LANDLORD AND TENANT

The lease of immovable property is governed by Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act.

A `lease' is defined in Section 105 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (in short T.P. Act), thus:-

"105. Lease defined - A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.

Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined - The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent."

A tenancy is created as a result of an agreement between the landlord and a tenant. Since the premises owned by the landlord are leased out to the tenant by virtue of the agreement between the parties, the agreement is normally called a `lease deed'. To put it in the words of Prof. P.F. Smith "The relationship of landlord and tenant arises where one person, who possesses either a freehold or leasehold property interest expressly or impliedly grants to another, by means of a contract, an estate in that property which is less than the freehold interest or for a shorter duration than the leasehold interest of the grantor, as the case may be." (The Law of Landlord and Tenant, Fourth Edition, Page 9). Although, the lease deed is also a contract between the parties, the provisions of T.P. Act relating to contracts, shall be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (vide Section 4 of T.P. Act). As a `lease deed' is a contract relating to `leases'. 19. Rights of landlord and tenants are normally governed by the terms of contract of the tenancy, if any, and in any case by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The Rent Act or any other law providing protection to tenants in the matters of letting, rent and eviction from building under his tenancy is by way of curtailment of the rights which has possessed by the landlord under the contract of tenancy or under the provisions of Ihe law on the subject (Transfer of Property Act) Allahabad High Court M/S. Hindustan Petroleum ... vs M/S. Kailash Motors on 3 January, 1997 Equivalent citations: AIR 1997 All 314 In para 13 of the judgment in Perripati Chandrashekharrao (supra), the Supreme Court

concludes as follows (at page 1784 of AIR):--

"According to us there is a material difference between the rights which accrue to a landlord under the common law and the protection which is afforded to the tenant by such legislation as the Act. In the former case the rights and remedies of the landlord and tenant are governed by the law of contract and the law governing the property relations. These rights and remedies continue to govern their relationship unless they are regulated by such protective legislation as the present Act in which case the said rights and remedies remain suspended till the protective legislation continues in operation. Hence while it can legitimately be said that the landlord's normal rights vested in him by the general law continue to exist till and so long as they are not abridged by a special protective legislation in the case of the tenant, the protective shield extended to him survives only so long as and to the extent the special legislation operates ....."

Which Law Govern The Suit:

The legal relationship between the landlord and tenant was governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It observed that the law applicable on the date of institution of suit will govern the suit and not the subsequent law. In Ramesh Chandra v. III Additional District Judge, (1992) I SCC 751 : (AIR 1992 SC 1106), the Supreme Court held that the law applicable on the date of institution of the suit would govern the suit and since on the date of institution of suit, building was exempted from operation of the Act. the suit will proceed notwithstanding subsequent applicability of the Act to the building in question.

Whether a person who is a co-owner along with others can be treated as owner and whether he is in possession thereof.:

Ownership imports three essential rights, namely, right to possession, right to enjoy and right to dispose. If an owner is wrongly deprived of possession of his property he has a right to be put in possession thereof. All the three essentials are satisfied in the case of co-owner of a land. All coowners have equal rights and co-ordinate interest in the property, though their shares may be either fixed or indeterminate. Every co-owner has a right to enjoyment and possession equal to that of the other co-owner or co-owners. Each co-owner has, in theory interest in every infinitesimal portion of the subject matter and each has the right, irrespective of the quantity of his interest, to be in possession of every part and parcel of the property, jointly with others. (vide Mitras Co-ownership and Partition, Seventh Edn.) A three-Judge Bench of this Court has held in Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath and ors.(AIR 1976 SC 2335) that a co-owner owns every part of the composite property along with others. The following statement of law has been made by their Lordships:

"Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place."

under construction......................

EVICTION OF A TENANT WHOSE TENANCY IS NOT PROTECTED UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE RENT CONTROL ACT :-

In a suit for recovery of possession from tenant whose tenancy is not protected under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, all that is required to be established by the plaintiff - landlord is the existence of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the termination of the tenancy either by lapse of time or by notice served by the landlord under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. So long as these two aspects are not in dispute the court can pass a decree in terms of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, Which read as under :

"judgment on admissions (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.

(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub - rule (1) a decree shall be drawn upon in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced".

