LACK OF PROTECTION FOR COMMUNITIES AT RISK FROM AMMONIUM NITRATE STORAGE FACILITIES.

EXPLOSION AT THE WEST FERTILIZER PLANT IN TEXAS

On April 17, 2013, an explosion and fire in the West Fertilizer facility in West, Texas, resulted in at least 14 fatalities, 226 injuries, and widespread community damage. Large quantities of ammonium nitrate (AN) fertilizer exploded after being heated by a fire at the storage and distribution facility. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) stated few months ago that the fire and explosion was preventable. It should never have occurred. It resulted from the failure of a company to take the necessary steps to avert a preventable fire and explosion and from the inability of federal, state and local regulatory agencies to identify a serious hazard and correct it.

CAUSE AND ORIGIN INVESTIGATION OF THE DEADLY EXPLOSION AT THE WEST FERTILIZER PLANT IN TEXAS

At around 7:30 p.m. on April 17, 2013, emergency dispatchers received reports of smoke and flames at the West Fertilizer Company’s storage and distribution center in the town of West, Texas (population 2,800), located on Interstate 35 just up the road from Waco. Firefighters from the town’s volunteer fire department rushed to the scene, where the fire seemed to be quickly intensifying. Neighbors who lived nearby, including many residents of the West Rest Haven Nursing Home, located just 200 yards (183 meters) from the West Fertilizer facility, gazed at the fiery spectacle. The nursing home was close enough to the billowing smoke that the facility’s staff began moving residents to more protected areas inside the building to avoid the hazard.

A crew of 22 emergency responders arrived at the site and, assisted by two West residents, attempted to douse the flames. The fire was large and getting bigger, and it was in the process of engulfing a wooden warehouse. The structure was comprised of wood-framed bins with wooden walls and contained approximately 60 tons of fertilizer-grade ammonium nitrate, a granular solid that can detonate in certain conditions when it interacts with fire. Built in 1961, the building lacked automatic sprinklers or suppression features and was not required to install them, since Texas lacks a state fire code. There were no state regulations guiding appropriate storage amounts of the fertilizer. The facility was unattended at the time of the fire.

View of the fire just a second prior to the explosion

About 20 minutes after the fire was reported, the ammonium nitrate detonated, producing an enormous explosion that pulverized much of the West Fertilizer site and sent chunks of concrete, wood, and steel hurtling into the surrounding neighborhoods. The explosion’s shockwave rocked the entire town.

View of the moment of the explosion

The blast was heard 80 miles away and registered a magnitude 2.1 tremor that was recorded by the U.S. Geological Survey. At the West Rest Haven Nursing Home, the windows shattered and the roof collapsed, trapping scores of elderly residents beneath the rubble. Across the street from the nursing home, the West Terrace apartment complex was shredded by the explosion. A half-mile from the blast site, the West Middle School suffered major damage, as did the West Intermediate School. Nearly 200 homes were damaged or destroyed.

The blast from the explosion

The explosion killed 15 people: 10 firefighters, ranging in age from 26 to 52; their two civilian helpers; two residents from the West Terrace apartment complex; and a nursing home resident. About 200 people were injured. Many of the impacted structures — including the two schools, the nursing home, and the apartment complex — have since been demolished. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), which has released preliminary findings on the incident and is working on a final report, estimates that total damages could exceed $230 million. The cause of the fire has not been determined; in its preliminary findings, the CSB said that “the explosion resulted from an intense fire … that led to the detonation of” the stored ammonium nitrate.

Residences destroyed by the blast

West prompted an executive order by President Barack Obama directing the federal government to improve safety and security at chemical facilities, and the Department of Homeland Security has sought the assistance of NFPA as part of its efforts to carry out that order. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has also answered calls to action from the president and CSB by taking part in a working group, including the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), that is addressing chemical facility safety.

The activity is timely and necessary, since the potential for another disaster extends far beyond West, Texas. The USEPA estimates that 13,000 facilities similar to West Fertilizer pose threats to communities throughout the U.S.

