1. Misinformation in Representative Democracy: The Role of Heterogeneous Confirmation Bias. (Joint with Satoshi Kasamatsu)
[First version: November 2022, Latest version: November 2024]- R&R at American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (second round)
1. Misinformation in Representative Democracy: The Role of Heterogeneous Confirmation Bias. (Joint with Satoshi Kasamatsu)
[First version: November 2022, Latest version: November 2024]Previous title: Strategic Misinformation: The Role of Heterogeneous Confirmation Bias
Abstract. This study investigates politicians' incentive to promote false claims supported by only a minority of the electorate and its impact on representative democracy. For this purpose, we construct a two-period electoral accountability model where an incumbent politician decides whether to support or deny the truth about a particular issue and exerts effort to produce public goods. We find that a low-competent incumbent has an electoral incentive to support misinformation, even if only a minority of voters believe in it. The key to this incentive is the heterogeneity of confirmation bias that leads people to persistently accept misinformation. When the degree of confirmation bias is heterogeneous among voters, promoting misinformation enables the incumbent to weaken the role of elections as a device for punishing the incumbent's low performance. Hence, to avoid electoral punishment, low-competent politicians may strategically deny the truth, which also reduces their effort level as a side effect. Moreover, we argue that social media platforms amplify the heterogeneity of confirmation bias, thereby inducing politicians' misinformation.
2. Affluence and Influence Under Tax Competition: Income Bias in Political Attention. (Joint with Satoshi Kasamatsu and Taiki Susa)
[First version: September 2023, Latest version: September 2025]Abstract. This study reveals that tax competition magnifies the political overrepresentation of the rich in democracy, and thus prevents redistribution both economically and politically. We develop a capital tax competition model between countries, each comprising two distinct classes: rich and poor. An income bias in political attention creates an overrepresentation of the rich in each country. First, we show that tax competition diminishes the political attention of the poor, amplifying the rich’s political influence. Therefore, tax competition reduces capital taxation not only through conventional economic channels but also by altering political power in favor of the rich. From a global perspective, the poor's political attention is underprovided for their benefit. Second, rising inequality encourages the poor to pay attention to politics, thereby increasing capital taxation. However, we show that tax competition weakens this mechanism, and increasing inequality in tax competition is more likely to lead to reduced capital taxation than in a closed economy.
3. Social Norms and the Rise of Fringe Candidates. (Joint with R. Emre Aytimur)
[First version: April 2024, Latest version: March 2025]Abstract. To explore the recent surge of fringe candidates, we investigate the dynamic interplay between social norms and elections. We use a two-period electoral competition model featuring a mainstream and fringe candidate, where voting for the fringe candidate incurs stigma due to her extreme views that contravenes prevailing social norms. A significant first-period vote for the fringe candidate signals wider acceptance, eroding norms and boosting her second-period success. To achieve this, the fringe candidate diverges on standard policy issues, while the mainstream candidate imitates her. Paradoxically, heightened initial social norms may enhance the fringe candidate’s subsequent election success.
4. Public Perceptions of False Positive and Negative Errors in News Reports. (Joint with Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen)
[First version: May 2024, Latest version: November 2024]Abstract. Due to the problem of misinformation, the public is advised to obtain information from reputable sources to avoid inaccurate news coverage (false positive errors). However, reputable sources might engage in selective reporting (false negative errors). We developed a concise model to explain why both inaccurate coverage and limited coverage should be considered if electors are to make an appropriate political decision. Then, we conducted a survey in Japan (𝑁 = 2020) to examine the hypotheses derived from the model. The results suggest that respondents perceive different types of media to vary in their likelihood of committing the two errors; these perceptions correlate with media consumption, and media literacy interventions do not change attitudes toward media consumption.
5. Political Trust and Preferences for Redistribution: Wasteful Spending and Plutocratic Influence. (Joint with Tomoko Matsumoto)
[First version: October 2024, Latest version: October 2025]Abstract. Higher political trust has been argued to stimulate support for redistribution. We revisit this argument by distinguishing between two types of trust: trust in efficient government spending and trust in limited plutocratic influence. By developing a political economy model of income taxation and public spending, we found that, while higher trust in efficient spending increases the ideal tax rate, higher trust in limited plutocratic influence may decrease it. To test this theory, we conducted an online survey experiment in Japan with approximately 2,000 respondents, where we measured and manipulated these two types of trust separately. The results showed that increasing trust in efficient spending had no effect on preferences for income taxation. However, increasing trust in limited plutocratic influence reduced support for progressive income taxation among supporters of governing parties. The additional experiment using a conjoint design to measure policy preferences also confirmed the result on the effect of trust in limited plutocratic influence.
