Stoicism
Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 2003, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi
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Topics
Introduction
Early and Middle Stoicism
Late Stoicism
Seneca
Life and Savory Info
God and Divine Providence
Epictetus
What's Impressive About Epictetus
Life and Savory Info
The Good Life and Peace of Mind
Freedom
Similarities and Differences Between Epictetus and Epicurus
Writings
Marcus Aurelius
What's Impressive About Marcus Aurelius
Life and Savory Info
Citizenship and Harmony with Nature
Stoicism
Introduction
The Stoic school of philosophy usually divides into three periods―early, middle, and late (or Roman) Stoicism. Unfortunately, the only substantial writings that survived come from the Roman period; this is why the account here focuses upon Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.
For the earlier Stoics, we have ancient commentaries on their work, but little else. The commentators usually were opponents of stoicism, explaining the position in order to refute it. While these commentaries are helpful in reconstructing early Stoic views, there is some worry that the commentators may have ignored some of the Stoics' best arguments.
Early and Middle Stoicism
The Early Triumvirate: Zeno of Citium (a city on the island of Cyprus) is the founder of Stoicism. He lived from 334 - 262 B.C.E. and established his school in Athens. He was followed as leader of the school by Cleanthes (331 - 233 B.C.E.), who was followed by Chrysippus (c. 280 - c. 206 B.C.E.). Of the three, Chrysippus apparently was the most prolific writer.
The leading proponents of middle Stoicism, residents of the island of Rhodes, were Panaetius (c. 185 - c. 110 B.C.E.) and Posidonius (c. 135 - c. 50 B.C.E.).
In brief outline, the Stoics held that (1) Divine Providence governs Nature for the best possible purposes, (2) Reason is the best guide to understanding Nature and guiding our lives, and (3) Human beings need to adapt themselves to, or bring themselves into harmony with, Nature.
In stressing the need for Reason, the early Stoics made important advances in logic, being ancient precursors of some developments in contemporary symbolic logic. In particular, they stressed the role of relations among propositions in logic and developed several argument forms, for example,
If p, then q (where p and q are propositions)
p
Therefore q.
Late (Roman) Stoicism
The three leading proponents of Roman Stoicism are Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. This website focuses upon Epictetus, in particular, as a representative of Stoicism; it adds consideration of Seneca's position with respect to God and divine providence as well as Marcus Aurelius' position with respect to citizenship.
Seneca has some interesting writings presenting the Stoic viewpoint. His statement of the design argument for the existence of God, along with explanations of how evil events happening to good persons do not negate the existence of Divine Providence, are especially worthwhile―in his essay, "On Providence."
Marcus Aurelius is important because he was both a Stoic and a Roman Emperor, an actual exemplification of a philosopher-ruler. In addition, he authored a significant work, his Meditations.
Seneca (1 - 65 C.E.)
Life and Savory Info
Seneca was an especially talented person. He wrote both philosophy and tragedies, in addition to being a person of political prominence.
Seneca came from a prominent Spanish family and acquired considerable wealth as a young lawyer in Rome. He was a skilled orator and took on some political offices. Apparently, the Emperor Caligula saw him as a threat; and the Emperor Claudius banished him from Rome in 41 C.E. on a charge of adultery (that was probably false).
In 49 C.E., he returned to Rome through the efforts of Agrippina, who then installed him as the tutor to her son, the future Emperor Nero. For the first five, good years of Nero's reign (54 - 58), he was a consul and a major force in the Emperor's administration. During the succeeding bad years however, his situation deteriorated―ending in 65 with Seneca taking his own life at Nero's demand.
Seneca's life presents a paradox in the sense that some of his actions seem so inconsistent with the Stoic philosophy he advocated. He amassed a fortune as a young lawyer, some of it through loans at high interest rates (a common practice in ancient Rome). He did not take his banishment with Stoic indifference; instead he was depressed and made groveling pleas for a return to Rome. When Nero orchestrated the murder of his own mother in 59, Seneca was involved and wrote a defense of Nero for the Roman Senate.
