Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy

brought to you by Ron Yezzi

Emeritus Professor of Philosophy

Minnesota State University, Mankato

© Copyright 2003, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi

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Topics

Hedonism

Aristippus

Epicureanism

Epicurus

What's Impressive About Epicurus

Life

Standard of Truth

Peace of Mind as the Goal of Life

Free Will

Writings

Lucretius

Atomism

The Soul

Truth and Falsity

Rejection of Supernatural Explanations

Hedonism and Epicureanism

Epicureanism is an ancient school of philosophy founded by Epicurus in the generation after Aristotle. Post-Aristotelian ancient philosophy moved away from the development of philosophical systems and toward more concern with achieving a proper state of contentment in life. Epicureanism reflected this shift. The school had considerable influence over several centuries. The most notable Epicurean, besides Epicurus himself, was Lucretius who produced a major work, On the Nature of Things, that has survived.

Hedonism

Epicureanism is a form of hedonism, that is, the ethical position that the good life consists in the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. It is a special kind of hedonism however, not to be confused with the common conception of hedonists as wild seekers of all kinds of sensual pleasures. That common conception is associable more with another ancient philosopher, Aristippus, who definitely was not an Epicurean.

Aristippus

Aristippus (c. 435 - c. 350 B.C.E.) came from Cyrene in northern Africa and was the founder of the Cyrenaic school, which advocated sensual hedonism. He went to Athens and became an associate of Socrates―although he apparently focused upon one facet of Socrates' life, namely, his ability to enjoy sensual pleasures.

According to Aristippus' view, the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain guide our lives. And more particularly, sensual pleasures outweigh intellectual pleasures in importance. What we experience through the senses in the present is more certain and reliable than intellectually abstract thinking. A desire to experience as much sensual pleasure as possible results.

Although Aristippus seemed to live a life of prudent sensual hedonism, the philosophy itself seems to advocate more the pleasures of the moment.

Epicureanism

Epicurean hedonism focuses more upon the avoidance of pain than the pursuit of pleasure. That is, if you direct your life primarily toward avoiding pain, a life of contentment and pleasure will result. Moreover, since the pursuit of sensual pleasures is especially likely to produce pain, an intellectual life is superior to one based upon gratification of the senses.

Epicurus (341 - 271 B.C.E.)

What's Impressive About Epicurus

Epicurus turned attention away from the grander philosophical systems of Plato and Aristotle (that easily led to serving merely intellectual interests) toward a focus of philosophical activity upon practical life. In a sense, he returns to Socrates' interests.

Although he advocates hedonism, the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, he gives the position an unusual negative twist by stressing the avoidance of pain as the primary goal.

Although he strongly advocates friendship and justice in human relationships, he turns away from advocacy of public service―arguing instead that we need to withdraw from concerns for the greater society.

Life and Savory Info

Epicurus was born in Samos, off the coast of Asia Minor (see map). Apparently he became interested in philosophy as a young teenager and was largely self-taught (at least in the sense that he never was a student of another well-known philosopher. In his writings, he never cited other sources for his ideas (a fact that sometimes led to criticism that he was stingy in granting credit to others for some of his ideas, particularly, the atomism that may have been borrowed from Democritus).

At about thirty-five years of age, he founded a school and community near Athens that came to be known as The Garden.

There is a strange, severe gap between the real Epicurus and some tales about him as well as between the real Epicurean philosophy and its reputation.

According to some tales, he frequently consorted with courtesans (high-class women of questionable repute) and forced himself to vomit twice a day because of overindulgence. Diogenes Laertius however describes the tellers of such tales as "mad," because there were numerous witnesses to Epicurus' high character and kindness as well as evidence that he was revered by his fellow citizens.

Likewise, the Epicurean philosophy historically often suggests the unbridled pursuit of sensual pleasures. For example, consider this passage from Shakespeare's King Lear, where Lear's daughter Goneril is berating her father:

Here do you keep a hundred knights and squires;

Men so disorder'd, so debosh'd [debauched], and bold

That this our court, infected with their manners,

Shows like a riotous inn. Epicurism and lust

Make it more like a tavern or a brothel

Than a grac'd palace. The shame itself doth speak

For instant remedy.

Yet attention to the actual Epicurean writings dispels any notion that Epicurus advocated a life of sensual pleasure.

