Publications & Manuscripts

eWorking Papers 

1. On Approximately Strategy-Proof Tournament Rules for Collusions of Size Three or More. David Mikšaník, Ariel Schvartzman, Jan Soukup. In submission. Accepted for a poster session in the 9th International Workshop for Computational Social Choice. 

2. Toward Fair and Strategy-Proof Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities. David Pennock, Ariel Schvartzman, Eric Xue. Accepted for an oral presentation in the 9th International Workshop for Computational Social Choice. 

Conference Publications

1. Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms are Not Much Better Than Bundling. Sepehr Assadi, Vikram Kher, George Li, Ariel Schvartzman. Accepted for publication to the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2023).

2. On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms: A Converse of a Theorem of Hart and Nisan. C. Alex Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg. In the proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2022). 

3. Optimal Mechanism Design for a Single-Minded Agent. Nikhil Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg. In the proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2020). My slides (for an earlier version) as presented in China Theory Week 2018. 

4. Approximately Optimal Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulation Sets and Cover Consistence. Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo. In the proceedings of the 11th Innovations of Theoretical Computer Science conference (ITCS 2020).

5. Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg. In the proceedings of the 60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2019). My slides for a talk at Harvard's Econ+CS group. 

6. Beyond Worst-Case Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg. In the proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2019). My slides.

7. The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design. Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg. In the proceedings of the 18th Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2018).

8. Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules. Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg. In the proceedings of the 8th Innovations of Theoretical Computer Science conference (ITCS 2017). My slides. Video of the talk.  

9. Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all. Mark Braverman, Sumegha Garg, Ariel Schvartzman. In the proceedings of the 8th Innovations of Theoretical Computer Science conference (ITCS 2017, invited talk).

10. The Fewest Clues Problem. Erik D. Demaine, Fermi Ma, Erik Waingarten, Ariel Schvartzman, and Scott Aaronson. In the proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Fun with Algorithms (FUN 2016).  

Journal Papers

1. The Fewest Clues Problem. Erik D. Demaine, Fermi Ma, Erik Waingarten, Ariel Schvartzman, and Scott Aaronson. Theoretical Computer Science, Volume 748: 28-39. 2018.

Manuscripts

1. Cutoff for the Star Transposition Random Walk. Jonathan Novak, Ariel Schvartzman. Manuscript. UROP Project for the Spring of 2014.