Cynics and Skeptics
Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 2003, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi
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Topics
Cynics
Antisthenes
Diogenes
Philosophical Significance
Skeptics
Proponents of Skepticism
Pyrrhonistic Skepticism
Carneades' More Moderate Skepticism
Sextus Empiricus: Writings
Cynics
The Cynic school represented a reaction against pleasure and luxury as fundamental, conventional goals of Greek life. The Cynics stressed instead a simpler, ascetic lifestyle―one that defied social convention―as the key to happiness. Antisthenes was the founder of Cynicism; and Diogenes of Sinope was the most prominent Cynic of all time. Cynicism had a following in the ancient world. And there are cynics today, even if they never heard of the Cynic school.
The writings of Antisthenes and Diogenes have been lost. What we have now is a general outline of the Cynic position plus a train of anecdotes about their lives (that may or not be accurate). The anecdotes however illustrate very well the way of life in the Cynic position.
Antisthenes (444 - 371 B.C.E.)
Antisthenes, an Athenian (but not a pure blooded one), was an associate of Socrates. He was attracted particularly by Socrates' ability to live a simple life without luxuries and his refusal to govern his life solely by pleasure and pain. This provided a model for Antisthenes' own asceticism. Moreover, he believed that a virtuous life is more important than following social conventions.
According to Diogenes Laertius, he wore just one garment all of the time. And he had a reputation for wittiness. Upon being told that many people admired him, he said, "What have I done wrong?" When a friend was upset about having lost his notes, Antisthenes said, "You should have inscribed them on your mind, instead of on paper."
Diogenes (404 - 323 B.C.E.)
According to Will Durant in The Story of Civilization Part II: The Life of Greece, Diogenes' fame during his lifetime was second only to that of Alexander the Great. This homeless hippie with theatrical flair had a knack for engaging in outrageous acts, tempered by a sense of humor.
Diogenes came to Athens from Sinope, a port on the Black Sea, after being banished because of a scandal involving the coinage of money. He became a follower of Anthisthenes.
Diogenes strove for a simple life that approximated as close as possible to nature; he disdained both social convention and the lives of his fellow citizens. He ate, talked, and slept wherever he happened to be―often in public places, such as temples. He saw no reason for seeking privacy when doing natural acts; so he believed in answering the calls of nature or love in public. He managed with a single garment as clothing during the day and as a blanket during the night and with a rucksack for food or whatever. For a time, he lived in a barrel. And he threw away his cup and bowl as unnecessary when he observed that a child using one's hands or some hollowed out bread could drink or eat without them.
Diogenes Laertius is the foremost teller of tales surrounding Diogenes the Cynic.
Diogenes had little respect for his philosophical contemporaries. When someone spoke favorably of the Parmenidean view that motion does not exist, he got up and moved around. When Plato described human beings as "featherless bipeds," Diogenes plucked the feathers from a chicken and announced, "Here is Plato's human being."
Diogenes once went around Athens with a lighted lamp during the day, saying that he was trying to find a human being. He walked into the theater when everyone else was leaving and justified it by saying that this was what he was doing all his life. When he was speaking seriously and no one was listening, he started whistling―until everyone gathered round him―so he could berate them for being interested in nonsense, but not serious thought. He once went begging before a statue and justified it by saying that he needed practice in being turned down. When a miserly man was slow to respond to his begging, he told him that he was just seeking food, not funeral expenses. Seeing a bad archer, he sat down beside the target―saying that he did not want to get hit. Upon entering a magnificent mansion and being told especially not to spit on anything, he spat in the man's face―so as not to dirty the house. At a feast, some people were throwing all the bones to him as if he were a dog; so Diogenes acted like a dog and urinated on them.
When Alexander the Great stood beside him and asked what the great king could do for him, Diogenes supposedly replied, "Stand out of my light." According to legend, Alexander once said that if he could not be Alexander, then he would like to be Diogenes.