Although Epicurus wrote extensively, the vast majority of the writings have been lost. What has survived are three letters (Letter to Herodotus, Letter to Pythocles, Letter to Menoeceus) plus a summary of Principal Doctrines―all preserved through Diogenes Laertius.

The Standard of Truth

For Epicurus, we arrive at truth by tracing terms and opinions to sensations, because sensations exist as a brute reality that requires no proof. Sensations (sense impressions and sometimes feelings) establish a clarity for terms and opinions that would otherwise be obscure. Accordingly, he seeks naturalistic explanations of events that can be related to the evidence of our sensations rather than seeking supernatural explanations.

Supernatural explanations tend to be dogmatic assertions that leave little room for a variety of possibilities, whereas reliance on sensations allows us consider various possibilities that then can be tested by evidence.

Sensations and direct rational inferences from sensations are reliable; but errors (falsity) can arise if some interference occurs. For example, if the image given off by a thing, in the form of a thin film of atoms, were to encounter another thin film of atoms, this interference might confuse the senses so as to produce a false opinion.

Peace of Mind as the Goal of Life

1. Peace of Mind with Respect to Oneself

a. Pleasure and pain are the primary motivations in life and we best achieve pleasure by avoiding pain—a negative form of hedonism.

b. No pleasure is bad in itself; but it is bad if it is a means to greater pain as a consequence.

c. One must reject the pursuit of sensual pleasure:

“When, therefore, we say that pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the

pleasures of the debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as

some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or interpret

them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul

from confusion. For it is not continued drinkings and revels, or the enjoyment of

female society, or feasts of fish and other such things as a costly table supplies,

that make life pleasant, but sober contemplation, which examines the reasons for

all choice and avoidance, and which puts to flight the vain opinions from which

the greater part of the confusion arises, which troubles the soul.”

(from Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus )

d. Rational thinking establishes the proper limits for dealing with pleasure and pain.

e. A simple life is best because it spare us from pain—particularly because we have no luxuries to lose through misfortunes.

f. A quiet life and retirement from the world is our best protection from the pains that other human beings can cause us. So Epicurus advocated turning away from public service.

2. Peace of Mind with Respect to Relations with Other People

a. Friendship (within the context of a quiet life and retirement from the world) is the greatest blessing of a complete life.

b. Justice is a practical convention that arises to order the interactions among people so as to avoid injuries to one another; it is not some sort of Platonic Form. Thus, although justice is not good in itself and therefore is not a worthy goal in itself, it is extremely useful in human life and we avoid much pain by treating others justly.

3. Peace of Mind with Respect to Nature

a. The gods exist; but we have no reason to fear them.

1) Superstitions about the gods need to be dispelled rationally so that we avoid pain.

2) Naturalistic (rather than supernatural) explanations of events such as earthquakes,

tornadoes, etc. dispel superstitions and are, thus, to be sought.

b. Nature is a concourse of invisible, material (physical) atoms in motion. The atoms are indivisible, unchangeable, and infinite in number―although there is not quite an infinite number of differences among them. Their primary properties are shape, size, and weight; and they can exist simply by themselves or in combination with other atoms (to form larger bodies). They move in space at equal speed unless involved in collisions; and they give rise to innumerable worlds.

1) That atoms exist is a direct inference from sensations. We know through the senses that bodies exist; but these bodies cannot be infinitely divisible because they would then be too weak (or too close to non-existence) to effect anything; hence composite bodies must be reducible to elementary ones, atoms, that are indivisible and unchangeable.

c. The soul is composed of extremely fine atoms that dissipate at death. So death is merely the absence of sensation due to this dissipation of the soul and therefore is not to be feared; it is a state of nothingness.

d. For sense perception to occur, atoms from the object must pass into our bodies through our senses. Smell, as we know it today, is a good model for Epicurus' position. Thus, in sight, an actual image of the object, composed of atoms and comprising a thin film, is given off and enters into our bodies through our eyes.

Free Will

Epicurus upholds the importance of human agency, or free will, in human actions―arguing that it is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. How can we morally praise or blame a human action if it occurs simply due to necessity or chance? To attribute all human actions to necessity, or destiny, evokes hopelessness, a sense of being a slave to fate. To attribute human actions to chance suggests that the most important acts, those relating to moral praise and blame, are simply product of disorder.