6. Welfare State and Natives' Preferences for Immigrants' Types. (Joint with Tomoko Matsumoto)
[First version: November 2024, Latest version: October 2025]Abstract. When natives realize that immigrants are included in the host country's welfare system, they may prefer high-income immigrants over low-income ones because high-income earners contribute to the system more due to its redistributive nature. We examine this causal effect through a novel survey experiment. In the experiment, half of the respondents are randomly assigned information designed to increase their perception that immigrants are included to the national healthcare insurance system which is redistributive. Afterward, respondents' preferences for different types of immigrants are assessed through a conjoint experiment. Our findings reveal that the treatment reduced preferences for low-income immigrants, but increased preferences for high-income immigrants. Furthermore, these effects were observed only among those who did not perceive an increase in foreign workers as a threat to their job security: concerns about the welfare system and job insecurity should not be considered in isolation.
7. Trust in Politicians and Preferences over False Positive and Negative Errors in News Reports. (Joint with Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen)
[First version: August 2025]Abstract. This study investigates how trust in politicians shapes citizens' news consumption preferences. We focus on two dimensions of media accuracy-false-positive and false-negative errors in the reporting on political scandals-and hypothesize that political trust alters citizens' preferences for avoiding these two errors in a different way. To test this, we conducted a survey experiment combining information provision treatment with a conjoint design in Japan. We found that citizens value both types of accuracy, and that increased political trust reduces the preference for avoiding false-negative errors, but has no significant effect on the preference for avoiding false-positive errors. The treatment reduces even the preference for avoiding false-positive errors among the supporters of governing parties. Our findings suggest that political trust affects the type of media citizens prefer, which has important implications for electoral accountability.
8. Partisan Disbelief in Polarized Societies: Evidence from South Korea and the U.S. (Joint with Shinnosuke Kikuchi, Yesola Kweon, and Yuko Kasuya)
[First version: October 2025]Abstract. This paper introduces and tests a new concept - partisan disbelief in knowledge - the tendency for partisans to believe that their in-group is more knowledgeable than the opposing party, even about basic non-partisan facts. Using large-scale surveys and experiments in South Korea and the United States, we document that partisans perceive their in-group's accuracy rate in judging non-partisan facts to exceed that of the out-group by about 15 percentage points. This partisan disblief distorts information processing: When identical information is attributed to outgroup sources, individuals are less likely to update their opinions, revealing an in-group bias that extends beyond explicitly partisan issues. Providing corrective evidence that both sides are equally knowledgeable reduces partisan disbelief and weakens this in-group bias. It also temporarily lowers affective polarization, though the effect fades over time. Together, these results show that polarization extends beyond politics to perceptions of competence, identifying a novel cognitive mechanism through which social identity undermines accurate information processing and mutual understanding in societies.
9. When State Concessions Backfire: Information Cascades, Protest Mobilization, and Authoritarian Survival. (Joint with Yuki Takagi and Hans H. Tung)
[First version: October 2025]Abstract. Do a dictator's concessions demobilize protests or instead fuel mobilization that threatens regime survival? To address this question, we develop a two-period model of protest cascades in which vanguards first decide whether to initiate protests, followed by ordinary citizens who choose whether to join. Concessions directly reduce incentives to protest, but they also make a vanguard's protest a stronger signal of regime weakness. As a result, concessions lower the likelihood of vanguard protests while paradoxically increasing ordinary citizens' propensity to follow once protests occur. We show that concessions raise the probability of regime change when (i) vanguards enjoy a sufficiently large advantage over ordinary citizens in participation costs and information, and (ii) when the regime is relatively resilient, that is, it has low vulnerability to protest and a mild commitment problem. Beyond theory, we also derive testable predictions and discuss empirical implications for research on contentious politics and comparative authoritarianism.
1. Population Dynamics of Conspiracy Thinking. (Joint with R. Emre Aytimur)
2. Fighting Fake News with Peer Feedback: Theory and Experiment. (Joint with Yasushi Asako, Yoshio Kamijo, and Masayuki Odora)
3. Search and Knightian Uncertainty Revisited: Roles of Optimism and Pessimism. (Joint with Kiyohiko G. Nishimura and Hiroyuki Ozaki)
4. Dictator’s Commitment Problem in a Protest-Repression Nexus: Evidence from Hong Kong’s Anti-ELAB Movement. (Joint with Hans H. Tung)
Presented at the 2022 AEA Meeting