Among the different versions of his death, the two most striking report that he died of a severe colic after eating raw octopus or that he was severely bitten while dividing up an octopus among dogs.
Philosophical Significance of the Cynics
The Cynics had little to offer in the way of constructive solutions either to complicated problems in society or to intellectual problems in philosophy. But they were effective critics of the pretensions of others. By being "cynical" about social conventions and abstract thinking, they offered a continual challenge to mainstream society and thinkers―much as the hippies of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States did during the twentieth century.
Skeptics
Skepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes
appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever, with the
result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and
reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of
mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness"
or quietude.
(Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism)
Once you understand the meaning of "equipollence," Sextus Empiricus' definition of skepticism above is admirably clear. If, for any allegedly true judgment or statement, you can come up with an opposing judgment or statement that is equally likely to be true, then the initial and opposing judgments or statements are equipollent. Given any statement, the Skeptic argues that you can always formulate an equipollent opposing statement and therefore you must suspend judgment as to whether the initial statement is true or false.
Proponents of Skepticism
Sophists such as Protagoras and Gorgias were early skeptics in the sense that they denied the existence of objective truth.
The Skeptic school of philosophy however begins with Pyrrho of Elis (360 - 270 B.C.E.). He may have accompanied Alexander the Great on his conquests in India. There are two widely different accounts of his life―one that his skepticism led to an extreme impracticality whereby he ignored all hazards and survived largely because his friends took steps to protect him, the other that he confined his skepticism to judgments and was quite wise in practical life. He left no writings.
According to tradition, Pyrrho left us with two basic tenets of Skepticism―namely, that appearances are indeterminate in establishing truth or falsity and that we can attain quietude, or peace of mind, by suspending judgment. His Skepticism focused more upon ethics, or a way of living, than the criteria for knowledge. He was sufficiently revered that the Skeptic school came to be known as Pyrrhonism.
Aenesidemus (c. 100 - c. 40 B.C.E.) focused upon the criteria of knowledge justifying Pyrrhonian skepticism. He formulated the famous Ten Tropes, modes of thinking or arguing that lead to suspension of judgment. Very little is known about his life and his writings did not survive, although we have an account of his position through the works of Sextus Empiricus.
Sextus Empiricus (late second, early third century, C.E.) was a compiler of Skeptic doctrines rather than an original thinker; but his thorough accounts are the primary source for our understanding of ancient Skepticism. He wrote four volumes: Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Against the Logicians, Against the Physicists and Against the Ethicists, Against the Professors. His life is pretty much a mystery, although he apparently had a medical background.
The account of Skepticism here relies heavily upon his works.
Carneades (c. 213 - c. 128 B.C.E.) became a leader of Plato's Academy after it had turned from Platonic doctrines to a more skeptical point of view. Apparently he was a workaholic. According to legend, he could become so absorbed in philosophical thinking while eating that others had to move his hands for him. He was a noted orator―especially famous for an Athenian mission to Rome in 156 about taxation, where he dazzled everyone by taking opposite positions on the nature of justice on successive days. His main contribution to Skepticism consists in his taking a more moderate position―one stressing the need for accepting probabilities in directing practical life.
We consider two forms of Skepticism here, the more extreme Pyrrhonic version and the milder Skepticism of Carneades.
Pyrrhonic Skepticism
Equipollence
All statements are equipollent—that is, no statement is more probable or less probable than any other. Hence we should suspend judgment with respect to truth or falsity—thereby attaining a state of quietude where we are unperturbed by the issue.
1. There is no denial that we have appearances; but there is denial about what the appearances represent. Thus the Skeptic makes no claim that an appearance represents a true state of affairs.
2. As a matter of convenience, for the conduct of practical life, we can act according to our instinctual feelings or the current customs of the country; but this policy of convenience in no way asserts a claim about the truth or falsity of anything.
3. Suspension of judgment should not be regarded as involving any dogmatic assertions. Accordingly, the Skeptic does not claim that the statement, "All statements are equipollent," is true.