Epicurus: Writings

Note: The writings that follow are taken from Charles Bakewell's Sourcebook in Ancient Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907).

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

(from Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus)

FIRST of all, then, one must determine with exactness the notion comprehended under each separate word, in order to be able to refer to it, as to a certain criterion, the conceptions which emanate from ourselves, the ulterior researches and the difficulties; otherwise the judgment has no foundation. One goes on from demonstration to demonstration ad infinitum; or else one gains nothing beyond mere words. In fact, it is absolutely necessary that in every word we should perceive directly, and without the assistance of any demonstration, the fundamental notion which it expresses, if we wish to have any foundation to which we may refer our researches, our difficulties, and our personal judgments, whatever in other respects may be the criterion which we adopt, whether we take as our standard the impressions produced on our senses, or the actual impression in general; or whether we cling to the idea by itself, or to any other criterion.

We must also note carefully the impressions which we receive in the presence of objects, in order to bring ourselves back to that point in the circumstances in which it is necessary to suspend the judgment; or even when the question is about things, the evidence of which is not immediately perceived.

When these foundations are once laid we may pass to the study of those things, the evidence of which is not immediate . . . .

One must not forget that the production of images is simultaneous with the thought; for from the surface of the bodies images of this kind are continually flowing off in an insensible manner indeed, because they are immediately replaced. They preserve for a long time the same disposition, and the same arrangement that the atoms do in the solid body, although, notwithstanding, their form may be sometimes altered. The direct production of images in space is equally instantaneous, because these images are only light substances destitute of depth.

But there are other manners in which natures of this kind are produced; for there is nothing in all this which at all contradicts the senses, if one only considers in what way the senses are exercised, and if one is inclined to explain the relation which is established between external objects and ourselves. Also, one must admit that something passes from external objects into us in order to produce in us sight and the knowledge of forms; for it is difficult to conceive that external objects can affect us through the medium of the air which is between us and them, or by means of rays, whatever emissions proceed from us to them, so as to give us an impression of their form and color. This phenomenon, on the contrary, is perfectly explained, if we admit that certain images of the same color, of the same shape, and of a magnitude pass from these objects to us,and so arrive at being seen and comprehended. These images are animated by an exceeding rapidity, and, as on the other side, the solid object forming a compact mass, and comprising a vast quantity of atoms, emits always the same quantity of particles, the vision is continued, and only produces in us one single perception which preserves always the same relation to the object. Every conception, every sensible perception which bears upon the form or the other attributes of these images, is only the same form of the solid perceived directly, either in virtue of a sort of actual and continued condensation of the image, or in consequence of the traces which it has left in us.

Error and false judgments always come from our adding in certain imaginings of our own which are occasioned by some motion in our own bodies, which motion in turn is connected with some impression or direct representation, but also connected with some opinion peculiar to ourselves, which is the parent of error. In fact the representations which intelligence reflects like a mirror, whether one perceives them in a dream, or by any other conceptions of the intellect, or of any other of the criteria, can never resemble the objects that one calls real and true, unless there were objects of this kind perceived directly. And, on the other side, error could not be possible if we did not receive some other motion also, a sort of initiative of intelligence connected, it is true, with direct representation, but going beyond that representation. These conceptions being connected with the direct perception which produces the representation, but going beyond it, in consequence of a motion peculiar to the individual thought, produce error when it is not confirmed by evidence, or when it is contradicted by evidence; but when it is confirmed, or when it is not contradicted by evidence, then it produces truth.

We must carefully preserve these principles in order not to reject the authority of the faculties which perceive truth directly; and not, on the other hand, to allow what is false to be established with equal firmness, so as to throw everything into confusion.

PHYSICAL SPECULATIONS

(from Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus)

And, first of all, we must admit that nothing can come of that which does not exist; for, were the fact otherwise, then everything would be produced from everything, and there would be no need of any seed. And if that which disappeared were so absolutely destroyed as to become nonexistent, then everything would soon perish, as the things with which they would be dissolved would have no existence. But, in truth, the universal whole always was such as it now is, and always will be such. For there is nothing into which it can change; for there is nothing beyond this universal whole which can penetrate into it, and produce any change in it . . . .

