In Venkatachallam Chetty v. Veerappa Pillai and others, ILR 29
Mad. 314 it has been held that,
"Where a perpetual injunction has been granted, on each successive breach of it the decree can be enforced under Section 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) by an application made within three years of such breach under Article 178, schedule II of the Limitation Act (Act XV of 1877)."
The Bench held that,
"the decree holder is not bound to take action in respect of every petty infringement and the injunction does not by his inaction become inoperative after three years from the date of the first petty breach so as to disentitle him to take action where a serious breach is afterwards committed.
Where the terms of a decree are clear, the executing Court is bound to give effect to it and cannot read into it limitations gathered from a reference to the records of the suit."
Bhagawan Das v. Sukhdei, ILR 28 A11.300.
In that case one S.D. obtained a decree against B for possession of a house and an injunction restraining him from occupying the house. This was in 1899. The respondent before the High Court having stepped into the shoes of S.D. On his death, made in 1904 an application for execution alleging that the appellant had taken possession of the house and placed tenants in it and prayed that the appellant should be ordered to comply with the injunction and to arrest him and to attach his property. The Executing Court ordered execution to issue and the same was confirmed by the Appellate Court. In the appeal before the High Court it was urged that the application was time barred. Reliance was placed on Article 179, schedule II of the Limitation Act, 1877. The High Court held that. "Article 179 of the second- schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 did not apply to an application asking the Court to enforce a decree granting an injunction to abstain from some particular act and that all that the Court had to see was whether the party bound by the decree had had an opportunity of obeying the decree or injunction and had wilfully failed to obey it."
. In Sachi Prasad Mukherjee v. Amarnath Roy Chowdhuri, ILR 46
Cal. 103 : AIR 1919 Cal. 674 : 22 Cal.W.N. 851
where in a suit for declaration of title to land the plaintiff contended that the defendant by raising a wall had disobeyed a permanent injunction embodied in a decree dated September, 1895 and prayed for the demolition of the wall so far as it was above the height limited by the aforesaid injunction, it was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that, "the remedy lay by way of execution, under Order 21, Rule 32, and the enforcement of an injunction being a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree by which it was awarded, a separate suit was prohibited under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908."
It was interpreted that the expression "the act required to be done" in clause (5) of Order XXI Rule 32 meant what had to be done to enforce the injunction.
. In Jai Dayal and others v. Krishkan Lal Garg and another, 1997 (2) L.W. 548 dealing with a question arising under Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to perpectual injunction and mandatory
injunction restraining the defendant from blocking a passage and for removal of the obstruction, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"..... If a judgment -debtor has suffered the decree, no attempt to circumvent the perpetual injunction and mandatory injunction, can be permitted. If the decree holder makes any construction clubbing the other adjacent property, property which is part of the subject matter in the earlier suit, a party cannot and should not, by his action, be permitted to drive the decree holder for another round of adjudication of the rights in the second suit, to be started afresh. In other words, giving such a liberty will amount to encouraging persons to take the law into their own hands and drive the decree holder to another suit It can never be facilitated to circumvent the law and relegate the party for tardy process of the civil action. What is needed is an opportunity to obey the injunction. Non-compliance is a continuing disobedience entailing penal consequences. A separate fresh suit is barred under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
Supreme Court of India
Kanwar Singh Saini vs High Court Of Delhi on 23 September, 2011
Bench: P. Sathasivam, B.S. Chauhan
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1798 of 2009
Kanwar Singh Saini ...Appellant Versus
High Court of Delhi ...Respondent J U D G M E N T
Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.
where a decree is for an injunction, and the party against whom it has been passed has wilfully disobeyed it, the same may be executed by attachment of his property or by detention in civil prison or both. The provision of Order XXI Rule 32 CPC applies to prohibitory as well as mandatory injunctions. In other words, it applies to cases where the party is directed to do some act and also to the cases where he is abstained from doing an act. Still to put it differently, a person disobeys an order of injunction not only when he fails to perform an act which he is directed to do but also when he does an act which he is prohibited from doing. Execution of an injunction decree is to be made in pursuance of the Order XXI Rule 32 CPC as the CPC provides a particular manner and mode of execution and therefore, no other mode is permissible. (See: Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. (In voluntary Liquidation) v. Haridas Mundhra & Ors., AIR 1972 SC 1826).
See also Madras High Court
Kanakamma vs Kamalan on 14 January, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000 (2) CTC 240
Bench: K Sampath