1. Public Goods Provision, Preferences over Public Finance, and Distributional Effects. (Joint with Tomoko Matsumoto and Atsushi Yamagishi)
[First version: August 2021, Latest version: June 2024]- R&R at Japanese Economic Review.
1. Public Goods Provision, Preferences over Public Finance, and Distributional Effects. (Joint with Tomoko Matsumoto and Atsushi Yamagishi)
[First version: August 2021, Latest version: June 2024]Previous title: More Public Goods, Larger Government, and More Redistribution
Abstract. This study uncovers a novel effect of public goods on inequality through public opinions. We hypothesize that people are more likely to support a tax increase after realizing the benefit from public goods, helping to reduce inequality by expanding government size. We conducted an online survey wherein the treatment group was informed about the universal benefits of public goods. We found that although the treatment substantially enhances support for a larger government, its impact on desired tax and spending progressivity is limited. Thus, increased perceived benefits might allow government to politically achieve redistribution through size expansion without reducing policy progressivity.
2. Dynamic Dilemma of Political Trust. (Joint with Satoshi Kasamatsu)
[First version: September 2021, Latest version: July 2025]Abstract. Special interest politics has been shown to undermine political trust, but little is known about how political trust affects special interest politics. In this study, we construct a static electoral competition model where two candidates propose policy platforms and an interest group determines the number of campaign contributions for each candidate. We demonstrate that a high level of political trust enables the interest group to capture politicians in the election, creating a dynamic dilemma of political trust. This dilemma arises because political trust undermines future democratic performance while pointing to high past performance. We extend the model to a dynamic one with short-lived players and find that this dilemma leads to endogenous cycles of political trust and special interest politics when the misalignment of policy preferences between voters and the interest group is severe. Political trust is accumulated, consumed, and restored following cycles of special interest politics.
3. Misinformation in Representative Democracy: The Role of Heterogeneous Confirmation Bias. (Joint with Satoshi Kasamatsu)
[First version: November 2022, Latest version: November 2024]Previous title: Strategic Misinformation: The Role of Heterogeneous Confirmation Bias
Abstract. This study investigates politicians' incentive to promote false claims supported by only a minority of the electorate and its impact on representative democracy. For this purpose, we construct a two-period electoral accountability model where an incumbent politician decides whether to support or deny the truth about a particular issue and exerts effort to produce public goods. We find that a low-competent incumbent has an electoral incentive to support misinformation, even if only a minority of voters believe in it. The key to this incentive is the heterogeneity of confirmation bias that leads people to persistently accept misinformation. When the degree of confirmation bias is heterogeneous among voters, promoting misinformation enables the incumbent to weaken the role of elections as a device for punishing the incumbent's low performance. Hence, to avoid electoral punishment, low-competent politicians may strategically deny the truth, which also reduces their effort level as a side effect. Moreover, we argue that social media platforms amplify the heterogeneity of confirmation bias, thereby inducing politicians' misinformation.
4. Affluence and Influence Under Tax Competition: Income Bias in Political Attention. (Joint with Satoshi Kasamatsu and Taiki Susa)
[First version: September 2023, Latest version: September 2025]Abstract. This study reveals that tax competition magnifies the political overrepresentation of the rich in democracy, and thus prevents redistribution both economically and politically. We develop a capital tax competition model between countries, each comprising two distinct classes: rich and poor. An income bias in political attention creates an overrepresentation of the rich in each country. First, we show that tax competition diminishes the political attention of the poor, amplifying the rich’s political influence. Therefore, tax competition reduces capital taxation not only through conventional economic channels but also by altering political power in favor of the rich. From a global perspective, the poor's political attention is underprovided for their benefit. Second, rising inequality encourages the poor to pay attention to politics, thereby increasing capital taxation. However, we show that tax competition weakens this mechanism, and increasing inequality in tax competition is more likely to lead to reduced capital taxation than in a closed economy.
5. Social Norms and the Rise of Fringe Candidates. (Joint with R. Emre Aytimur)
[First version: April 2024, Latest version: March 2025]Abstract. To explore the recent surge of fringe candidates, we investigate the dynamic interplay between social norms and elections. We use a two-period electoral competition model featuring a mainstream and fringe candidate, where voting for the fringe candidate incurs stigma due to her extreme views that contravenes prevailing social norms. A significant first-period vote for the fringe candidate signals wider acceptance, eroding norms and boosting her second-period success. To achieve this, the fringe candidate diverges on standard policy issues, while the mainstream candidate imitates her. Paradoxically, heightened initial social norms may enhance the fringe candidate’s subsequent election success.