The universe is infinite. For that which is finite has an extreme, and that which has an extreme is looked at in relation to something else. Consequently, that which has not an extreme, has no boundary; and if it has no boundary, it must be infinite, and not terminated by any limit.

Again: the atoms which form the bodies, these full elements from which the combined bodies come, and into which they resolve themselves, assume an incalculable variety of forms, for the numerous differences which the bodies present cannot possibly result from an aggregate of the same forms, [and] the atoms are in a continual state of motion . . . .

Among the atoms, some are separated by great distances, others come very near to one another in the formation of combined bodies, or at times are enveloped by others which are combining; but in this latter case they, nevertheless, preserve their own peculiar motion, thanks to the nature of the vacuum, which separates the one from the other, and yet offers them no resistance. The solidity which they possess causes them, while knocking against one another, to react the one upon the other; till at last the repeated shocks bring on the dissolution of the combined body; and for all this there is no external cause, the atoms and the vacuum being the only causes . . . .

One must also allow that the atoms possess no one of the qualities of sensible objects, except form, weight, magnitude, and anything else that is unavoidably inherent in form; in fact every quality is changeable, but the atoms are necessarily unchangeable; for it is impossible but that in the dissolution of combined bodies, there must be something which continues solid and indestructible, of such a kind, that it will not change either into what does not exist, or out of what does not exist; but that it results either from a simple displacement of parts, which is the most usual case, or from the addition or subtraction of certain particles . . . .

Moreover, all the atoms are necessarily animated by the same rapidity, when they move across the vacuum, or when no obstacle thwarts them. For why should heavy atoms have a more rapid movement than those which are small and light, since in no quarter do they encounter any obstacle? Why, on the other hand, should the small atoms have a rapidity superior to that of the large ones, since both the one and the other find everywhere an easy passage, from the very moment that no obstacle intervenes to thwart their movements? Movement from low to high, horizontal movement to and fro, in virtue of the reciprocal percussion of the atoms, movement downward, in virtue of their weight, will be all equal, for in whatever sense the atom moves it must have a movement as rapid as the thought, till the moment when it is repelled, in virtue of some external cause, or of its own proper weight, by the shock of some object which resists it . . . . At the same time, an atom has not, in any moment perceptible to the intelligence, a continued movement in the same direction; but rather a series of oscillating movements from which there results, in the last analysis, a continued movement perceptible to the senses . . . .

Let us now return to the study of the affections, and of the sensations; for this will be the best method of proving that the soul is a bodily substance composed of slight particles, diffused over all the members of the body, and presenting a great analogy to a sort of spirit, having an admixture of heat, resembling at one time one, and at another time the other of those two principles. There exists in it a special part, endowed with an extreme mobility, in consequence of the exceeding slightness of the elements which compose it, and also in reference to its more immediate sympathy with the rest of the body. That it is which the faculties of the soul sufficiently prove, and the passions, and the mobility of its nature, and the thoughts, and, in a word, everything, the privation of which is death. We must admit that it is in the soul most especially that the principle of sensation resides. At the same time it would not possess this power if it were not enveloped by the rest of the body which communicates it to it, and in its turn receives it from it, but only a certain measure; for there are certain affections of the soul of which it is not capable.

THE PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS

(from Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus)

Let no one delay to study philosophy while he is young, and when he is old let him not become weary of the study; for no man can ever find the time unsuitable or too late to study the health of his soul. And he who asserts either that it is not yet time to philosophize, or that the hour is passed, is like a man who should say that the time is not yet come to be happy, or that it is too late. So that both young and old should study philosophy, the one in order that, when he is old, he may be young in good things through the pleasing recollection of the past, and the other in order that he may be at the same time both young and old, in consequence of his absence of fear for the future.

It is right then for a man to consider the things which produce happiness, since, if happiness is present, we have everything, and when it is absent, we do everything with a view to possess it. Now, what I have constantly recommended to you, these things I would have you do and practise, considering them to be the elements of living well. First of all, believe that God is a being incorruptible and happy, as the common opinion of the world about God dictates; and attach to your idea of him nothing which is inconsistent with incorruptibility or with happiness; and think that he is invested with everything which is able to preserve to him this happiness, in conjunction with incorruptibility. For there are gods; though our knowledge of them is indistinct. But they are not of the character which people in general attribute to them; for they do not pay a respect to them which accords with the ideas that they entertain of them. And that man is not impious who discards the gods believed in by the many, but he who applies to the gods the opinions entertained of them by the many. For the assertions of the many about the gods are not anticipations, but false opinions . And in consequence of these, the greatest evils which befall wicked men, and the benefits which are conferred on the good, are all attributed to the gods; for they connect all their ideas of them with a comparison of human virtues, and everything which is different from human qualities they regard as incompatible with the divine nature.