God and Divine Providence
In his essay, “On Providence: Why Any Misfortunes Befall Good Men When a Providence Exists, " Seneca lays out the design argument for the existence of God, a standard tenet of stoicism.
The powerful, orderly structure of Nature cannot exist without a caretaker, namely, God. Chance or random movements could never produce this orderly structure, since these movements lack any clear or organized direction. There is a plan to Nature laid out by God so that even unexpected or irregular events¾such as flashes of lightning, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions¾fit into a plan. Witness, for example, the tides. While merely observing the turbulent waves coming in and receding might suggest blind motions, we know that there is a precise regularity to the tides.
Since Nature is the realization of divine order, we know that all events that happen serve good ends. So even the misfortunes of life fulfill a good purpose.
Seneca realizes that misfortunes are most difficult to explain in terms of divine providence when bad things happen to good people. He explains away the problem by (1) arguing for the virtues of adversity and (2) making a distinction between internal and external goods.
For Seneca, overcoming adversity is the measure of greatness. So an easy life, far from being desirable, is an indication of mediocrity. God, or the gods, would not be treating us well by giving us easy lives. Even events associated with horror and dread are challenges to be overcome, rather than evil in themselves. “By suffering misfortune the mind grows able to belittle suffering.”
He also argues that the divine nature always provides what is good to good people. People often fail to see this though, because they do not distinguish internal from external goods. Real goods lie within oneself: to scorn terror, to disdain passions, to be indifferent to wealth or poverty, to overcome the fear of death. Possessing an external good like wealth may seem to confer happiness on a person; but it is just a lot of glitter if it conceals a foulness within.
God and The Gods
The Stoics tend to jump indiscriminately between monotheism and polytheism―a tendency that can drive those accustomed to the monotheistic Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition up the wall. For example, Seneca says, "God's attitude to good men is a father's; his love for them is a manly love"―thereby implying monotheism. Elsewhere, he says, "In the case of good men, accordingly, the gods follow the plan that teachers follow with their pupils: they demand more effort from those in whom they have confident expectations"―thereby implying polytheism.
What is important to the Stoics is the existence of a divine plan that guides the universe for the best. This plan fits most comfortably with a single intelligent director of events; so references to a single God are appropriate. But they do not have problems with the existence of multiple gods so long as these gods do not introduce confusion into the divine plan. Accordingly, Stoics do not place great importance on the monotheism-polytheism distinction.
My Sources
Mose Hadas, tr., The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca: Essays and Letters (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1958). In addition to the translations, Hadas provides an introduction that I found very helpful.
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Vol. I, Greece & Rome (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1948), Ch. 40. Copleston's account is brief, but useful.
Epictetus (c. 55 - 135 C.E.)
Topics
What's Special About Epictetus
Life and Savory Info
The Good Life and Peace of Mind
Freedom
Similarities and Differences Between Epictetus and Epicurus
Epictetus: Writings
My Sources
What's Impressive About Epictetus
Epictetus offers a classic model of a Stoic person―someone with a mind so disciplined that it is invincible and at peace in the presence of any amount of adversity.
He pushes the notion of Divine Providence to Its extreme conclusion.
He offers an intriguing notion of freedom: It consists in not wanting anything rather than in being able to do or get something.
Life and Savory Info
Epictetus, although born in Hierapolis (in Asia Minor), was a Roman slave. His master had some status under the Emperor Nero. Of the master's relationship with Epictetus, there is both good news and bad news. The good news: Apparently his master thought enough of his abilities to send him to an influential Stoic philosopher, C. Musonius Rufus, to advance his education. The bad news (of dubious authenticity): The master had a mean streak. Once when he was having Epictetus tortured by having his leg twisted, Epictetus supposedly pointed out that the leg would break if this continued; and when the twisting continued and the leg broke, Epictetus supposedly said, "You see, it is as I told you." It is known that Epictetus had a lame leg; but it is questionable whether this legendary story is true. I repeat it however, because it captures the Stoic attitude toward pain: You train yourself to be indifferent to it.
