1. PUBLISHED/FORTHCOMING

“Motivations behind Peer-to-Peer (Counter-)Punishment in Public Goods Games: An Experiment” (with Katy Tabero), 2025, Economics Letters [doi] [download] [Appendix] open access

“Collective Sanction Enforcement: New Experimental Evidence from Two Societies” (with Matthew Walker and Smriti Sharma), 2025, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] open access # Toyokeizai (Japanese, Cf: RIETI-転載) 

“Self-Regulatory Resources and Institutional Formation: An Experiment,” 2024, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] open access    # Toyokeizai (Japanese, cf. RIETI-転載)  # Formerly circulated (as RIETI/Keio working paper) with a slightly different title "Self-Regulatory Resources and Institutional Formation: A First Experimental Test "

“Endogenous Monitoring through Voluntary Reporting in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Experimental Evidence” (with Artem Nesterov [PhD student at Durham University]), 2024, Economica [cover] [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] open access  

“The Democracy Effect: A Weights-Based Estimation Strategy” (with Pedro Dal Bó and Andrew Foster) [doi] [pdf download], 2024, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization  # NBER working paper/Brown Univ working paper version [pdf download] 

“Free Riding, Democracy and Sacrifice in the Workplace: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment” (with Katy Tabero [PhD student at Durham University]), 2025, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy [issue][doi] [pdf download] open access  ** Note: A new real effort task (collaborative counting task) was devised.  # RIETI column (Japanese; English)

“Civic Engagement, the Leverage Effect and the Accountable State” (with Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran), 2023, European Economic Review [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix]     #CEPR(London)/Brown Univ/Univ Copenhagen/Durham Univ working paper (formerly circulated with the different title “Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State”) [pdf download] [slides] ##Jean-Robert's plenary speech in ESA [link] # RIETI column (Japanese, English) 

“Peer Learning in Teams and Work Performance: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment” (with John Ashworth), 2023, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix] # RIETI column (Japanese; English)

“Free Riding and Workplace Democracy – Heterogeneous Task Preferences and Sorting” (with Thomas Markussen), 2023, Management Science [doi] [pdf] [Appendix] open access # RIETI column (Japanese, English) 

“Transfer Paradox in a General Equilibrium Economy: An Experimental Investigation,” 2022, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]

“Observability of Partners’ Past Play and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence” (with Hajime Kobayashi and Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse), 2022, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]

“Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships,” 2021, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization [front matter] [toc] [pdf download] [Appendix] [doi] [slides(short)] 

“Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions,” 2020, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [doi] [slides]

“Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma,” 2019, International Journal of Game Theory [pdf download] [doi] [slides] open access

“The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms,” 2018, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]

“Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma,” 2019, Oxford Economic Papers [pdf download] [cover] [content] [doi] [slides]

“Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms,” 2020, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [doi]  #1. Published in a special issue on experimental public choice [editors' intro: doi]  #2. The effect of having two independent third party punishers was also studied using a between-subjects design, finding the same group size paradox: see Kamei (2017: “Altruistic Norm Enforcement and Decision-making Format in a Dilemma: Experimental Evidence,” ssrn wp [download])

“Disapproval Aversion or Inflated Inequity Acceptance? The Impact of Expressing Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining” (with Josie I Chen, National Taipei University), 2018, Experimental Economics. [pdf download] [Appendix download] open access

“Endogenous Reputation Formation under the Shadow of the Future,” 2017, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [treatment summary] DOI (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.012)

“Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus” (with Louis Putterman),” 2018, Economic Inquiry [content] [pdf download] [Appendix download] # working paper version available here [pdf download] [Appendix download]

“Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality,” 2018, The Journal of Conflict Resolution [content] [doi] [pdf download] [Appendix download] open access  # A typo in lines 14-15 on page 641 ("An MPCR is the highest for set H subjects and the lowest for set L subjects, as shown in equation (1)."): This sentence should be "An MPCR is the highest for set L subjects and the lowest for set H subjects, as shown in equation (1)." 

“Democracy and Resilient Pro-Social Behavioral Change: An Experimental Study,” 2016, Social Choice and Welfare [pdf download] [doi] [voting process(slide)] open access    Note: Working paper version available here [pdf download] [Appendix download]

“In Broad Daylight: Fuller Information and Higher-order Punishment Opportunities Can Promote Cooperation” (with Louis Putterman), 2015, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization [pdf download] [Appendix download] [Erratum download]

# A related study of “In Broad Daylight” conducted in China, also with two new collaborators (Tingting Fu and Yunan Ji), was published in Economics Letters as below:

“Punishment can Support Cooperation even when Punishable” (with Tingting Fu, Yunan Ji and Louis Putterman), 2017, Economics Letters [pdf download] [Appendix download].

“Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games” (with Louis Putterman), 2017, The Economic Journal [cover] [pdf download] [All Instructions download]

“Conditional Punishment,” 2014, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi] 

# A replication study in England (“Conditional Punishment in England,” 2017, Economics Bulletin) is available here [pdf download]

“State or Nature? Endogenous Formal vs. Informal Sanctions in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods” (with Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran), 2015, Experimental Economics [pdf download] [Appendix download] [slides]

“From Locality to Continent: A Comment on the Generalization of an Experimental Study,” 2012, Journal of Socio-Economics (Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics) [pdf download] [Appendix download]

“Self-Regulatory Strength and Dynamic Optimal Purchase,” 2012, Economics Letters [pdf download] [doi]

“Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes” (with Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran), 2011, Journal of Public Economics [pdf download] [Appendix download]

2. WORKING PAPERS

“Edutainment, Parental Involvement, and Child Development: Evidence from a Home-based Intervention” (with Hideo Akabayashi, Tim Ruberg and Mirka Zvedelikova), in preparation.

“Collateral Enforcement of Cooperation in Public Goods Games” (with Abhijit Ramalingam and Brock V. Stoddard), in preparation.

“Contract Choice and Incentive under Uncertainty: Experimental Evidence on Simon’s (1951) Theory of the Firm” (with Thomas Markussen), in preparation.

“Pay Inequity and Peer Dynamics: New Field Evidence on Labor Market Sorting” (with Subhasish Dugar) [download] 1st revisions invited by The Economic Journal

“Peer Interactions in Teams and their Spill-over Effect: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment” (with Mongoljin Batsaikhan) [download] # Toyokeizai (Japanese) 

“Civic Engagement as a Constraint on Corruption” (with Louis Putterman, Katy Tabero, and Jean-Robert Tyran) CESIfo/CEPR/Keio/Brown WP [download] 

“The Individual-Team Discontinuity Effect on Institutional Choices" (with Katy Tabero [PhD student at Durham University]) [pdf download] conditionally accepted at Economic Inquiry

“The Perverse Costly Signaling Effect on Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future” [pdf download]  

3. OTHER

# Null results are meaningful to help advance the field.

The following papers report null results based on laboratory experiments.

“Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence” 2021, Games [pdf download] [doi] * This paper shows that the punishment strength of third party teams does not differ from that of third party individuals.

“Collective Selection of Representatives and the Democracy Effect,” 2017 [pdf download] * This paper shows that, unlike direct democracy, there is no or at most negative impact of democracy on people’s behavior under representative democracy.