research

Broadly, my research focuses on situations with a poor contractual environment due to asymmetric information or lack of formal enforcement. I study how repeated interactions or policies can be used to partially overcome the underlying frictions.

My work is mostly theoretical and carried out at a relatively high level of abstraction, but the insights gathered can be widely applied from the design of transnational institutions, to the design of contracts within an organization, and the regulation of diverse markets by governments. More recently I have started trying to use these tools to understand problems in development and used theory guided randomized controlled trials to try to find solutions that can be implemented in the field. [Research statement]


Work in Progress:

Self-enforcing Contracts with Persistence (with Jangwoo Lee andMartin Dumav) NEW VERSION 04/2019

Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection (with Vladimir Asriyan andBrett Green) NEW VERSION 02/2019

Optimal Arrangements for Distribution in Developing Markets: Theory and Evidence (with Brett Green andDavid I. Levine)

Dividing and Discarding: A Procedure for Taking Decisions with Non-transferable Utility(with Vinicius Carrasco)

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Published and Forthcoming Work: (Links to working paper versions of these papers)


Liquidity Sentiments (with Vladimir Asriyan andBrett Green)

Forthcoming at American Economic Review

From Equals to Despots: The Dynamics of Repeated Group Decision Taking with Private Information (w/ Vinicius Carrasco and Satoshi Fukuda )

Journal of Economic Theory (2019)

Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market (with Andy Skrzypacz)

Review of Economic Dynamics (2019)

Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values (with Vladimir Asriyan and Brett Green) ONLINE APPENDIX

American Economic Review (2017)

Adverse Selection, Slow Moving Capital and Misallocation (with Brett Green andDimitris Papanikolaou)

Journal of Financial Economics (2016)

Transparency and Distressed Sales under Asymmetric Information (with Aniko Oery andAndy Skrzypacz)

Theoretical Economics (2016)

Subjective evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility.

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2015)

Optimal Contracting and the Organization of Knowledge (with Luis Garicano and Luis Rayo) Online Supplement

Review of Economic Studies (2015)

Government Interventions in a Dynamic Market with Adverse Selection (with Andy Skrzypacz)

Journal of Economic Theory (2015)

Bridging the Gap: Bargaining with Interdependent Values. (with Andy Skrzypacz)

Journal of Economic Theory (2013)

Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information. (with Andy Skrzypacz)

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2013)

Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders (with Andy Skrzypacz)

American Economic Review (2010) ONLINE APPENDIX

Matching Problems with Expertise in Firms and Markets (With Luis Garicano)

Journal of the European Economic Association (2010)

Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations

American Economic Review (2007)

Landau Prize for Best Student Working Paper.

Monetary Union with Voluntary Participation (with Francesco Lippi)

Review of Economic Studies (2006)

CEPR/ESI Prize 2004 for the Best Central Bank Research Paper.

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