Prof. Andreas Bieler and Prof. Adam D. Morton
Norm Entrepreneurs: The Constructed World of Sovereignty
'In an ideational structure, idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation. Norm shifts are to the ideational theorist what changes in the balance of power are to the realist'
- Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change'
But where do norms come from? This is the key question that animates scholars such as Martha Finnemore and Kathyrn Sikkink in their pivotal article and us in this class concerned with constructivism. As there are positivist as well as post-positivist constructivist IR theorists, this lecture provides a transition to the second part of the resource, which is dedicated to post-positivist IR theory. The Class is structured in three parts. First, some key constructivist assumptions are outlined including the self-positioning by key constructivist scholars vis-à-vis positivist and post-positivist approaches. This is followed by two examples of positivist constructivists, Alexander Wendt as well as Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, and one example of post-positivist constructivism, Steve Smith. The Class is concluded with some critical remarks on the shortcomings of constructivism.
Key constructivist assumptions
For constructivists, most importantly, international relations is not only constituted by material structures, but also normative/ideational structures. In other words, ideas and beliefs are part of the overall structure, within which actors operate. Of course, ideas here do not refer to all the ideas an individual actor may hold. From a constructivist perspective, it is collectively held ideas, intersubjective meanings, which acquire structural relevance.
Unlike positivist IR theory such as neo-realists and liberals, constructivists do not take the interests and identities of actors as exogenous to interaction. Rather, they assume that actors’ interests and identities have been partly constructed by social interaction. As Emanuel Adler sums up, ‘constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world’ (Adler 1997: 322). As a result, first, they acknowledge the possibility of ideational causation. Actors’ strategies may result from their changing interests, themselves a result of interaction with other actors. Second, constructivists take into account the possibility of transformation. If, as a result of interaction, the agents involved change their collectively held ideas about each other and the overall structure, the structure itself will change in line with the changing intersubjective meanings.
Finally, constructivists account for constitutive rules. In order to understand a game of chess, it is not enough to observe simply the visible moves by the two players. Only if we understand the underlying rules, the constitutive rules of chess, are we able to make sense of these moves (Ruggie 1998: 22). Similarly, constructivists argue, in International Relations too, we need to understand and uncover the constitutive rules, if we are to comprehend various agents’ strategies.
Adler (1997) regards constructivism as a middle way between interpretive (post-positivist) approaches (postmodernism, post-structuralism, critical theory) and rationalist (positivist) approaches (realism and liberalism). From a rationalist perspective, actors are self-interested, rational, atomistic and pre-social. Their interests and identity are considered to be exogenous to social interaction and society is simply understood as a strategic realm, within which rational actors pursue strategies to maximise their utility. Interpretive approaches, by contrast, regard actors as social and their identities and interests are socially constructed as the product of intersubjective meanings. They reject positivist epistemology and methodology and emphasise the normative purpose of all theories. Engaging critically with the positivist discourse in international relations in itself is regarded as the key aspect of substantive analysis.
Against this background then, constructivism is introduced. It accepts certain premises of critical theory, which stress actors’ social embeddedness. Unlike interpretive approaches, however, constructivism emphasises the importance of empirical research and, perhaps unsurprisingly, many constructivists employ a positivist epistemology and methodology in their analyses. In the next section, we give, first, two examples of positivist constructivism in line with this idea of middle ground. At the same time, however, characterising constructivism as a middle ground is not accepted by everyone. Hence, we also provide one example of post-positivist constructivism.
THINK POINT:
Can you identify some collectively held ideas, i.e. intersubjective meanings, which are part of the structure of world order?
Constructivist examples:
a) Alexander Wendt: anarchy is what states make of it.
Wendt criticizes ‘state-centric’ approaches for taking the interests and identity of states as given, i.e. exogenous to the process of state intervention, and for viewing the system structure merely in terms of a distribution of material capabilities. In contrast to neo-realism, Alexander Wendt considers the identities and interests of states as endogenous to interaction. ‘It is through reciprocal interaction ... that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests’ (Wendt 1992: 406). In line with general constructivism, he views the international structure as consisting of both material capabilities as well as intersubjective meanings. Assuming that structure is endogenous to process and changing practices of interaction will change intersubjective meanings, the overall structure itself is changeable. In the process of interaction between states, their identities and interests may also change, as they are no longer deduced from an international, anarchic system, which is unchangeable. Hence, through collective action, state interests and the international structure can be changed and ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. Overall, Wendt identifies three different macro-level structures, the Hobbesian (war of all against all), the Lockean (rivalry, not excluding the use of violence but also implying the possibility of co-operation) and the Kantian structure (collective security), characterised by enemy, rival and friend respectively as the dominant state role (Wendt 1999: 246-312). The anarchic system with war of every state against each other is still a possibility, but unlike neo-realism, it is not taken as unchangeable. There is the possibility to move towards a more peaceful international order with states changing their opinions of each other and the overall system in the process of interaction.