Accustom yourself also to think death a matter with which we are not at all concerned, since all good and all evil is in sensation, and since death is only the privation of sensation. On which account, the correct knowledge of the fact that death is no concern of ours, makes the mortality of life pleasant to us, inasmuch as it sets forth no illimitable time, but relieves us from the longing for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in living to a man who rightly comprehends that there is nothing terrible in ceasing to live; so that he was a silly man who said that he feared death, not because it would grieve him when it was present, but because it did grieve him while it was future. For it is very absurd that that which does not distress a man when it is present, should afflict him when only expected. Therefore, the most formidable of all evils, death, is nothing to us, since, when we exist, death is not present to us; and when death is present, then we have no existence. It is no concern then either of the living or of the dead; since to the one it has no existence, and the other class has no existence itself. But people in general at times flee from death as the greatest of evils, and at times wish for it as a rest from the evils in life. Nor is the not living a thing feared, since living is not connected with it; nor does the wise man think not living an evil; but, just as he chooses food, not preferring that which is most abundant, but that which is nicest; so, too, he enjoys time, not measuring it as to whether it is of the greatest length, but as to whether it is most agreeable. And he who enjoins a young man to live well, and an old man to die well, is a simpleton, not only because of the constantly delightful nature of life, but also because the care to live well is identical with the care to die well. And he was still more wrong who said:

“Tis well to taste of life, and then when born To pass with quickness to the shades below.”

For if this really was his opinion why did he not quit life? for it was easily in his power to do so, if it really was his belief. But if he was joking, then he was talking foolishly in a case where it ought not to be allowed; and we must recollect that the future is not our own, nor, on the other hand, is it wholly not our own, I mean so that we can never altogether await it with a feeling of certainty that it will be, nor altogether despair of it as what will never be. And we must consider that some of the passions are natural, and some empty; and of the natural ones some are necessary, and some merely natural. And of the necessary ones some are necessary to happiness, others are necessary that the body may be exempt from trouble, and others, again, merely in order that life itself may be; for a correct theory, with regard to these things, can refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the imperturbability of the soul, since this is the end of living happily. For it is for the sake of this that we do everything, wishing to avoid grief and fear; and when once this is the case, with respect to us, then the storm of the soul is, as I may say, put an end to; since the animal is unable to go as if to something deficient, and to seek something different from that by which the good of the soul and body will be perfected.

For then we have need of pleasure when we grieve, because pleasure is not present; but when we do not grieve, then we have no need of pleasure; and on this account, we affirm that pleasure is the beginning and end of living happily; for we have recognized this as the first good, being connate with us; and it is with reference to it that we begin every choice and avoidance; and to this we come as if we judged of all good by passion as the standard; and, since this is the first good and connate with us, on this account we do not choose every pleasure, but at times we pass over many pleasures when any difficulty is likely to ensue from them; and we think many pains better than pleasures, when a greater pleasure follows them, if we endure the pain for a time.

Every pleasure is therefore a good on account of its own nature, but it does not follow that every pleasure is worthy of being chosen; just as every pain is an evil, and yet every pain must not be avoided; but it is right to estimate all these things by the measurement and view of what is suitable and unsuitable; for at times we may feel the good as an evil, and at times, on the contrary, we may feel the evil as good. And we think contentment a great good, not in order that we may never have but a little, but in order that, if we have not much, we may make use of a little, being genuinely persuaded that those men enjoy luxury most completely who are the best able to do without it; and that everything which is natural is easily provided, and what is useless is not easily procured. And simple flavors give as much pleasure as costly fare, when everything that can give pain, and every feeling of want, is removed; and corn and water give the most extreme pleasure when any one in need eats them. To accustom one's self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive habits is a great ingredient in the perfecting of health, and makes a man free from hesitation with respect to the necessary uses of life. And when we, on certain occasions, fall in with more sumptuous fare, it makes us in a better disposition toward it, and renders us fearless with respect to fortune. When, therefore, we say that pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else interpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion. For it is not continued drinkings and revels, or the enjoyment of female society, or feasts of fish and other such things as a costly table supplies, that make life pleasant, but sober contemplation, which examines into the reasons for all choice and avoidance, and which puts to flight the vain opinions from which the greater part of the confusion arises which troubles the soul.