6. Public Perceptions of False Positive and Negative Errors in News Reports. (Joint with Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen)
[First version: May 2024, Latest version: November 2024]Abstract. Due to the problem of misinformation, the public is advised to obtain information from reputable sources to avoid inaccurate news coverage (false positive errors). However, reputable sources might engage in selective reporting (false negative errors). We developed a concise model to explain why both inaccurate coverage and limited coverage should be considered if electors are to make an appropriate political decision. Then, we conducted a survey in Japan (𝑁 = 2020) to examine the hypotheses derived from the model. The results suggest that respondents perceive different types of media to vary in their likelihood of committing the two errors; these perceptions correlate with media consumption, and media literacy interventions do not change attitudes toward media consumption.
7. Political Trust and Preferences for Redistribution: Wasteful Spending and Plutocratic Influence. (Joint with Tomoko Matsumoto)
[First version: October 2024]Abstract. Higher political trust has been argued to stimulate support for redistribution. We revisit this argument by distinguishing between two types of trust: trust in efficient government spending and trust in limited plutocratic influence. By developing a political economy model of income taxation and public spending, we found that, while higher trust in efficient spending increases the ideal tax rate, higher trust in limited plutocratic influence may decrease it. To test this theory, we conducted an online survey experiment in Japan with approximately 2,000 respondents, where we measured and manipulated these two types of trust separately. The results showed that increasing trust in efficient spending had no effect on preferences for income taxation. However, increasing trust in limited plutocratic influence reduced support for progressive income taxation among supporters of governing parties. We also explored the mechanisms underlying this finding.
8. Welfare State and Natives' Preferences for Immigrants' Types. (Joint with Tomoko Matsumoto)
[First version: November 2024, Latest version: August 2025]Abstract. When natives realize that immigrants are included in the host country's welfare system, they may prefer high-income immigrants over low-income ones because high-income earners contribute to the system more due to its redistributive nature. We examine this causal effect through a novel survey experiment. In the experiment, half of the respondents are randomly assigned information designed to increase their perception that immigrants are included to the national healthcare insurance system which is redistributive. Afterward, respondents' preferences for different types of immigrants are assessed through a conjoint experiment. Our findings reveal that the treatment reduced preferences for low-income immigrants, but increased preferences for high-income immigrants. Furthermore, these effects were observed only among those who did not perceive an increase in foreign workers as a threat to their job security: concerns about the welfare system and job insecurity should not be considered in isolation.
9. Polarization as Pluralistic Ignorance. (Joint with Kenjiro Asami)
[First version:January 2025, Latest version: August 2025] *The latest version is available upon request.Abstract. Polarization is considered one of the most serious challenges in democratic countries. While substantial evidence points to exaggerated perceptions of polarization — called false polarization — whether it can persist in the long run remains understudied. This paper develops a social learning model in which each citizen belongs to either of two political groups and holds either of two attitudes on a controversial issue. In each period, two citizens – one from each group – publicly express their opinions on the issue. Citizens have conformity motives, but their distribution could be misperceived. We show that false polarization may arise as pluralistic ignorance even when the majority shares the same attitude across the two groups. Specifically, when citizens underestimate others’ conformity motives, perceived polarization can trigger a self-reinforcing spiral, leading both groups to appear polarized. Consequently, both groups may continue to publicly express different opinions.
10. Trust in Politicians and Preferences over False Positive and Negative Errors in News Reports. (Joint with Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen)
[First version: August 2025]Abstract. This study investigates how trust in politicians shapes citizens' news consumption preferences. We focus on two dimensions of media accuracy-false-positive and false-negative errors in the reporting on political scandals-and hypothesize that political trust alters citizens' preferences for avoiding these two errors in a different way. To test this, we conducted a survey experiment combining information provision treatment with a conjoint design in Japan. We found that citizens value both types of accuracy, and that increased political trust reduces the preference for avoiding false-negative errors, but has no significant effect on the preference for avoiding false-positive errors. The treatment reduces even the preference for avoiding false-positive errors among the supporters of governing parties. Our findings suggest that political trust affects the type of media citizens prefer, which has important implications for electoral accountability.
1. Population Dynamics of Conspiracy Thinking. (Joint with R. Emre Aytimur)
2. Fighting Fake News with Peer Feedback: Theory and Experiment. (Joint with Yasushi Asako, Yoshio Kamijo, and Masayuki Odora)
3. Search and Knightian Uncertainty Revisited: Roles of Optimism and Pessimism. (Joint with Kiyohiko G. Nishimura and Hiroyuki Ozaki)
4. Dictator’s Commitment Problem in a Protest-Repression Nexus: Evidence from Hong Kong’s Anti-ELAB Movement. (Joint with Hans H. Tung)
Presented at the 2022 AEA Meeting
5. When Dictator’s Concessions Backfire: Information Cascade, Protest Mobilization, and Authoritarian Survival (Joint with Yuki Takagi and Hans H. Tung)
Will be presented at the 2025 APSA Meeting