2013 - Review of 2002 Phase 2B Study

Analysis

Assisted by these disclosures, lawyers and experts have been able to analyse the conduct of and result of the Feasibility Studies. Their detailed analyses have been made publicly available for the first time on this website.

The Feasibility Study Analysis Note was conducted by Mr Richard Gifford (Solicitor) and Mr Richard Dunne (Barrister and Coral Reef Scientist). Its purpose was to:

1. to identify the extent to which the Study was influenced by Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials

2. to examine the reliability of the findings by consultants

3. ultimately, whether reliance can be placed on the overall conclusion advanced that resettlement was costly and precarious.

It concluded, inter alia, that:

1. The conclusions of the original ‘independent’ Preliminary Feasibility Study were altered following a meeting with BIOT officials. Thus, an unreserved conclusion in favour of resettlement which was originally delivered by consultants, was changed to provide a heavily qualified finding in the final version of the report in June 2000, thereby making resettlement seem contingent on serious issues being resolved.

2. The figure of 1,000 Chagossians whom consultants advised, in the May 2000 version of the Stage I study, could resettle without qualification, was deleted after a meeting with officials, thereby making the idea of resettlement entirely theoretical.

3. The independence of Consultants was apparently compromised when they agreed to qualify their original conclusions after a ‘de-briefing meeting with officials’.

4. The so-called Phase 2A and Phase 2B studies which then emerged did not comply with the recommendation of consultants nor of the original TOR in that (i) there was no consultation with islanders and no consideration of economic issues; (ii) Phase 2B was expressly precluded from considering costs in breach of clause 3 of the original TOR), and (iii) the purpose of the feasibility study was frustrated by a decision taken at the ‘debriefing meeting with officials’ that ministers must first decide on resettlement before Stage II would be undertaken. This prevented ministers from receiving the very information that they would need, and created an effective barrier to resettlement.

5. The influence upon the findings of consultants was repeated in the handling of the draft Phase 2B study. After ‘peer review’ and extensive criticisms of the draft Phase 2B report by BIOT substantial amendments were made to the final published version of the Report. The scientific findings were altered, apparently to provide increased support. The FCO was responsible for this by: a) indicating to consultants in clear terms what they hoped would be the result and effect of the Study, b) establishing a defective peer review process which lacked both appropriate qualifications and objectivity, c) altering the direction of the study by requiring a political decision to resettle the islands without the crucial Stage II cost/benefit analysis.

6. It has consistently been claimed by the FCO that all copies of the draft Phase 2B report had been destroyed, following repeated requests which have been made over the last 7 years in the context of the duty of candour in Judicial Review proceedings, following Freedom of Information requests, and more general enquiries. The discovery and release in May 2012 of a draft of the Phase 2B Executive Summary (Volume I) together with highly relevant correspondence by the Treasury Solicitor in the course of proceedings in Bancoult (3) , and an Appeal to the Information Tribunal is surprising. The denial of the existence of such a draft and correspondence appears consistent with a desire to conceal the extent of influence upon the consultants’ conclusions and the changes that were required by officials and/or their peer review appointees.

7. The release of the draft and the correspondence has enabled a full and detailed re-assessment to be made of the scientific and evidential basis for the statements and conclusions in the published Executive Summary. This shows for the first time that not only were many of the conclusions which were specifically relied upon as the basis for resettlement being unfeasible, unjustified and unsupported by the consultant’s own detailed study and analysis (as presented in Volumes II-IV of the Report) but also some (such as those relating to increased storminess) were even scientifically unproven at the time. That this should be so, may have been a consequence of the pressure being placed upon consultants to make extensive and hasty alterations to their original drafts and findings such that conclusions from different parts of the Report became out of step with each other and qualifications that had previously appeared were dropped in favour of the ‘beefing up’ of sections (in particular those relating to climate change) that was influenced by the FCO to support the desired outcome of the unfeasibility of resettlement.

8. The absence of an independent and professional ‘peer review’ and the hasty, secretive review by FCO chosen internal appointees, who were only partly qualified for the tasks assigned, has resulted in a report some of whose most important conclusions were scientifically unsound and unsubstantiated. As such, the unequivocal interpretation placed upon the principle finding (the ‘General conclusions’) by the FCO and HM Government, that resettlement was unfeasible was and remains patently flawed.

A further detailed review of the critical Review of the Coastal & Oceanic Process Section of the Phase 2B Report was then conducted by Professor Paul Kench of the (University of Auckland) . Its principal findings were that:

1. The review of ocean and coastal processes was primarily based on theoretical mathematical modelling of the wave environment and the potential for overtopping of the islands.

2. The theoretical models used were based on continental shorelines and their application to coral reef settings such as in the Chagos islands were untested.

3. The study undertook no validation or calibration of the models to provide confidence in the model outputs.

4. The report contains contradictory evidence concerning wave overtopping of islands, indicating the model over-predicted the magnitude and frequency of overtopping.

5. The assessment of island erosion is fundamentally flawed due to lack of a robust methodology.

6. The assessment lacks field data to support conclusions of the study.

7. The assessment lacked insights of the physical processes that form and change islands and of the physical mechanisms of island adjustment on coral reef surfaces. Consequently, conclusions were not considered in the correct context of physical island change.

8. The Summary of Chapter 6 (Coastal and Oceanic Processes) in section 1.6 of the Executive Summary was not supported by the findings in Chapter 6, which in any event was flawed for the reasons stated above.

9. The ‘General conclusions’ found in section 1.11 of the Executive Summary appears to be predicated largely on the Chapter 6. As such it is considered to be flawed.

10. Reviews of these aspects of the Study were uncritical and demonstrated that those tasked with assessing the robustness of the science were not qualified to do so.

Court Order required to obtain draft Phase 2B material

In November 2012, a Court Order required the consultants (Royal Haskoning - formerly Posford Duvivier) to hand over its files concerning the Phase 2B Study to Chagossian lawyers. Although Royal Haskoning had been were willing to do this, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office refused its permission. These documents have been scrutinised and provide additional insight into the scientific failings in the critical section on Coastal & Oceanic Processes. The detailed analysis (Addendum to Feasiblity Analysis - Feb 2013) reveal that:

1. There were delays to the award of the contract for the Study which resulted in a much shortened work programme and a reduction in the length of the field visit to the Chagos.

2. For its estimation of sea-level rise the consultants only used the IPCC AR4 values for Global Mean Sea Level. They failed to analyse tide gauge data from Diego Garcia or any satellite altimetry.

3. Consultants failed to collect any local weather information because their equipment was insecure and was vandalised. A weather station installed during fieldwork was inappropriately located and provided no useful data.

4. Locally installed tide gauges failed to operate correctly.

5. Modelling of the local wave climate (using SWAN) was not commenced before the fieldwork so that consultants had no prior knowledge of these conditions whilst collecting field data.

6. Similarly, the modelling of wave overtopping (AMAZON) was run until after the fieldwork was complete.

7. The AMAZON output produced unexpectedly large values for overtopping of the islands by seawater. The consultants remarked that they had not seen any evidence of this whilst they were on the islands. Their attempts to resolve this clearly erroneous output were unsuccessful.

8. The current meter deployed by consultants in the field gave unreliable readings. They only achieved what they described as "very limited" drogue measurements of surface current.

Page last updated: 17 November 2020