Clearly, Wendt incorporates all the key constructivist assumptions of intersubjective meanings being part of the overall structure and states’ interests and identities being endogenous to interaction with other states. At the same time, he still adheres to a positivist research agenda. In his own words, ‘when it comes to the epistemology of social inquiry I am a strong believer in science …; I am a “positivist”’ (Wendt 1999: 39).
b) Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink: international norms and political change.
In their positivist, empirical research programme, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink investigate how certain norms become accepted in international relations. They identify three stages in a norm life cycle. First, norms do not appear out of the blue, but are put forward by what they call norm entrepreneurs, driven by empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment. This is the stage of norm emergence. These ‘norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895). International organisations may function as platforms from which these norm entrepreneurs operate. Equally, provided new norms become part of international organisations, they may actually help support the validity of these norms.
The second stage in a norm life cycle is referred to as ‘norm cascade’. ‘After norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms, we can say the norm reaches a threshold or tipping point’ (Finnemore and Sikking 1998: 901). As soon as the tipping point has been reached, more and more states are likely to sign up to the new norm, as they do not want to appear as outsiders within the international society of states. Finally, in the third stage of a norm life cycle, the stage of internalization, certain norms acquire an almost common sense quality in the way they become internalized by key policy decision-makers. It is at this stage, that a certain norm has truly become embedded in the structure of international relations.
On norm emergence Finnemore and Sikkink argue (1998: 900, 907, 914) that, for example, the World Bank ‘though not tailored to norm promotion, may have the advantage of resources and leverage over weak or developing states they seek to convert to their normative convictions’. On norm cascading they argue that while there may be norms that are congruent between capitalism and liberalism such ‘a formulation is too vague to be useful’. Finally, on norm internalisation there is the position that there is supposedly ‘no good way of treating it theoretically’ although ‘persuasion is central to politics of all kinds and we need a good theoretical apparatus for understanding it’.
Elsewhere, on norm life cycles and the global promotion of gender equality, Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True (2012) have developed one of the most nuanced engagements and critiques of norm construction and the emergence, evolution and impact of norm life cycles. Arguing against a static conceptualisation of norm creation, or a linear model of norm emergence and diffusion, they instead propose an understanding of norms as processes elaborating sources of dynamism behind norm definition, their fraught contestation, and development, as well as reversal. Pertinently, an acute critique is developed of literature on international norm dynamics and political change, especially in its excising of power from accounts of norm diffusion and for asserting a static view of norm content inattentive to shifts and modifications in the content of norms over time or how norms as processes emerge and change. To reinforce their point, Krook and True argue that scholars such as Finnemore and Sikkink ‘do not explore the contested space within and among norms and how it may result in the fluidity or evolution of norms themselves’. Temporality is crucial here to assessing the origins and transformations of norms as processes. To cite Krook and True (2012: 117):
'norms do not necessarily remain stable once they have been constructed: their content may be revised in the course of attempts to extend or challenge their meanings, or as a result of shifts in the broader universe of norms'.
THINK POINT:
How convincing is it to argue that the World Bank is really not tailored to norm promotion following decades of structural adjustment after the debt crisis in developing countries?
The concept of norm entrepreneurs is very similar to Peter Haas’ (1992) concept of ‘epistemic communities’, defined as groups of experts to which governments turn for advice in times of crisis and uncertainty. What they have both in common is the attempt to integrate an analysis of ideas into a broader positivist research programme in international relations. Ideas are treated as a potential additional empirical variable. Again, similar to Wendt, a different ontology is accepted, but the epistemology and methodology of enquiry remain firmly positivist.
c) Steve Smith – singing our world into existence.
In a major address to the International Studies Association, Steve Smith looked more closely at the impact of the discipline on empirical conditions and how this might have been related to the terrorist attack on the USA on 11 September 2001. ‘I want to claim that the discipline of International Relations is complicit in the constitution of this world of international relations; I want to claim that there can be no such thing as a value-free, non-normative social science; and I want to claim that the ways in which the discipline, our discipline, not their discipline or the U.S. discipline, constructs the categories of thought within which we explain the world, helps to reinforce Western, predominantly U.S., practices of statecraft that themselves reflect an underlying set of social forces’ (Smith 2004: 499). In other words, IR theory and the concepts it puts forward is part of the overall structure itself.