Preliminary Findings of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board from its Investigation of the West Fertilizer Explosion and Fire. CSB Says the Disaster Should Never had happened

The CSB has made the following observations and preliminary findings to date, which are subject to further revision and development as the investigation unfolds:

1) The explosion at West Fertilizer resulted from an intense fire in a wooden warehouse building that led to the detonation of approximately 30 tons of Ammonium Nitrate (AN) stored inside in wooden bins. Not only were the warehouse and bins combustible, but the building also contained significant amounts of combustible seeds, which likely contributed to the intensity of the fire. According to available seismic data, the explosion was a very powerful event.

2) Whether additional factors such as material characteristics, shock, or contamination contributed to the incident remains to be determined. Company employees described a PVC plastic pipe that was located directly above the AN bin that detonated, and likely would have been melted by the fire. Additionally, large amounts of potentially flammable anhydrous ammonia were stored along the southern edge of the warehouse building.

3) The building lacked a sprinkler system or other systems to automatically detect or suppress fire, especially when the building was unoccupied after hours. By the time firefighters were able to reach the site, the fire was intense and out of control. Just 20 minutes after the first notification to the West Volunteer Fire Department, the detonation occurred.

4) Both National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the International Code Council (ICC), private organizations that develop fire codes that are widely applied across the U.S., have written code provisions for the safety of ammonium nitrate. Many of these safety provisions are quite old[1] and appear to be confusing or contradictory, even to code experts, and are in need of a comprehensive review in light of the West disaster and other recent accidents. For example the ICC’s International Fire Code directs users to a defunct code for ammonium nitrate (NFPA 490, last issued in 2002) rather than the current code, known as NFPA 400.

5) The existing fire codes do contain some useful provisions; for example the codes do require a fire resistant barrier between AN and any stored flammable or combustible materials and have provisions to avoid AN confinement and promote ventilation during fire conditions. However, even the most current NFPA 400 standard allows AN to be stored in wooden buildings and in wooden bins, and does not mandate automatic sprinkler systems unless more than 2500 tons of AN is being stored – vastly more than the approximately 30 tons that was sufficient to devastate much of the town of West. In addition, the standard contains a “grandfathering” provision that allows existing buildings that were constructed prior to code adoption – and fail to meet all of its provisions – to continue in use.

6) Texas has not adopted a statewide fire code, and state law actually prohibits most smaller rural counties from adopting a fire code. McLennan County, where the West facility was located, had not adopted a fire code, although it technically had the authority to do so because of its proximity to the more populous Bell County. The West Fertilizer facility was thus not required to follow any NFPA or ICC recommendations for the storage of AN.

7) Although some U.S. distributors have constructed fire-resistant concrete structures for storing AN, fertilizer industry officials have reported to the CSB that wooden buildings are still the norm for the distribution of AN fertilizer across the U.S.

8) Industry has developed other forms of ammonium nitrate that are reported to reduce or eliminate the risk of accidental detonation. For example, compounding the ammonium nitrate with calcium carbonate (limestone) “practically eliminates any risk of explosion in its storage, transportation, and handling,” while preserving the AN’s nutritive value.[2] Calcium ammonium nitrate fertilizers have been widely used in Europe. Ammonium sulfate nitrate also has been found to be non-explosive provided the percentage of AN is held below about 37%.[3]

9) The federal OSHA standard for “Explosives and Blasting Agents” (29 CFR 1910.109) does have requirements for ammonium nitrate fertilizer; its provisions are similar to the NFPA codes. Unlike the NFPA codes – which West was not legally required to follow under any fire code – the OSHA standard would have applied. Like NFPA, however, the OSHA standard does not prohibit wooden bins or wooden construction, and does not require sprinklers unless more than 2500 tons of AN is present. However, OSHA public records indicate that OSHA last inspected the facility in 1985, and no citations were issued under the “Explosives and Blasting Agents” standard.

10) OSHA’s Process Safety Management standard (29 CFR 1910.119) or PSM was adopted in 1992 and is designed to prevent catastrophic workplace incidents involving highly hazardous chemicals. PSM requires companies to have a variety of management elements to prevent catastrophic incidents, such as conducting hazard analyses and developing emergency plans. Ammonium nitrate is not, however, one of the listed chemicals that triggers PSM coverage. The PSM standard also contains an exemption for retail facilities.

