammed behavior, which doesn't qualify as morality. Moral choices, by their nature, are made by free agents, not dictated by internal mechanics.
Secondly, the Darwinist explanation reduces morality to mere descriptions of behavior. The morality that evolution needs to account for, however, entails much more than conduct. Minimally, it involves motive and intent as well. Both are non-physical elements which can't, even in principle, evolve in a Darwinian sense.
Further, this assessment of morality, being descriptive only, ignores the most fundamental moral question of all: Why should I be moral tomorrow? Evolution cannot answer that question. It can only attempt to describe why humans acted in a certain way in the past. Morality dictates what future behavior ought to be.
Evolution does not explain morality. Bongo is not a bad chimp, he's just a chimp. No moral rules apply to him. Eat the banana, Bongo.