Statutory Tenant

Delhi High Court, Mohan Lal Goela vs Siri Krishan on 8 August, 1977 Equivalent citations: AIR 1978 Delhi 92

74. The concept of a statutory tenant is now well understood, Time and again it has been said that the statutory tenant has no estate or property as tenant at all, but has a merely personal right to retain possession of the property, The Supreme Court in Anand Nivas Pvt. Ltd. v. Anandji Kelyanjis Pedhi, , observed as follows:- "A person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly though in law not accurately, called "a statutory tenant'. Such a person is not a tenant at all. He has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and performs the other condition of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal: it is not capable of being transferred or assigned and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. " And again at p. 426: "A statutory tenant has-no interest in the premises occupied by him and he has no estate to assign or transfer ... .. ... A statutory tenant is as we have already observed, a person who on determination of his contractual right, is permitted to remain in occupation so long as he observes and performs the conditions of his tenancy and pays the standard rent and permitted increases. His personal right of occupation is incapable of being transferred or assigned, and he having no interest in the property. there is no estate on which sub-letting may operate."

75. Anand Nivas was followed in Calcutta Credit Corporation v. Happy Homes Ltd. and J. C. Chatterjee v. Sri. Kishan Tandon, . Palekar J. in J. C. Chatterjee's case (supra) said (at p 2528):

It is now settled that after the termination of the contractual tenancy the statutory tenant has onlv a personal right to continue in possession till evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Act."

76. In Damadi Lai their Lordships referred to their own previous decisions in Anand Nivas and J. C. Chatterjee . These decisions, have not been overruled. Anand Nivas was a decision of three Judges. So was Calcutta Credit Corporation . So is Damadi Lal. The Supreme Court is not bound by its previous decisions. This is now clearly established. It can overrule its previous decisions if it finds them wrong or unjust. A larger bench can always do that. The -Supreme Court has not reversed Anand Nivas and J. C. Chatterjee. Following those two cases I would hold that the incident of a statutory tenancy is that the statutory tenant has only a personal right or privilege. It is nothing more than a status of irremovability conferred by the statute. Statutory tenancy close not vest in the heirs unless the statute confers the right to pass it on to heirs. The incident of the contractual tenancy on the other hand is that the tenant retains an interest in the premises and not merely a personal right of occupation. The contractual tenancy vests in the heirs on death of the tenant. I am, therefore, of the view that Anand Nivas and J. C. Chatterjee are good law and binding on us. Following Anand Nivas case I would hold that Shiv Prasad Gupta was a statutory tenant and on his death the rights in the tenancy did not devolve on his sons or daughters. So long as he was alive he was Protected by the. statute.

General law of landlord and Tenant:

11. Generally, the terms of the agreement between the landlord and the tenant would require the landlord to maintain the premises in tenantable condition, and he will get the premises repaired when necessary. The tenant will be required to vacate the premises at the end of the period of lease. During the lease period, it will be the responsibility of the tenant to pay the rent regularly and `keep the premises in good condition subject only to changes caused by reasonable wear and tear or irresistible force' and `when such defect has been caused by any act or default on the part of the lessee, his servants or agents, he is bound to make it good within three months after such notice has been given or left' (See Section 108 (m) of T.P. Act. If the tenant commits breaches of the lease agreement by not paying the rent regularly or remaining in arrears thereof, or causing damage to the premises, the landlord may terminate the lease earlier, even before the expiry of the agreed term as per the provisions concerning the termination provided in the agreement and the Transfer of Property Act. If the tenant does not vacate the premises after the termination of lease, the landlord will have to file a suit for evicting him in the Civil Court.

12. On the other hand `if the lessor neglects to make, within a reasonable time after notice, any repairs which he is bound to make to the property, the lessee may make the same himself, and deduct the expense of such repairs with interest 9from the rent, or otherwise recover it from the lessor' (see Section 108 (f) of T.P. Act). Section 108 (l) of the T.P. Act lays down that `the lessee is bound to pay or tender, at the proper time and place, the premium or rent to the lessor or his agent in this behalf'. This implies that the amount of rent that the landlord will require shall be a certain definite amount.

Subsequent Events:

. It is settled law that in proceedings under the Rent Control Act, subsequent events also will have to be taken into consideration,

Madras High Court S.V. Periasamy And Sons By Its ... vs R. Senthil Kumar And Ors. on 7 February, 1997 Equivalent citations: (1997) 1 MLJ 420.

Undoubtedly, the Court has power to take notice of subsequent events and mould relief according to the changed circumstances under Order Vii, rule 7 Civil Procedure Code That proposition is no longer in dispute. The basic ruling on, the point is Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and others v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhary and others : , which has been followed recently by the Supreme Court inPasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders: .

