Broadly, my research focuses on situations with a poor contractual environment due to asymmetric information or lack of formal enforcement. I study how repeated interactions or policies can be used to partially overcome the underlying frictions.

    My work is mostly theoretical and carried out at a relatively high level of abstraction, but the insights gathered can be widely applied from the design of transnational institutions, to the design of contracts within an organization, and the regulation of diverse markets by governments. [Research statement]

 Work in Progress:

Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market (with Andy Skrzypacz)

Optimal Arrangements for Distribution in Developing Markets (with Brett Green and David I. Levine)

Dividing and Discarding: A Procedure for Taking Decisions with Non-transferable Utility(with Vinicius Carrasco)

From Equals to Despots: The Dynamics of Repeated Group Decision Taking with Private Information (with Vinicius Carrasco and Satoshi Fukuda )

Published Work: (Links to working paper versions of these papers)                                                                              

 Monetary Union with Voluntary Participation (with Francesco Lippi)

Review of Economic Studies (2006) 

CEPR/ESI Prize 2004 for the Best Central Bank Research Paper. 

Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations

American Economic Review  (2007) 

Landau Prize for Best Student Working Paper. 

Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders (with Andy Skrzypacz

American Economic Review (2010) ONLINE APPENDIX

Matching Problems with Expertise in Firms and Markets (With Luis Garicano)

Journal of the European Economic Association (2010) 

Bridging the Gap: Bargaining with Interdependent Values. (with AndySkrzypacz)

Journal of Economic Theory (2013)

Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information. (with Andy Skrzypacz)

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2013)

Subjective evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility.      

 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2015)

Optimal Contracting and the Organization of Knowledge (with Luis Garicano and Luis Rayo) Online Supplement

Review of Economic Studies (2015)

Government Interventions in a Dynamic Market with Adverse Selection (with Andy Skrzypacz)
Journal of Economic Theory (2015) 

Adverse Selection, Slow Moving Capital and Misallocation (with Brett Green and Dimitris Papanikolaou

Forthcoming at Journal of Financial Economics