A dilemma for dispositional answers to Kripkenstein's challenge.

I argue that keeping in mind what is the real nature of Kripkenstein's rule-following challenge can help us see that it cannot be met by appealing to the speakers' dispositions. The published version is open access on Minds and Machines' website (erratum here).

Yet another victim of Kripkenstein's monster: dispositions, meaning, and privilege.

I discuss a neglected argument against semantic dispositionalism that revolves around the idea that dispositionalists have no way to justify their privileging certain dispositions over all the others. The published version is open access on Ergo's website.

Meaning relativism and subjective idealism.

I show that, even though it entails a form of global relativism, Kripkenstein's relativism about semantic discourse does not lead to subjective idealism. A postprint, and the published version on Synthese's website.

Yet another skeptical solution.

I put forward a skeptical solution to Kripkenstein's paradox, arguing that communication does not require meaning. A postprint, and the published version.

Constructivism, intersubjectivity, provability, and triviality.

I show that Street’s claim that her Darwinian dilemma is sound relative to every possible normative point of view is inconsistent with her own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of this incompatibility. A postprint, and the published version (erratum here).

Semantic dispositionalism and non-inferential knowledge.

I argue that the real point of Kripke's normativity argument against semantic dispositionalism is that dispositionalists cannot make sense of non-inferential knowledge of what we intend by the words we utter. A postprint, and the published version.

Rule-following, ideal conditions and finkish dispositions.

I explain how some outcomes of the debate about the metaphysics of dispositions can be used to build an argument against certain varieties of dispositional analyses of meaning/intending. A postprint, and the published version on Philosophical Studies' website.

Kripke's account of the rule-following considerations.

I argue that Kripkenstein's paradox rests on a foundationalist assumption we should reject. A postprint, and the published version on the European Journal of Philosophy's website.