Eventually, he attained his freedom and taught in Rome. The Emperor Domitian however expelled philosophers from Rome in 89 or 93 C.E. Epictetus then settled in Nicopolis (in western Greece) and started a highly successful school of Stoic philosophy. As a person, he was renowned for his integrity and for the simplicity of his lifestyle.
The Good Life and Peace of Mind
Epictetus maintained that the good life consists in accepting whatever happens to you. This advocacy of acceptance rested upon two claims:
(1) All events in the universe, including human actions, are determined—except for freedom of will in our attitudes toward what is happening to us; and
(2) The universe is ordered by a Divine plan to serve the best possible purposes.
Since only our own attitudes are under our control and since we can trust Divine Providence, we fare best when we accept whatever happens.
A particular event may seem to be wrong at times, but only because we fail to grasp the Divine plan for the universe. Therefore a wise person always seeks to understand the brighter side of any event so as to bring oneself into accord with the laws governing nature. For example, a person may look upon some crisis or tragedy in life as an opportunity to test one's character. Thus a fire, a war, a death in the family, or an earthquake are all events that can serve a good purpose.
Epictetus aptly captures this view of the good life in the following passage:
(VIII.) Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life.
(IX.) Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless the will itself chooses. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will. And add this reflection on the occasion of everything that happens; for you will find it an impediment to something else, but not yourself.
(X.) On the occasion of every accident (event) that befalls you, remember to turn to yourself and inquire what power you have for turning it to use. If you see a fair man or a fair woman, you will find that the power to resist is temperance (continence). If labour (pain) be present to you, you will find that it is endurance. If it be abusive words, you will find it to be patience. And if you have been thus formed to the (proper) habit, the appearances will not carry you along with them.
(XI.) Never say about any thing, I have lost it, but say I have restored it. Is your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored. Has your estate been taken from you? Has not then this also been restored? But he who has taken it from me is a bad man. But what is it to you, by whose hands the giver (God) demanded it back? So long as he (God) may allow you, take care of it as a thing which belongs to another, as travellers do with their inn.
(from The Manual of Epictetus)
By recognizing what is in our power—namely, our thoughts, desires, and aversions—and by disciplining our minds, he believed that we can bring ourselves into accord with nature and achieve contentment, or peace of mind.
Given the strong emphasis upon accepting whatever happens, it may seem that Epictetus eliminated any positive goals in life. After all, events, our bodies, possessions, relatives, friends, and fellow citizens are not within our control. We should remember however that he regarded the will as being free in its thoughts, desires, and aversions. Thus we can will good instead of evil. Accordingly, we can turn our thoughts toward such goods as forbearance, self-control, good faith, service to others, simplicity, kindness, honor, seriousness, purity, freedom from affectation, and worship of the Divine. Moreover, we can develop an aversion for such evils as thievery and adultery. Similarly, in selecting a vocation, we rationally can assess our abilities and decide to employ them in the best possible way, so as to bring our life work into accord with nature. In assessing and deciding, we should take care to free ourselves from such selfish desires as avarice, ambition, and vanity.
Epictetus' Stoic attitude does not eliminate positive goals; rather, it provides a way to accept with equanimity whatever life offers. When we ourselves or others fail to do what is right in actions, the Stoic attitude reminds us that actions are not within our control. So we should not berate ourselves for past misdeeds; nor should we become angry or show pity in the presence of others' misdeeds. We can will to do better next time; and we can point out moral errors to others. But we cannot control events. Epictetus offers the following advice to persons victimized by an unrepentant thief or adulterer:
. . . Why, then, are we angry? Is it because we value so much of things of which these men rob us? Do not admire your clothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer. Learn that a thief and an adulterer have no place among the things which are yours, but in those which belong to others and which are not in your power. If you dismiss these things and consider them as nothing, with whom are you still angry? But as long as you value these things, be angry with yourself rather than with the thief and the adulterer. Consider the matter thus: you have fine clothes; your neighbour has not; you have a window; you wish to air the clothes. The thief does not know wherein man's good consists, but he thinks that it consists in having fine clothes, the very thing which you also think. Must he not come then and take them away? When you show a cake to greedy persons and then swallow it all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? Do not provoke them, do not have a window, do not air your clothes.
