Market Design

I'm very grateful for the support from the European Research Council for my project:Market Design: Theory and Applications in Development

There are two components to my research plan.

First is the study of dynamic markets for real and financial assets in which traders might have asymmetric information. In particular I aim to understand how different characteristics of the market such as frequency of trade and transparency affect the efficiency with which these markets operate. This is a stepping stone to then be able to understand how these markets can be designed or regulated to improve their efficiency. Allowing for competition among market places can also indicate if the best way to intervene in these markets is by fostering competition or if direct government intervention is called for.

Second, market imperfections are exacerbated in developing countries due to the poor rule of law and poor institutional framework. Thus, important welfare gains can potentially be achieved by mitigating these imperfections and fostering the development of markets. I plan to work on these issues by combining theoretical analysis with controlled randomized trials to validate the theoretical insights in the field. For example there are many durable goods such as solar lights that would greatly enhance the welfare of poor rural households. These markets have been very slow to develop due to the lack of credit of final consumers and uncertainty about product quality. By properly designing the self-enforcing agreements between the producers of these goods and the retailers we can ensure retailers get access to financing from the producers. In turn this would allow retailers to extend financing to final consumers. Work on the field will surely uncover other frictions which we can study theoretically how to overcome and again test in the field with further controlled randomized trials.

Published Papers and Working Papers under this project:


Survey on Bargaining with Asymmetric Information (with Andy Skrzypacz)

Forthcoming in a book by Palgrave Mac Millan: Current Research and Future Directions in Bargaining.

Self-enforcing Contracts with Persistence (with Jangwoo Lee andMartin Dumav)

Forthcoming at the Journal of Monetary Economics

Aggregation and Design of Information in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection (with Vladimir Asriyan andBrett Green)

Journal of Economic Theory 2021

Optimal Arrangements for Distribution in Developing Markets: Theory and Evidence (with Brett Green andDavid I. Levine)

Forthcoming at American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Liquidity Sentiments (with Vladimir Asriyan andBrett Green)

American Economic Review (2019)

From Equals to Despots: The Dynamics of Repeated Group Decision Taking with Private Information (with Vinicius Carrasco and Satoshi Fukuda )

Journal of Economic Theory (2019)

Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market (with Andy Skrzypacz)

Review of Economic Dynamics (2019)

Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values (with Vladimir Asriyan and Brett Green)
American Economic Review (2017)

ONLINE APPENDIX


Collaborators:

Vladimir Asriyan (CREI)

Brett Green (UC Berkeley)

David I. Levine (UC Berkeley)

Piero Gottardi (Essex)

Jaime Millan (UC3M)

Andy Skrzypacz (Stanford)

Ganesh Iyer (UC Berkeley)

Vinicius Carrasco (PUC Rio)

Satoshi Fukuda (Bocconi)

Santiago Oliveros (Essex)

Jangwoo Lee (CUHK)

Martin Dumav (UC3M)