1. PUBLISHED/FORTHCOMING

“The Individual-Team Discontinuity Effect on Institutional Choices: Experimental Evidence in Voluntary Public Goods Provision" (with Katy Tabero [PhD student at Durham University]) [pdf download] forthcoming, Economic Inquiry [doi]

“Motivations behind Peer-to-Peer (Counter-)Punishment in Public Goods Games: An Experiment” (with Katy Tabero), 2025, Economics Letters [doi] [download] [Appendix] open access

“Collective Sanction Enforcement: New Experimental Evidence from Two Societies” (with Matthew Walker and Smriti Sharma), 2025, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] open access # Toyokeizai (Japanese, Cf: RIETI-転載) 

“Self-Regulatory Resources and Institutional Formation: An Experiment,” 2024, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] open access    # Toyokeizai (Japanese, cf. RIETI-転載)  # Formerly circulated (as RIETI/Keio working paper) with a slightly different title "Self-Regulatory Resources and Institutional Formation: A First Experimental Test "

“Endogenous Monitoring through Voluntary Reporting in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Experimental Evidence” (with Artem Nesterov [PhD student at Durham University]), 2024, Economica [cover] [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] open access  

“The Democracy Effect: A Weights-Based Estimation Strategy” (with Pedro Dal Bó and Andrew Foster) [doi] [pdf download], 2024, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization  # NBER working paper/Brown Univ working paper version [pdf download] 

“Free Riding, Democracy and Sacrifice in the Workplace: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment” (with Katy Tabero [PhD student at Durham University]), 2025, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy [issue][doi] [pdf download] open access  ** Note: A new real effort task (collaborative counting task) was devised.  # RIETI column (Japanese; English)

“Civic Engagement, the Leverage Effect and the Accountable State” (with Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran), 2023, European Economic Review [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix]     #CEPR(London)/Brown Univ/Univ Copenhagen/Durham Univ working paper (formerly circulated with the different title “Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State”) [pdf download] [slides] ##Jean-Robert's plenary speech in ESA [link] # RIETI column (Japanese, English) 

“Peer Learning in Teams and Work Performance: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment” (with John Ashworth), 2023, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] # RIETI column (Japanese; English)

“Free Riding and Workplace Democracy – Heterogeneous Task Preferences and Sorting” (with Thomas Markussen), 2023, Management Science [doi] [pdf] [Appendix] open access # RIETI column (Japanese, English) 

“Transfer Paradox in a General Equilibrium Economy: An Experimental Investigation,” 2022, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]

“Observability of Partners’ Past Play and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence” (with Hajime Kobayashi and Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse), 2022, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]

“Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships,” 2021, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization [front matter] [toc] [pdf download] [Appendix] [doi] [slides(short)] 

“Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions,” 2020, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [doi] [slides]

“Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma,” 2019, International Journal of Game Theory [pdf download] [doi] [slides] open access

“The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms,” 2018, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]

“Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma,” 2019, Oxford Economic Papers [pdf download] [cover] [content] [doi] [slides]

“Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms,” 2020, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [doi]  #1. Published in a special issue on experimental public choice [editors' intro: doi]  #2. The effect of having two independent third party punishers was also studied using a between-subjects design, finding the same group size paradox: see Kamei (2017: “Altruistic Norm Enforcement and Decision-making Format in a Dilemma: Experimental Evidence,” ssrn wp [download])

“Disapproval Aversion or Inflated Inequity Acceptance? The Impact of Expressing Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining” (with Josie I Chen, National Taipei University), 2018, Experimental Economics. [pdf download] [Appendix download] open access

“Endogenous Reputation Formation under the Shadow of the Future,” 2017, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [treatment summary] DOI (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.012)

“Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus” (with Louis Putterman),” 2018, Economic Inquiry [content] [pdf download] [Appendix download] # working paper version available here [pdf download] [Appendix download]

“Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality,” 2018, The Journal of Conflict Resolution [content] [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix download] open access  # A typo in lines 14-15 on page 641 ("An MPCR is the highest for set H subjects and the lowest for set L subjects, as shown in equation (1)."): This sentence should be "An MPCR is the highest for set L subjects and the lowest for set H subjects, as shown in equation (1)." 

“Democracy and Resilient Pro-Social Behavioral Change: An Experimental Study,” 2016, Social Choice and Welfare [pdf download] [doi] [voting process(slide)] open access    Note: Working paper version available here [pdf download] [Appendix download]

“In Broad Daylight: Fuller Information and Higher-order Punishment Opportunities Can Promote Cooperation” (with Louis Putterman), 2015, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [Appendix download] [Erratum download]

# A related study of “In Broad Daylight” conducted in China, also with two new collaborators (Tingting Fu and Yunan Ji), was published in Economics Letters as below:

“Punishment can Support Cooperation even when Punishable” (with Tingting Fu, Yunan Ji and Louis Putterman), 2017, Economics Letters [pdf download] [Appendix download].

“Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games” (with Louis Putterman), 2017, The Economic Journal [cover] [pdf download] [All Instructions download]

“Conditional Punishment,” 2014, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi] 

# A replication study in England (“Conditional Punishment in England,” 2017, Economics Bulletin) is available here [pdf download]

“State or Nature? Endogenous Formal vs. Informal Sanctions in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods” (with Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran), 2015, Experimental Economics [pdf download] [Appendix download] [slides]

“From Locality to Continent: A Comment on the Generalization of an Experimental Study,” 2012, Journal of Socio-Economics (Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics) [pdf download] [Appendix download]

“Self-Regulatory Strength and Dynamic Optimal Purchase,” 2012, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]

“Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes” (with Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran), 2011, Journal of Public Economics [pdf download] [Appendix download]

2. WORKING PAPERS

“Edutainment, Parental Involvement, and Child Development: Evidence from a Home-based Intervention” (with Hideo Akabayashi, Tim Ruberg and Mirka Zvedelikova), in preparation.

“Collateral Enforcement of Cooperation in Public Goods Games” (with Abhijit Ramalingam and Brock V. Stoddard), in preparation.

“Free-riding, Wisdom of Crowds, and Incentive Effects in Committee Decision Making: An Experiment” (with Yukihiko Funaki), in preparation

“Contract Choice and Incentives under Uncertainty: Experimental Evidence on Simon’s (1951) Theory of the Firm” (with Thomas Markussen), in preparation.

“Pay Inequity and Peer Dynamics: New Field Evidence on Labor Market Sorting” (with Subhasish Dugar) [download] 1st revisions invited by The Economic Journal   # RIETI column （Japanese） 

“Peer Interactions in Teams and their Spill-over Effect: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment” (with Mongoljin Batsaikhan) [download] # Toyokeizai (Japanese) 

“Civic Engagement as a Constraint on Corruption” (with Louis Putterman, Katy Tabero, and Jean-Robert Tyran) CESIfo/CEPR/Keio/Brown WP [download] 

“The Perverse Costly Signaling Effect on Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future” [pdf download]  

3. OTHER

# Null results are meaningful to help advance the field.

The following papers report null results based on laboratory experiments.

“Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence” 2021, Games [pdf download] [doi] * This paper shows that the punishment strength of third party teams does not differ from that of third party individuals.

“Collective Selection of Representatives and the Democracy Effect,” 2017 [pdf download] * This paper shows that, unlike direct democracy, there is no or at most negative impact of democracy on people’s behavior under representative democracy.