(From Epictetus, Discourses, Book I, Chapter XVIII)
Although Epictetus' Stoic position may suggest passiveness, remember that he advocates a life of intense mental discipline to maintain a proper attitude. And his philosophy develops an attitude of invincibility in the sense that no event, no matter how tragic or devastating, will overwhelm us.
Freedom
For Epictetus, being a slave is not a hindrance to freedom, because slavery can control your body, but not your mind. Again, we have to recognize what is or is not in our power: We have a will that is free in its thoughts, desires, and aversions; but we do not control our bodies or events. Recognition of what is in our power allows us to be true to ourselves and not slaves to external things—and therefore free.
And in a break from commonly held views about freedom, he adds, “for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire” (Epictetus, Discourses, Book IV, end of Chapter I). Achieving this state of indifference toward desires is not easy and requires a great amount of freely chosen mental discipline.
The mental discipline requires development of character so that we can bear the burden of events not under our control; it also requires development of an ability to reason well so that we rationally can understand how to bring ourselves into harmony with nature. Education is a useful means to attain this latter end.
Similarities and Differences between Epictetus and Epicurus
At first glance, we may have trouble separating Epictetus' philosophy from that of Epicurus due to the apparent similarities. Both philosophers stress the value of a simple, ascetic life; both stress the importance of reason and development of the mind. Both accept the existence and goodness of God (or the gods); both deliver exhortations against the fear of death.
Closer examination though reveals fundamental differences. First, and most importantly, whereas Epicurus regards pleasure and pain to be the basis for action, Epictetus advocates indifference to pleasure and pain. Secondly, whereas Epicurus advises retirement from the world, Epictetus regards human beings to be naturally social as participants in the divine plan of Nature as a whole and therefore stresses civic duties as a normal obligation of life. Thirdly, whereas Epicurus accepts a materialistic atomism, Epictetus stresses the importance of the mind over the body. And finally, whereas Epicurus' admonishments against the fear of death rest on the view that death is a state of nothingness, Epictetus' admonishments rest on the view that the existence or non-existence of an afterlife is beyond our control and therefore should be a matter of indifference to us.
Epictetus: Writings
Epictetus wrote nothing himself; but we still have a detailed presentation of his philosophy. A student, Arrian, took down lecture notes, known as The Discourses, and also put together a manual of the master's wisdom, known as the Encheiridion. These writings focus on ethics―so that we do not find any exposition of stoic logic in his works.
The Discourses Of Epictetus
The Encheiridion, or Manual, of Epictetus
My Sources
Whitney J. Oates, ed. The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers (New York: The Modern Library, 1940).
This is a very useful collection of all the extant writings of Epicurus, Lucretius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.
George Long, tr., The Discourses of Epictetus: with the Encheiridion and Fragments (New York: Lovell, Coryell & Company, no date)
Older publications of the George Long translation, like this one, contain Long's biographical sketch of Epictetus' life, an introduction to his philosophy, and an index―all of which are useful.
Phillip P. Hallie, "Epictetus," in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: MacMillan, 1967), Vol. 3.
This is a relatively short entry; but The Encyclopedia of Philosophy is always a useful source.
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Vol. I, Greece & Rome (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1948), Ch. 40.
Copleston's account is brief, but useful.
Marcus Aurelius (121- 180 C.E.)
Topics
What's Special About Marcus Aurelius
Life and Savory Info
Citizenship and Harmony with Nature
My Sources
What's Impressive About Marcus Aurelius
Marcus Aurelius probably is the world's best approximation to Plato's ideal of a philosopher-ruler (although he was a Stoic rather than a Platonist).
