A dilemma for dispositional answers to Kripkenstein's challenge.

I argue that Kripkenstein's rule-following challenge is often misunderstood and that getting clear about the real nature of the problem is sufficient to see that it cannot be solved by appealing to the speakers' dispositions. The published version is open access on Minds and Machines' website (erratum here).

Yet another victim of Kripkenstein's monster: dispositions, meaning, and privilege.

I discuss a strangely neglected argument against semantic dispositionalism, an argument that revolves around the idea that dispositionalists have no way to justify their privileging certain dispositions over all the others. The published version is open access on Ergo's website.

Meaning relativism and subjective idealism.

I show, contra John McDowell and others, that even though it entails a form of global relativism, Kripkenstein's relativism about semantic discourse does not lead to subjective idealism. A postprint, and the published version on Synthese's website.

Yet another skeptical solution.

I put forward a new skeptical solution to Kripkenstein's rule-following paradox, arguing that communication does not require meaning. A postprint, and the published version.

Constructivism, intersubjectivity, provability, and triviality.

I show that Sharon Street’s claim that her Darwinian dilemma is sound relative to every possible normative point of view is inconsistent with her own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of this incompatibility. A postprint, and the published version (erratum here).

Semantic dispositionalism and non-inferential knowledge.

I argue that the standard reading of Kripke's normativity argument against semantic dispositionalism is wrong and that the real point of the argument is that semantic dispositionalism cannot make sense of the fact that we have non-inferential knowledge of what we intend by the words we utter. A postprint, and the published version.

Rule-following, ideal conditions and finkish dispositions.

I explain how some outcomes of the debate about the metaphysics of dispositions can be used to build a new argument against certain varieties of dispositional analyses of meaning/intending. A postprint, and the published version on Philosophical Studies' website.

Kripke's account of the rule-following considerations.

My first (serious) paper about Kripke's Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox. My views on the topic are now somewhat different and some of the ideas I argue for here are developed more fully in subsequent articles, but the paper is still worth reading. A postprint, and the published version on the European Journal of Philosophy's website.