Different definitions then would also result in different international relations. For example, an alternative understanding of securing as emancipation could emphasise human security as freedom from the tyranny of want (Booth 2007). Because IR as a discipline has only focused on certain notions of security, it is accused of having helped ‘to sing into existence the world of September 11, 2001’ (Smith 2004: 513-4). As Smith argues, ‘some of these aspects of violence are absolutely critical to explaining September 11 because they help explain why much of the world’s population celebrated the attacks, and why the West generally, and the United States specifically, are so unpopular, even hated’ (Smith 2004: 510).
Again, Smith incorporates all the key constructivist assumptions including that our collectively held ideas are part of the overall structure of international relations. At the same time, however, unlike our two other constructivist examples, he goes beyond accepting a different ontology and also pursues a post-positivist epistemology. ‘I want to claim that there can be no such thing as a value-free, non-normative social science’ (Smith 2004: 499). It is on the basis of such a post-positivist understanding that he can accuse the discipline of IR theory of having contributed to creating the world responsible for 9/11. As researchers, our own ideas and theories are not seen as separate from an objective reality, but they are directly part of the reality we are investigating.
THINK POINT:
What are the similarities, what are the tensions between positivist and post-positivist IR theory
Conclusion:
When constructivism hit IR theorising in the late 1980s/early 1990s it revitalised theoretical thinking. The notion that ideas can be part of the overall structure opened up completely new theoretical avenues. It was the positivist strand of constructivism, which was soon accepted into the family of mainstream theories. In a way, it simply added a focus on the potential causality of ideas without undermining the overall emphasis on empirical research programmes with testable hypotheses of mainstream IR theory. Next to neo-realism and liberalism, constructivism became the third widely accepted approach. Post-positivist constructivism, however, went further and questioned the purpose underlying mainstream IR theory more broadly. It therefore provides a good moment in this resource to indicate the shift towards the second part and its focus on post-positivist IR theory.
Nevertheless, whether positivist or post-positivist constructivism, there are a number of key problems. First, there is nothing from within the various constructivist theories, which could guide us, the researchers, to the key actors, the who, to be investigated. In fact, constructivist approaches rely on other approaches when identifying the most important agents. While Wendt falls back on neo-realism and its state-centrism, for example, Finnemore and Sikkink adopt liberal notions of the importance of individuals and international organisations as well as some neo-realist assumptions of the significance of states in international decision-making. Second, while constructivists are very good at tracing how a particular set of ideas have become part of the overall structure – see Finnemore and Sikkink’s focus on norm cycles – they cannot explain why it is that one set of ideas became part of the overall structure, but not another. Third, constructivism does not have a clear methodology to assess change from one international social structure to another. Wendt hypothetically outlines three potential types of international structures, but how we analyse a shift from one structure to another is not addressed. Finally, some actually question the radicalism of constructivism in the first place. Do not already liberal IR theorists in their focus on ‘complex interdependence’ include the possibility that states identities and interests can change as a result of repeated interaction over time (Sterling-Folker 2000)? In sum, while the focus on ideas is welcome, many questions remain left unanswered by constructivism. We will return to these questions in Class 10 on the role of ideas in International Relations.
References
Adler, Emanuel (1997) ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European Journal of International Relations, 3(3): 319-63.
Booth, Ken (2007) Theory of World Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52(4): 887-917.
Haas, Peter M. (1992), ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’, International Organization, 46(1).
Krook, Mona Lena and Jacqui True (2010) ‘Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality’, European Journal of International Relations, 18(1): 103-27.
Ruggie, John G. (1998) Constructing the World Polity. Essays on International Institutionalism. London: Routledge.
Smith, Steve (2004) ‘Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11’, International Studies Quarterly, 48(3): 499-515.
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer (2000) ‘Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared’, International Studies Quarterly, 44(1): 97-119.
Wendt, Alexander (1992) ‘Anarchy is What Stakes Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46(2): 393-425.
Wendt, Alexander (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Textbook chapters
Fierke, Karin M. (2016) ‘Constructivism’, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (fourth edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 9.
Reus-Smit, Christian (2013) ‘Constructivism’, in Scott Burchill et al (eds.) Theories of International Relations, Fifth edition. London: Palgrave, Chapter 9.
Ulbert, Cornelia (2014) ‘Social Constructivism’, in Manuela Spindler and Siegfried Schieder (eds.) Theories of International Relations. London: Routledge, Chapter 15.