He expressed and exemplified well the the sense of civic duty and public service in Stoicism.
His Meditations has been a source of consolation and guidance for political leaders.
Life and Savory Info
Marcus Aurelius was born in Rome to a prominent family. He was an avid student who encountered and embraced the doctrines of Stoicism before he was a teenager. He became the adopted son and heir to his uncle, the Emperor Antoninus. After twenty-three years of apprenticeship in the art of ruling, he became Emperor himself in 161 C.E. He may not have been precisely the philosopher-ruler envisioned by Plato in the Republic; but he combined the gifts of philosophical wisdom and the art of ruling to become an exemplary Emperor.
As a person, Marcus Aurelius showed steadfast and humane dedication in service to the state and a generous disposition toward political enemies and the failings or imperfections of others. During his reign, he was often forced to lead in battle to protect the far-flung provinces of the Empire. While on military campaign, he wrote the Meditations, his major contribution to Stoicism.
If he had a major flaw, it probably lay with his patience toward, or tendency to overlook, the imperfections of others, particularly his family members. There were scandalous stories of his wife Faustina's adulterous affairs; and he chose his son Commodus as his heir, thereby foisting a cruel, dissolute ruler on the Empire.
If you have seen the movie Gladiator, you will have witnessed its brief portrayal of the last days of Marcus Aurelius, along with a more elaborate picture of the character of Commodus. Although there always were rumors, it has never been established that Commodus actually caused his father's death.
Citizenship and Harmony with Nature
The Stoic insistence upon the need for personal mental discipline in order to accept whatever happens to you may suggest a life of retirement from the world where a person battles to control oneself. The Stoics however were advocates of civic duty rather than hermits.
They regarded humans to be social beings who bring themselves into harmony with the divine plan for Nature by cooperating with one another rather than by withdrawing into themselves. As a Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius exemplified this sense of civic duty.
He justifies a life of public service this way:
Whether the universe is a concourse of atoms, or nature is a system,
let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is
governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related to the
parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering this,
inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the
things which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is
injurious to the part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the
whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all natures
indeed have this common principle, but the nature of the universe has
this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any
external cause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering,
then, that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with
everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately
related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do
nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which
are of the same kind with myself, and I shall turn an my efforts to the
common interest, and divert them from the contrary. Now, if these
things are done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayest
observe that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of
action which is advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is content
with whatever the state may assign to him.
(Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book IX)
Note that he points out one's special bonds with one's fellow human beings, "things which are of the same kind with myself," and the need to serve "the common interest." Accordingly, public service is a normal requirement of life.
This strong sense of civic duty has its limitations however from a Stoic point of view. For Marcus Aurelius, enforcement of existing laws and innovation with respect to new laws that serve the public interest were normal duties of one's office. Likewise, there had to be dedicated public service in promoting and maintaining social harmony. He was very unlikely though ever to approve radicalism, civic turmoil, or revolution. Furthermore, he was very unlikely to approve the aggressive seeking of political office. Remember that there is his emphasis upon being "content with whatever the state may assign to him."
My Sources
Whitney J. Oates, ed. The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers (New York: The Modern Library, 1940).
This is a very useful collection of all the extant writings of Epicurus, Lucretius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.
Will Durant, The Story of Civilization: Part III, Caesar and Christ (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), pp. 425-432, 443-446.
Durant provides valuable historical information as well as some explanation of Marcus Aurelius' philosophy. Durant also comes up with a great line about him, "He was a Stoic before he became a man."
Edward Gibbon (abridged by D.M. Low), The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (New York: Washington Square Press, 1962), Vol. One, Ch. 4.
This classic eighteenth century work is my main source for the scandalous side of Marcus Aurelius' family.
Maxwell Staniforth, "Marcus Aurelius Antoninus," in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: MacMillan, 1967), Vol. 5.
This is a relatively short entry; but The Encylopedia of Philosophy is always a useful source.