1. PUBLISHED/FORTHCOMING
“Self-Regulatory Resources and Institutional Formation: An Experiment,” 2024, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] open access # Toyokeizai (Japanese, cf. RIETI-転載) # Formerly circulated (as RIETI/Keio working paper) with a slightly different title "Self-Regulatory Resources and Institutional Formation: A First Experimental Test "
“Endogenous Monitoring through Voluntary Reporting in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Experimental Evidence” (with Artem Nesterov [PhD student at Durham University]), forthcoming, Economica [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] open access
“The Democracy Effect: A Weights-Based Estimation Strategy” (with Pedro Dal Bó and Andrew Foster) [doi] [pdf download], 2024, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization # NBER working paper/Brown Univ working paper version [pdf download]
“Free Riding, Democracy and Sacrifice in the Workplace: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment” (with Katy Tabero [PhD student at Durham University]), forthcoming, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy [doi] [pdf download] open access ** Note: A new real effort task (collaborative counting task) was devised. # RIETI column (Japanese; English)
“Civic Engagement, the Leverage Effect and the Accountable State” (with Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran), 2023, European Economic Review [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] #CEPR(London)/Brown Univ/Univ Copenhagen/Durham Univ working paper (formerly circulated with the different title “Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State”) [pdf download] [slides] ##Jean-Robert's plenary speech in ESA [link] # RIETI column (Japanese, English)
“Peer Learning in Teams and Work Performance: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment” (with John Ashworth), 2023, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] # RIETI column (Japanese; English)
“Free Riding and Workplace Democracy – Heterogeneous Task Preferences and Sorting” (with Thomas Markussen), 2023, Management Science [doi] [pdf] [Appendix] open access # RIETI column (Japanese, English)
“Transfer Paradox in a General Equilibrium Economy: An Experimental Investigation,” 2022, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]
“Observability of Partners’ Past Play and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence” (with Hajime Kobayashi and Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse), 2022, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]
“Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships,” 2021, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization [front matter] [toc] [pdf download] [Appendix] [doi] [slides(short)]
“Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions,” 2020, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [doi] [slides]
“Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma,” 2019, International Journal of Game Theory [pdf download] [doi] [slides] open access
“The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms,” 2018, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]
“Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma,” 2019, Oxford Economic Papers [pdf download] [cover] [content] [doi] [slides]
“Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms,” 2020, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [doi] #1. Published in a special issue on experimental public choice [editors' intro: doi] #2. The effect of having two independent third party punishers was also studied using a between-subjects design, finding the same group size paradox: see Kamei (2017: “Altruistic Norm Enforcement and Decision-making Format in a Dilemma: Experimental Evidence,” ssrn wp [download])
“Disapproval Aversion or Inflated Inequity Acceptance? The Impact of Expressing Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining” (with Josie I Chen, National Taipei University), 2018, Experimental Economics. [pdf download] [Appendix download] open access
“Endogenous Reputation Formation under the Shadow of the Future,” 2017, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [treatment summary] DOI (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.012)
“Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus” (with Louis Putterman),” 2018, Economic Inquiry [content] [pdf download] [Appendix download] # working paper version available here [pdf download] [Appendix download]
“Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality,” 2018, The Journal of Conflict Resolution [content] [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix download] open access # A typo in lines 14-15 on page 641 ("An MPCR is the highest for set H subjects and the lowest for set L subjects, as shown in equation (1)."): This sentence should be "An MPCR is the highest for set L subjects and the lowest for set H subjects, as shown in equation (1)."
“Democracy and Resilient Pro-Social Behavioral Change: An Experimental Study,” 2016, Social Choice and Welfare [pdf download] [doi] [voting process(slide)] open access Note: Working paper version available here [pdf download] [Appendix download]
“In Broad Daylight: Fuller Information and Higher-order Punishment Opportunities Can Promote Cooperation” (with Louis Putterman), 2015, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [Appendix download] [Erratum download]
# A related study of “In Broad Daylight” conducted in China, also with two new collaborators (Tingting Fu and Yunan Ji), was published in Economics Letters as below:
“Punishment can Support Cooperation even when Punishable” (with Tingting Fu, Yunan Ji and Louis Putterman), 2017, Economics Letters [pdf download] [Appendix download].
“Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games” (with Louis Putterman), 2017, The Economic Journal [cover] [pdf download] [All Instructions download]
“Conditional Punishment,” 2014, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]
# A replication study in England (“Conditional Punishment in England,” 2017, Economics Bulletin) is available here [pdf download]
“State or Nature? Endogenous Formal vs. Informal Sanctions in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods” (with Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran), 2015, Experimental Economics [pdf download] [Appendix download] [slides]
“From Locality to Continent: A Comment on the Generalization of an Experimental Study,” 2012, Journal of Socio-Economics (Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics) [pdf download] [Appendix download]
“Self-Regulatory Strength and Dynamic Optimal Purchase,” 2012, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]
“Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes” (with Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran), 2011, Journal of Public Economics [pdf download] [Appendix download]
2. WORKING PAPERS
“Civic Engagement as a Check on Corruption” (with Louis Putterman, Katy Tabero, and Jean-Robert Tyran), in preparation.
“Collective Sanction Enforcement: New Experimental Evidence from Two Societies” (with Matthew Walker and Smriti Sharma) [pdf download] revise-resubmit at Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
“The Individual-Team Discontinuity Effect on Institutional Choices" (with Katy Tabero [PhD student at Durham University]) [pdf download]
“The Perverse Costly Signaling Effect on Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future” [pdf download]
3. OTHER
# Null results are meaningful to help advance the field.
The following papers report null results based on laboratory experiments.
“Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence” 2021, Games [pdf download] [doi] * This paper shows that the punishment strength of third party teams does not differ from that of third party individuals.
“Collective Selection of Representatives and the Democracy Effect,” 2017 [pdf download] * This paper shows that, unlike direct democracy, there is no or at most negative impact of democracy on people’s behavior under representative democracy.