In case the lessor transfers the property leased:

Provision of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act says.

"If the lessor transfers the property leased, or any part thereof, or any part of his interest therein, the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights, and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer, cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease; unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him: Provided that the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the transfer, and that, if the lessee, not having reason to believe that such transfer has been made, pays rent to the lessee, shall not be liable to pay such rent over again to the transferee."

9. Once the transfer takes place, the arrears of rent which was due to the transferor becomes a debt and loses its character as arrears of rent. The same could be transferred as an actionable claim coming under Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act.

11. In Daya Debi v. Chapala Debt A.I.R. I960 Cal. 378 in paragraph 2 of the judgment, a Division Bench of that High Court has held thus:

..."A claim for arrears of rent loses its character of rent as it is assigned."

At page 379 of the Reports, their Lordships went on to consider this point and held thus:

. In my opinion, the cause of action for recovery of arrears of rent is completely satisfied as soon as the assignor receives the consideration for which he sells the arrears of rent and what the assignee purchases is not the cause of action for recovery of arrears of rent, but the right of the assignor to recover those arrears. The right of the assignor to recover arrears of rent is a property and as such it is transferable under the main provisions of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and it is not hit by any of the clauses which appear in that section. Such a right can be transferred either in favour of the person who has acquired title to the house itself or in favour of a stranger, It is quite possible that the house is sold to 'X' and the claim for recovery of arrears is sold to 'Y'. For these reasons I have reached the conclusion that the claim for arrears of rent ceases to be a claim for rent and is converted into an actionable wrong as defined by Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and is assignable in the manner contemplated by Section 130 of that Act. This conclusion is supported to some extent by the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Lal Sinha v. Tripura Charan Roy I.L.R. 40 Cal. 650. In that case arrears of rent were transferred to a legal practitioner who instituted a suit for recovering the arrears assigned to him. One of the points raised before the Division Bench was, that the claim for arrears of rent was an actionable claim and as such the plaintiff's suit was hit by Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act. On this point the Division Bench recorded the following opinion: "On the third point we are of opinion that the right of arrears of rent purchased is an actionable claim under Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act end that the plaintiff cannot, therefore, enforce it in any court.

19. For getting eviction the nature of the amount due from the tenant must be arrears of rent. The relationship of landlord and tenant ceases, and the previous landlord only becomes a creditor and the tenant becomes a debtor. The eviction petition on the ground of default in payment of rent thereafter cannot be continued either by the previous landlord, or by the purchaser on the basis of the same cause of action.

Madras High Court S.V. Periasamy And Sons By Its ... vs R. Senthil Kumar And Ors. on 7 February, 1997

Equivalent citations: (1997) 1 MLJ 420

Sale of Property During Pendency of the Suit:

Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur Naresh Chand vs Smt. Prem Lata Bakshi on 20 January, 2009

SBC SECOND APPEAL NO.107/1991 -NARESH CHAND V/S SMT. PREMLATA BAKSHI : JUDGMENT DTD. 20.1.2009

10. Since bonafide need was claimed by the landlord - plaintiff for her husband as well as her son as stated above on the date of filing of the suit and the Courts below concurrently found that the said bonafide need existed on the date of filing suit and while the trial Court granted the decree for partial eviction, the first appellate Court granted the decree of entire residential house in question, the said findings of facts which are based on relevant evidence and material did not deserve to be disturbed at all and the second appeal was liable to be dismissed at the threshold as no substantial question of law could be said to be arising in the present appeal. However, the fact remains that since this appeal came to be admitted by this Court by framing the aforesaid question of law and which remained pending here for long number of 18 years in this Court, subsequent developments in the form of death of husband of the plaintiff and sale of property by her arose. The question which arises now in these circumstances for consideration by this Court in the changed circumstances is as to whether now the purchaser of the suit property can get fruits of the decree passed by the Courts below and can get the suit premises evicted or not or whether the defendant - tenant should be allowed to remain in the property for next 20 to 30 years after the new purchaser of the property is asked to file a fresh suit establishing his own bonafide need of the said suit property or on other grounds of eviction as as specified in the Rent Control Act.