11) The EPA’s Risk Management Program rule (40 CFR Part 68) or RMP was adopted in 1996 and is designed to prevent catastrophic offsite and environmental damage from extremely hazardous substances. As the name suggests, the rule requires covered facilities to develop a Risk Management Plan, implement various safety programs, and analyze offsite consequences from potential accidents. Once again, however, ammonium nitrate is not one of the listed chemicals that triggers RMP coverage. West Fertilizer was RMP-covered due to its stored ammonia, and the company’s offsite consequence analysis considered only the possibility of an ammonia leak, not an explosion of ammonium nitrate.

12) OSHA considered adding ammonium nitrate along with other highly reactive chemicals to its list of PSM-covered substances in the late 1990’s. However, this proposal was shelved in 2001. In developing the RMP regulation, the EPA did not explicitly include explosives or reactive chemicals in the list of covered chemicals. In 2002, the CSB issued a study on reactive hazards, identifying 167 prior reactive incidents (including a 1994 explosion at an ammonium nitrate manufacturer). The Board recommended that both OSHA and EPA expand their standards to include reactive chemicals and hazards. However, neither agency has yet acted upon the recommendations.

13) No federal, state, or local standards have been identified that restrict the siting of ammonium nitrate storage facilities in the vicinity of homes, schools, businesses, and health care facilities. In West, Texas, there were hundreds of such buildings within a mile radius, which were exposed to serious or life-threatening hazards when the explosion occurred on April 17.

14) West volunteer firefighters were not made aware of the explosion hazard from the AN stored at West Fertilizer, and were caught in harm’s way when the blast occurred. NFPA recommends that firefighters evacuate from AN fires of “massive and uncontrollable proportions.” Federal DOT guidance contained in the Emergency Response Guidebook, which is widely used by firefighters, suggests fighting even large ammonium nitrate fertilizer fires by “flood[ing] the area with water from a distance.” However, the response guidance appears to be vague since terms such as “massive,” “uncontrollable,” “large,” and “distance” are not clearly defined. All of these provisions should be reviewed and harmonized in light of the West disaster to ensure that firefighters are adequately protected and are not put into danger protecting property alone.

15) While U.S. standards for ammonium nitrate have apparently remained static for decades, other countries have more rigorous standards covering both storage and siting of nearby buildings. For example, the U.K.’s Health and Safety Executive states in guidance dating to 1996 that “ammonium nitrate should normally be stored in single story, dedicated, well-ventilated buildings that are constructed from materials that will not burn, such as concrete, bricks or steel.”[4] The U.K. guidance calls for storage bays “constructed of a material that does not burn, preferably concrete.”

16) CF Industries, a principal manufacturer of AN that was one of the suppliers to West, also recommends more rigorous safeguards in its Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for the chemical. In the section entitled “Handling and Storage,” CF recommends that “Storage construction should be of non-combustible materials and preferably equipped with an automatic sprinkler system.”[5] Although companies are required to issue MSDS’s, the recipients of this information like West Fertilizer are not obligated to follow the recommended safety precautions. West lacked these safeguards.

17) The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has regulations for ammonium nitrate used as an explosive but these do not apply to ammonium nitrate used as fertilizer. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has reporting requirements for companies that have a threshold amount of fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate. However, the authority of DHS is to require security measures to protect against theft, diversion, or other intentional acts; DHS does not regulate the safety of ammonium nitrate to prevent conditions leading to accidental detonation.

18) The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) contains an exemption from hazardous chemical reporting for “fertilizer held for sale by a retailer to the ultimate customer.” The EPA has interpreted this provision as not applying to firms, like West, that make custom blends of bulk fertilizer for customers’ use. In 2012, West Fertilizer filed an EPCRA Tier II report with the McLennan County Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC). West reported the presence of up to 270 tons of ammonium nitrate, as well as anhydrous ammonia, at the site. The company did not provide the LEPC or the West Fire Department with an ammonium nitrate MSDS indicating the material’s hazards, nor does EPCRA automatically require that information to be provided. There is no indication that West’s filing with local authorities resulted in an effort to plan for an ammonium nitrate emergency.

The EPA says it has responded to the executive order by taking part in a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group comprised of representatives from the EPA, Department of Homeland Security, OSHA, and other sectors. The group recently released a preliminary list for improving chemical safety and security options that is now out for public comment. The options specifically consider the improvement of risk management practices at chemical facilities as well as the storage and handling of ammonium nitrate.