Tropes
Aenesidemus provided a more detailed justification of Skepticism by laying out ten tropes, or modes of thinking leading to suspension of judgment. Each trope tries to show the unreliability of a particular type of thinking in establishing a correct judgment.
1. Differences in appearances due to the differences among animals
There is no reason to presume that our human sensory appearances properly represent underlying objects because sensory appearances vary so widely among different animals. For example, with respect to touch, appearances will vary according to whether it is an animal with flesh, shells, prickles, feathers, or scales. Similarly, visual organs may be concave, plane, or convex which affects the way subjects appear.
We cannot look to human rationality as a way to better distinguish among appearances, because we find animals quite capable of reasoning. For example, even dogs can recognize friends from enemies, take actions to cure themselves of injury, and communicate in a variety of ways.
2. Differences in appearances due to the differences among human beings
Different people react physically to substances in different ways: Wine may cause diarrhea in some, but not in others; persons differ in their digestion of meat and fish; some are more affected by poisons than others; some people are allergic to substances that others are not; a medicinal purgative may have no effect on some persons. Accordingly, persons' choices as to what to seek or avoid will vary widely so that we cannot establish a "correct" choice. Moreover, we cannot rely upon a majority view, since we have not encountered the totality of all human beings.
3. Differences in appearances due to the differences among the sensory organs
We cannot determine the real nature of something when it affects different senses differently. For example, a painting may be three dimensional to the eyes, but two dimensional to the touch; an oil may be pleasant to smell but bitter to taste. Furthermore, since we are limited to just five senses, we cannot be sure that an object does not have additional qualities only apparent to additional senses―similar to a blind and deaf person who does not see or hear.
4. Differences in appearances due to differences in circumstantial conditions
We cannot determine the real nature of something when how it appears varies so much with different circumstantial conditions. For example, being sleep or awake will give rise to different impressions; the same air will appear colder to an older person than to a younger one; the same person will seem beautiful to a lover, but ugly to someone else; the same food will taste delicious to a hungry person, but disagreeable to a full one.
There is no way to establish a "natural" (as opposed to an "unnatural") condition from which to make judgments, or to establish some privileged position from which to make them.
5. Differences in appearances due to differences in positions, distances, and locations
The same tower may appear round from a distance, but rectangular up close; the light of a lamp appears dim in the sun, but bright in the dark; sound coming from a flute is different from a sound in the air. Since appearances are so relative to positions, distances, and locations, there is no way to establish the real nature of an object.
6. Differences in appearances due to differences in admixtures, i.e. the particular ways things combine together at different times
There is no pure representation of an external object because of the particular mixtures by which sensory organs perceive. For example, the eyes consist of membranes and liquids which combine to produce different resultant perceptions, yellowish ones to someone suffering from jaundice and reddish ones to someone with bloodshot eyes.
7. Differences in appearances due to differences in the quantity and constitution of underlying objects
As separate parts, the filings of a goat's horn appear white; but combined in the horn, they look black, similarly, chips of a type of marble that appear white appear yellow when combined into a block of marble. A large quantity of food causes indigestion, whereas a smaller quantity does not. So we cannot make absolute statements about the real nature of external objects.
8. The relativity of all things
For the previous tropes, an appearance always is relative to some particular entity or condition―to a particular type of animal or human being, to a particular circumstance, to a particular admixture, to a particular combination or quantity. So all things are relative and there is no way to establish the real nature of external objects.
9. Differences in appearances due to whether events occur frequently or rarely
The sun does not amaze us as much as a comet does, because we encounter it so frequently. Similarly, the first earthquake we experience is more amazing than later earthquakes. How precious we judge a stone or metal to be depends upon how rare it is, so that gold is more precious than iron. So how something appears to us varies with its frequency or rarity.
10. Differences in ethics regarding rules of conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions
Different peoples and different persons differ so much in their rules of conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and conceptions that we cannot declare a right course of conduct.