11. A perusal of the sale-deed produced along with the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. shows that the said property was sold by the plaintiff to the purchaser with clear stipulation that the said property is in possession of the tenant since 15.3.1969 and therefore, the vacant possession cannot be handed over to the purchaser and only symbolic possession is being handed over and the purchaser will be treated to be in possession of the property in the same manner in which the plaintiff was. This was para 5 of the sale-deed and para 10 of the sale-deed also states that the eviction decree in respect of said suit property has already been passed by the first appellate Court against which the defendant has filed second appeal before High Court. Para 3 of the sale-deed also stipulates that the seller is transferring all her rights in the suit property including the easementary rights to the purchaser. Thus, the right of the plaintiff which vested in her including the right to get the vacant possession of the suit property stood vested in the purchaser on the date of sale i.e. 15.3.1999 and the purchaser stepped into her shoes entitled to all the rights and fruits to enjoy the said property thereafter.

It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta (supra) that attornment by the tenant is not necessary upon transfer of landlord's right and it is automatic. In para 5 and 6 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"5......... It is well settled that a transferee of the landlord's right steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the transferorlandlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. The section does not require that the transfer of the right of the landlord can take effect only if the tenant's attorn to him. Attornment by the tenant is not necessary to confer validity of the transfer of the landlord's rights. Since attornment by the tenant is not required, a notice under Section 106 in terms of the old terms of lease by the transferor landlord would be proper and so also the suit for ejectment.

6. Attornment would, however, be desirable as it means the acknowledgement of relation of a tenant to a new landlord. It also implies continuity of tenancy."

13. This Court in the case of Ram Saran Sharma (supra) has also held that upon transfer of property through gift and where the tenant was served with a notice intimating the fact of gift, the plaintiff was vested with all rights of original landlord and was entitled to evict the tenant. In para 17 of the said judgment, this Court has held as under:

"Section 109 of the Act of 1882, it is held that Section 109 of the said Act does not require service of notice on the tenant, or alienation of property, to create relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee landlord and the existing tenant. The transferee of the lessor steps into the shoes and possess all the rights which the transferor has and the attornment is not a condition precedent, to give validity to the transfer made in favour of the transferee. Section 2 of the Act of 1882 specifically provided that a transfer of property interests, which the transferor is capable of passing in the property, including the legal incidents thereof and such incidents include the rents and profits thereof. Once the title of the assignee is complete, the attornment is automatic not dependent on the tenant's attorning or agreeing to the attornment."

14. In the case of Dharam Chand V/s Karam Chand (supra) this Court also held referring to decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gaya Prasad V/s Pradeep Srivastava reported in (2001) 2 that it would be pernicious and unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of litigation reaching final stage merely on the ground that certain development occurred pendente lite because the opposite party succeeds in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. Para 5 of the said judgment quoted below for ready reference:

"5. Admittedly the plaintiff instituted the suit for eviction on April 22,1982. The plaintiff could not see the final result of the litigation in his life time and died on January 21, 2000 during the pendency of this second appeal. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad V/s Pradee Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604 had occasion to consider the similar situation. It was urged on behalf of the tenant before the Hon'ble Supreme Court to take into account the subsequent events. Dismissing the appeal the Hon'ble Supreme Court indicated that the crucial date for deciding the bonafides of the requirements of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bonafides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in the litigative slow process subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the perils of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnums. It would be pernicious and unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendent lite, because the opposite party succeeds in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period."

15. This Court in the case of Ratan Lal V/s Brij Mohan - S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.319/2009 decided on 7.11.2008 held as under:

"6. ............After death of elder son Dinesh on 1.11.1996, the bonafide need which was claimed for elder son Dinesh should be deemed to continue for his widow and grand-son. Such subsequent event could definitely be taken into account by the first appellate Court while deciding the appeal. Even the trial Court while returning its findings on 3.11.2006 was very well aware of these facts, still the learned trial Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish his bonafide need upon death of sons of plaintiff landlord Brij Mohan. The bonafide need of the plaintiff - respondent in the present case could not be said to be mere whims and desire of the landlord, but bonafide need further aggravated on the death of sons of the landlord. It is indeed unfortunate that the learned trial Court instead of appreciating these facts in correct perspective..........."

16. In a recent decision in the case of LRs. of Smt. Bilam Kanwar V/s Pushp Chand - S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.110/2005 decided on 17.1.2009 , this Court again held in para 5 as under:

"5..............It was not in dispute before the learned trial Court that after death of her son plaintiff Bilam Kanwar sought to add grounds for eviction of personal bonafide necessity for the business of her grand-son Gautam, who was 10th class pass. There was no evidence on record to show that the plaintiff - respondent had any alternative shop or was in possession of so called shop situated at Ada Bazar, Jodhpur. The fact that the said grand-son Gautam was carrying on the business in a shop owned by one Bhagat Singh Surana in a small shop of 6ft x 6ft was proved and could not be controverted before the learned trial Court......