“We have engaged industry to identify hazards and are looking at their existing programs and activities to see how they can be advanced,” the EPA said in a statement to NFPA Journal.

“We have also heard from local emergency responders. They have important needs such as preparedness, capacity preparedness, and ready access to critical information that needs to be addressed.”

West Fertilizer after the explosion

Similar Chemical Explosions

The ammonium nitrate is known to be an explosive material, and we got a taste of its explosiveness in 1947 in Texas City. The Texas City disaster was an industrial accident that occurred April 16, 1947 in the Port of Texas City. It was the deadliest industrial accident in U.S. history, and one of the largest non-nuclear explosions. Originating with a mid-morning fire on board the French-registered vessel SS Grandcamp (docked in the port), its cargo of approximately 2,300 tons (approximately 2,100 metric tons) of ammonium nitrate detonated, with the initial blast and subsequent chain-reaction of further fires and explosions in other ships and nearby oil-storage facilities killing at least 581 people, including all but one member of the Texas City fire department. The disaster triggered the first ever class action lawsuit against the United States government, under the then-recently enacted Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), on behalf of 8,485 victims.

Other chemical plant explosions in recent years include:

· T2 Laboratories explosion in Jacksonville, Florida in December 19, 2007. See http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/T2_Final_Copy_9_17_09.pdf

· Sythron Chemical Facility Explosion, North Carolina January 31, 2006. See http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Synthron_Final_Report1.pdf

· MFG Chemical Inc. Toxic Gas Release, in Dalton, Georgia, August 12, 2004. See http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/MFG_Report.pdf

The Role of Insurers

We recommended many years ago that the safety and reporting rules are expanded to include reactive chemicals and hazards; but nothing ever happened – then the West Texas disaster hits us. With the proposed construction of several new fertilizer plants across the United States, we believe that safety rules are urgently needed.

The insurers can play a key role in helping preventing similar disasters. According to Allianz, the insurers took a $200 million hit as a result of the explosion. Considering that there are 13,000 thousands of these plants across the United States and additional plants are being proposed to take advantage of the oil boom in the states, there is significant risk posed by fertilizer plant explosions.

In most developed countries, including the United States, insurance is one of the principal risk management instruments, not only for aiding in recovery after a disaster, but also for encouraging future investments that are more resilient to potential hazards. We always had an issue with these “grandfathered” facilities, like the one at West, Texas that are not compliant with the NFPA code or other fire codes. Compliance with the regulations does not always mean that it is safe or that it follows the modern or proper safety procedures. How come not a single insurer realized the risk by this plant and the thousands of other plants across the United States? The insurers can find a way of forcing them to install the appropriate safeties and controls to at least prevent the risk of explosions and the carnage to human life.

METROPOLITAN ENGINEERING, CONSULTING & FORENSICS (MECF)

Providing Competent, Expert and Objective Investigative Engineering and Consulting Services

P.O. Box 520

Tenafly, NJ 07670-0520

Tel.: (973) 897-8162

Fax: (973) 810-0440

E-mail: metroforensics@gmail.com

Web pages: https://sites.google.com/site/metropolitanforensics/

https://sites.google.com/site/metropolitanenvironmental/

https://sites.google.com/site/metroforensics3/

We are happy to announce the launch of our twitter account. Please make sure to follow us at @MetropForensics

To unsubscribe from future technical blogs and announcements, please reply to this email with the word “unsubscribe” in the subject line.

Metropolitan appreciates your business.

Feel free to recommend our services to your friends and colleagues.

Synthron facility after the explosion and fire

[1] NFPA 400 refers users to a 1953 publication by the U.S. Bureau of Mines for information on the explosive properties of AN.

[2] Calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) must still be protected from contamination with other chemicals that can re-sensitize it to detonation. See Popovici Ipochim, N.N.; Icechim, M.M.; “Other Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizers;” In Keleti, C. (ed.); Nitric Acid and Fertilizer Nitrates; New York: Marcel Dekker Inc., 1985.

[3] Ibid.

[4] U.K. Health and Safety Executive; “Storing and Handling Ammonium Nitrate;” Available from http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg230.pdf

[5] http://www.cfindustries.com/pdf/Ammonium-Nitrate-Amtrate-MSDS.pdf