Now, the beginning and the greatest good of all these things is prudence, on which account prudence is something more valuable than even philosophy, inasmuch as all the other virtues spring from it, teaching us that it is not possible to live pleasantly unless one also lives prudently, and honorably, and justly; and that one cannot live prudently, and honorably, and justly, without living pleasantly; for the virtues are connate with living agreeably, and living agreeably is inseparable from the virtues. Since, who can you think better than that man who has holy opinions respecting the gods, and who is utterly fearless with respect to death, and who has properly contemplated the end of nature, and who comprehends that the chief good is easily perfected and easily provided; and the greatest evil lasts but a short period, and causes but brief pain? And who has no belief in necessity, which is set up by some as the mistress of all things, but he refers some things to fortune, some to ourselves, because necessity is an irresponsible power, and because he sees that fortune is unstable, while our own will is free; and this freedom constitutes, in our case, a responsibility which makes us encounter blame and praise. Since it would be better to follow the fables about the gods than to be a slave to the fate of the natural philosopher; for the fables which are told give us a sketch, as if we could avert the wrath of God by paying him honor; but the other presents us with necessity which is inexorable.

And he, not thinking fortune a goddess, as the generality esteem her (for nothing is done at random by a god), nor a cause which no man can rely on; for he thinks that good or evil is not given by her to men so as to make them live happily, but that the principles of great goods or great evils are supplied by her; thinking it better to be unfortunate in accordance with reason, than to be fortunate irrationally; for that those actions which are judged to be the best, are rightly done in consequence of reason.

Do you then study these precepts, and those which are akin to them, by all means day and night, pondering on them by yourself, and discussing them with any one like yourself, and then you will never be disturbed by either sleeping or waking fancies, but you will live like a god among men; for a man living amid immortal gods is in no respect like a mortal being.

SOME MAXIMS OF EPICURUS

(from Epicurus' Sovereign Maxims, or Principal Doctrines)

No pleasure is intrinsically bad; but the efficient causes of some pleasures bring with them a great many perturbations of pleasure.

If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.

Irresistible power and great wealth may, up to a certain point, give us security as far as men are concerned; but the security of men in general depends upon the tranquillity of their souls, and their freedom from ambition.

The riches of nature are defined and easily procurable; but vain desires are insatiable.

The wise man is but little favored by fortune; but his reason procures him the greatest and most valuable goods, and these he does enjoy, and will enjoy the whole of his life.

He who is acquainted with the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain which arises from want, and which makes the whole of life perfect, is easily procurable; so that he has no need of those things which can only be attained with trouble.

Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship.

He who desires to live tranquilly without having anything to fear from other men, ought to make himself friends; those whom he cannot make friends of, he should, at least, avoid rendering enemies; and if that is not in his power, he should, as far as possible, avoid all intercourse with them and keep them aloof, as far as it is for his interest to do so.

The happiest men are they who have arrived at the point of having nothing to fear from those who surround them. Such men can live with one another most agreeably, having the firmest grounds of confidence in one another, enjoying the advantages of friendship in all their fulness, and not lamenting, as a pitiable circumstance, the premature death of their friends.

Natural justice is a covenant of what is suitable, leading men to avoid injuring one another, and being injured.

Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury.

In a general point of view, justice is the same thing to every one; for there is something advantageous in mutual society. Nevertheless, the difference of place, and divers other circumstances, make justice vary.

From the moment that a thing declared just by the law is generally recognized as useful for the mutual relations of men, it becomes really just, whether it is universally regarded as such or not.

But if, on the contrary, a thing established by law is not really useful for the social relations, then it is not just.

The just man is the freest of all men from disquietude; but the unjust man is a perpetual prey to it.

Lucretius (c. 95 - 52 B.C.E.)