For example, Sextus Empiricus says,
"And we oppose habit to the other things, as for instance to law when we say that amongst the Persians it is the habit to indulge in intercourse with males, but amongst the Romans it is forbidden by law to do so; and that, whereas with us adultery is forbidden, amongst the Massagetae it is traditionally regarded as an indifferent custom, as Eudoxus of Cnidos relates in the first book of his Travels; and that, whereas intercourse with a mother is forbidden in our country, in Persia it is the general custom to form such marriages; and also among the Egyptians men marry their sisters, a thing forbidden by law amongst us. And habit is opposed to rule of conduct when, whereas most men have intercourse with their own wives in retirement, did it in public with Hipparchia; and Diogenes went about with one shoulder bare, whereas we dress in the customary manner. It is opposed also to legendary belief, as when the legends say that Cronos devoured his own children, though it is our habit to protect our children; and whereas it is customary with us to revere the gods as being good and immune from evil, they are presented by the poets as suffering wounds and envying one another. And habit is opposed to dogmatic conception when, whereas it is our habit to pray to the gods for good things, Epicurus declares that the divinity pays no heed to us; and when Aristippus considers the wearing of feminine attire a matter of indifference, though we consider it a disgraceful thing."
(Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Ch. XIV)
Carneades' More Moderate Skepticism
Carneades set out to refute criticisms that Skepticism led to paralysis or inaction. Although he agreed with the Pyrrhonistic view that the quest for absolute knowledge of anything was indeterminate, he argued that, for the purposes of practical life, we can distinguish different degrees of probability―rather than simply falling back on feelings or customs of one's country as a mater of convenience. He laid out three different degrees of probability:
1. Appearances that are Probable in Themselves (the lowest level of probability) - That is, a particular sensory appearance, aside from other appearances, is enough in itself to induce belief.
a. Sometimes this is the appropriate level just because there is not enough time for more thorough examination. For example, if you step into an unlighted room and see something coiled, you may jump over it, presuming that it is a snake. (The example comes from Sextus Empiricus, as an explanation of Carneades' position.)
2. Appearances that are Probable in Themselves and Also are Not Contradicted by Other Appearances - That is, a particular sensory appearance is consistent with all the other appearances we are currently aware of.
a. In the coiled something example, with more time, you may notice that it is motionless, leading to the conclusion that is more likely to be a coiled rope; and you may then prod at it with a stick and finding it still motionless increase the likelihood that it is a coiled rope.
3. Appearances that are Probable in Themselves, are Not Contradicted by Other Appearances, and Also Stand Up to Close Scrutiny (the highest level of probability). - That is, a particular sensory appearance holds up before whatever critical intellectual tests we apply to it.
a. For the coiled rope, we can add to the probability with more intense scrutiny. Thus we can make sure that all the appearances are plainly perceived, that our senses are functioning well, that we are wide awake rather than sleeping, that no environmental conditions disrupt the sensing process, that we are appropriately situated to receive the sensory appearances, and that there is not so much motion occurring as to cause confusion.
b. This third level of probability is especially worthy of our assent—although, ultimately, we are still making a subjective judgment.
Sextus Empiricus: Writings (Selections)
My Sources
R.B. Bury, tr., Sextus Empiricus: In Four Volumes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933-1949).
This is a standard edition of the complete works of Sextus Empiricus in the Loeb Classical Library. And Sextus is the best ancient source for Skepticism.
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1990).
This is the R.B. Bury translation of the first volume of Sextus Empiricus' works, available in an inexpensive paperback edition.
Phillip P. Hallie, "Aenesidemus," "Carneades," "Pyrhho," "Sextus Empiricus," entries in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: MacMillan, 1967), 8 vols.
Given our limited knowledge of the ancient Skeptics, these encyclopedia entries are fairly detailed. I found them quite useful.
Charlotte L. Stough, Greek Skepticism: A Study in Epistemology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).
This book provides useful, extended commentary on the ancient Skeptics.