6. In the case of Ragavendra Kumar V/s Firm Prem Machinery and Co. reported in (2000) 1 SCC 679, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement for residential or business purposes and has complete freedom in the matter and therefore, the appellant landlord stating in evidence that he owned several other shops and houses, but they were not vacant and also that the suit premises were suitable for the proposed business, the Hon'ble Apex Court granted eviction decree and dismissed the tenant's appeal."

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheikh Jehangir V/s Smt. S. Kaushilyabai and ors (supra) in view of clear inhibition contained in Section 10(3)(iii) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 held that in view of clear inhibition in the said provisions against institution of a suit by a purchaser on the ground of bonafide personal necessity for a period of three months from the date of purchase, therefore, the suit could not be brought by the purchaser till the expiry of the said period calculated from the date of sale-deed. The Supreme Court therefore held that the suit for eviction was liable to be withdrawn with a liberty to the purchaser to file a fresh suit. This judgment relied upon by the counsel for the defendant - appellant clearly is distinguishable and turns upon the specific provisions in A.P. Act prohibiting the purchaser to institute a suit within 3 months from the date of purchase of the said property. There is no such provision in Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950. Therefore, the said judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is of no help.

18. Similarly, the judgment in the case of Preetam Singh V/s Narendra Singh, this Court dealing with the issue in revisional jurisdiction held that where the plaintiff had sold out the demise premises, the purchaser should establish his own bonafide need and therefore, had right to be impleaded under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. in the suit filed by the erstwhile owner. The Court further observed that the purchaser could not evict the tenant on the bonafide need of the erstwhile owner and therefore, was liable to be impleaded and the revision petition filed by the defendant was dismissed. This case is also distinguishable inasmuch as this Court only allowed the new purchaser to join the litigation at the trial stage under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. This case supports the conclusion drawn by this Court that purchaser steps into the shoes of the existing landlord - plaintiff and could be allowed to have fruits of the said decree as property rights including the right of vacant possession of the suit property stood transferred under the sale-deed.

19. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that not only the question framed by this Court while admitting the present appeal deserves to be answered against the appellant - defendant by holding that the bonafide need of the plaintiff continues even after death of her husband as the bonafide need was claimed for her husband as well as her son and it deserves to be further held that the purchaser of the suit property during the pendency of present second appeal who steps into the shoes of the plaintiff shall be entitled to vacant possession of the suit property in pursuance of the decree passed by two Courts below which is liable to be upheld by this Court as no perversity in those findings is found by this Court. In view of the fact that the bonafide need of the plaintiff - landlord on the date of filing of the suit is relevant, subsequent events in the form of sale of said property does not ipso facto up-set the decree of eviction. The attornment in favour of purchaser was automatic and did not depend upon the acceptance of the same by the defendant - tenant. The appellant - defendant is, therefore, not entitled to any relief in the present second appeal, which is found to be devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

Regarding an agreement of lease between the landlord and the tenant in contravention of the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction):

1. Whether an agreement of lease between the landlord and the tenant for letting and occupation of a building in contravention of the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 is void?

2. Whether the said agreement is enforceable in law and a decree for ejectment of the tenant can be passed in favor of the landlord on the basis there of ?

Allahabad High Court. Nutan Kumar And Others vs Iind Additional District Judge, ... on 20 May, 1993

Equivalent citations: AIR 1994 All 298, Author: D Sinha

Bench: D Sinha, S Verma, S Singh

115. In view of the majority opinion, the Full Bench answers and holds thus:

1. An agreement of lease between the landlord and the tenant for letting and occupation of a building in contravention of the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 is void.

2. The said agreement is unenforceable in law and no decree for ejectment of the tenant can be passed in favor of the landlord on the basis thereof.

Notice to Quit ( Determination of tenancy ):

Whether in a case where a property owned by two or more co-owners is let out to a tenant, a notice to quit given by some only out of them, is sufficient to determine the tenancy or it is necessary that the notice to quit must be given by or on behalf of all co-owners.?

Mesne Profits:

UNDER CONSTRUCTION...................................