Lucretius was a Roman follower of Epicurus, writing some two centuries after the master's death. It is difficult to decide whether he just reported on the Epicurean philosophy or whether he made his own original contributions as well. We do know however that his book-length poem, De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), is one of the few major surviving works of Epicureanism.

Even if Lucretius was not an original philosophical thinker, his decision to write in poetic form was both masterful and highly original. He embedded the hard-headed materialistic atomism of Epicurus within a structure of poetic imagination―with words of grandeur and praise as well as of vivid imagery.

Rather than trying to present a thorough analysis of On the Nature of Things, I will confine myself here to several points that complement the treatment of Epicurus already given.

Topics

Atomism

The Soul

Truth and Falsity

Rejection of Supernatural Explanations

Atomism

Does it make sense to say that atoms, invisible to the eye, exist?

Lucretius offers several observation examples to show the existence of something invisible to the naked eye. Thus, wet clothing spread out in the sun dries out so that the moisture must leave; but we never directly observe any tiny bits of moisture leaving. With time, the underside of a ring on your finger thins away, even though we never directly observe tiny particles of metal leaving. And raindrops, given enough time, will scoop out a hole in stone, although we never directly observe the scooped out particles of stone. - (from Book I)

Why must the atoms be indivisible and unchangeable?

If two compound bodies, one large and one small, were both infinitely divisible, then the total sum of the smaller one would be equal to the total sum of the larger one (since one infinite sum is equal to another infinite sum). But this result is rationally impossible; so there must be some minimum bodies with their own nature.

Also if nature broke down bodies into their least parts and this went on infinitely, then it could never reproduce anything out of those parts because they would lack the properties needed to regenerate anything. For example, they would never be capable of the specific motions, weights, and collisions that constituted their being. So there must be indivisible, unchangeable entities.

- (from Book I)

How do different types of atoms produce different types of sensations?

We have sense impressions of dense, hard substances due to the atoms having hooks that bind them firmly together. Our sense impressions of liquids arises because the atoms are more smooth and round. And if the liquid is bitter, then the atoms have a rougher surface. - (Book II)

The Soul

Why must the soul dissipate when the body dies?

Lucretius offers examples of the close relation between the mind and the body.

Just as the body grows and ages, so does the mind. So toddlers totter about with weaker, unsure body development just as their minds show less development. And with old age, people become more feeble in both body and mind.

When the body is racked by disease, the mind suffers as well through pain, grief, and fear.

And the wine that affects the body's functioning―producing slow reflexes, stagerring, and a stuttering tongue―likewise produces changes in the mind that can lead to shouting and brawling.

The mind and body are constantly intertwined so that one cannot function without the other. The mind relies upon the senses that the body provides and can do nothing without the motion of the body. - (Book III)

How can the soul affect the body?

The soul, composed of extremely fine atoms, functions much like the wind moving a sailing ship.:

That particles so fine can whirl around

So great a body and turn this weight of ours;

For wind, so tenuous with its subtle body,

Yet pushes, driving on the mighty ship

Of mighty bulk; . . . - (Book IV)

Truth and Falsity

Why should we trust the senses more than reason alone?

Since all reasoning rises out of the senses, in that it works on sense impressions, it must be faulty if the senses are faulty.

Besides, we cannot live practically, if we do not trust the senses―for example, in recognizing the need to avoid hazardous heights and other dangerous places. Our lives and safety are so dependent upon a sensory foundation that we must trust the senses even when reason fails to find the cause of some particular sense impressions. - (Book IV)

If the senses are reliable, what can we say about the image of a centaur, when centaurs do not exist?

Since images are thin films given off from bodies, they sometimes can collide and combine before we have sense impressions of them. So the image of a horse and the image of a human being can combine to form the image of a centaur, even though no centaur actually exists. This explanation is not a rejection of sensations; rather it is a reasoned explanation depending upon what the senses lead to knowing about atoms and their motions. - (Book IV)

Rejection of Supernatural Explanations

Why are supernatural explanations of natural events unacceptable?

Lucretius argues that the world is too flawed to have been designed by the gods. Too much human toil is necessary to sustain life: humans must deal with arid land, frozen land, land that requires constant cultivation, devastating winds and rains, animal predators, disease and death. It is better to seek natural explanations than to attribute these afflictions to the gods. - (Book V)

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