
Restrictiveness relative to notions of interpretation
Special session on the philosophy of mathematics, Logic Colloquium, Vienna, July 2014.

Maximally consistent sets of instances of Naive Comprehension
88th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Cambridge, July 2014.

The iterative conception: what is it and what is it for?
Seminar at the Faculty of Philosophy, Universita VitaSalute San Raffaele, Milan, May 2014.

Finitism and opentexture
History and Philosophy of Infinity Conference, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, September 2013.

That's it, you're grounded!
Departmental Seminar, Department of Philosophy, University of Kent, April 2013.

That's it, you're grounded!
DIP Colloquium, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, April 2013.

On Restrictiveness
Seminar of the Project 'Plurals, Predicates and Paradox: Towards a TypeFree Account', University of Oslo, March 2013.

That's it, you're grounded!
Workshop on Groundedness in Semantics and Beyond, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LudwigMaximiliansUniversitat, October 2012.
A conception of settheoretical truth
Axiomatic Versus Semantic Truth Conference, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LudwigMaximiliansUniversitat, March 2012.
 The graph conception of set
Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, November 2011.

The graph Conception of Set
Third ParisNancy Philosophy of Mathematics Workshop, September 2011.

A conception of settheoretical truth
Workshop on Set Theory and HigherOrder Logic, Birkbeck, London University, August 2011.

The graph conception of set
Seminar of the Project 'Plurals, Predicates and Paradox: Towards a TypeFree Account', Birkbeck, University of London, February 2011.

Interpreting natural deduction: reply to Sundholm
Logic and Knowledge Conference, University of Rome "La Sapienza", June 2010.

How to be a minimalist about sets
Foundations of Mathematics Seminar, University of Paris 7Diderot, June 2010.

On the naive conception of set
Moral Sciences Club, Cambridge, May 2010.

On intuitionistic negation
Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar, Department of Philosophy, Bristol, March 2009.

Does truth equal provability in the maximal theory?
Annual BPPA Conference, University of Kent, Canterbury, June 2008.

How basic is the Basic Revisionary Argument? (with J. Murzi)
4th Archè/CSMN Graduate Conference, St. Andrews, November 2007. Commentator: Marcus Rossberg.

How basic is the Basic Revisionary Argument? (with J. Murzi)
Graduate Seminar, Sheffield, October 2007.

An analogue of Isaacson's Thesis for ZFC?
Workshop on Arithmetical Truth: 20 Years Later, Fitzwilliam College Cambridge, April 2007.

Does a Kripke semantics vindicate the adoption of intuitionistic logic in set theory?
Annual Meeting of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy, Cesano Maderno, Milan, September 2006.

