Prof. Andreas Bieler and Prof. Adam D. Morton
Why Theory?
'Inequalities in power between mainstream and feminist IR allow for greater ignorance of feminist approaches on the part of the mainstream than is possible for feminists with respect to conventional IR, if they are to be accorded any legitimacy within the profession. Because of this power differential, feminists are suspicious of co-optation or attempts to label certain of their approaches as more compatible than others'. - J. Ann Tickner, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists'.
The purpose of this class is to emphasise the importance of theory in analysing international relations and, thereby, lay the foundations for this module on Theories and Concepts in International Relations (IR). Allocating the terms of the debate, however, can often mean allocating power. As recognised by Steve Smith (1992: 494), these allocations also shape the presentation of alternatives that can become co-opted so that they are configured to say something about the main (or "great") debates. The result can be assimilation in the form of a "synthesis" or, alternatively, marginalisation in those instances when conformity is not ensured or condoned. As these classes will substantiate, such outcomes have often shaped the reception of critical theoretical approaches in theorising the international, not least radical feminist perspectives on gender and sexuality, poststructuralist approaches to discourse, decolonial and postcolonial emphases on racialised politics, or historical materialist appreciations of class as an emergent force in contexts of social struggle. Such outlets of theoretical heterodoxy are, of course, not mutually exclusive and the role of "theory" (as a tool or as critique) is often highly contested, or worse, dismissed as inessential in the "real world". As Marysia Zalewski (1996: 351) once stated in a pivotal essay: 'The "real worlders" use a variety of tactics to delegitimise those forms of theorising which they see as either useless or downright dangerous'. Nevertheless, before addressing how a variety of critical approaches provide ways of theorising the international in relation to the mainstream, the power differentials accruing to the latter have to be acknowledged from the outset, as highlighted by J. Ann Tickner in our opening epigraph (1997: 629). Although such relations of power and knowledge cannot be avoided, we want to start this series of introductory classes on 'Why Theory?' by delivering four main parts to the Class. The first section discusses why theory is essential in the first place, before the subsequent section introduces the dichotomy between positivist (mainstream) and post-positivist (critical) approaches. The third section provides a brief overview of the three key "debates" in IR theory, while the fourth section sums up the key conclusions for the remainder of the teaching resource.
Why Theory?
‘An observer enters a room and begins to take note of what he or she sees. Five things are noted: brown carpets on the floor, plain white walls, steps, inset spotlights in the ceiling and 61 people. A second observer of the same scene also notes five things. One individual is standing at the front of the room doing most, if not all, of the talking. This person is standing by a device projecting images and text onto a white screen on the wall. The other 60 are best described as being variously engaged with what the person at the front is saying. The room is tiered. The event lasts about 50 minutes. Our two observers have seen the same event, but they have chosen to observe different aspects of that event. The first observer has the sense that s/he has observed 61 people in a room with particular physical features, whereas the second has clearly seen a lecture’ (Rosamond, 2000: 4).
As this statement indicates, theory is absolutely essential for a number of empirical and conceptual considerations. Empirically, theories are necessary in that they provide concepts to produce ordered and, thus, meaningful observations. Considering the large amount of empirical facts out there, it would simply be impossible to conduct a research project without any concepts guiding our enquiry. Those who do argue that their research is purely empirical generally have adopted a number of common sense assumptions sub-consciously. No statements about social phenomena are possible in a theoretical vacuum. Theories are important in that they tell us which actors to look at and which phenomena to observe. They influence the questions asked, the way research is carried out and, at least to some extent, have an impact on the actual results of a research project.
‘International relations comprise a multiplicity of events, issues and relationships which are often enormous in scale and bewildering in their complexity. Theories can help the observer to think critically, logically and coherently by sorting these phenomena into manageable categories so that the appropriate units and level of analysis can be chosen and so that, where possible, significant connections and patterns of behaviour are identified’ (Burchill, 2013: 17).
Because it is impossible to carry out empirical research without theoretical concepts, good research is characterised by self-awareness and critical self-reflexivity of one’s own approach, comprehending what particular concepts allow us to do, but equally being aware of the limitations of our approach.
The theoretical relevance, therefore, lies in uncovering what the underlying assumptions of our approach are and how they influence the research project. Importantly, by defining the object of study, knowledge is not neutral and it has to be asked which theory is relevant at what time and why. Theory, as a result, becomes an issue of power. A theory considered to be common sense or the dominant approach can become very influential in that it defines what can be known and what is sensible to talk about. It demarcates the field as well as mode of enquiring.
There are two key concepts, which need to be kept in mind when comparing a range of approaches with each other. First, ‘ontology’ refers to the basic image of what social reality is. Almost every IR theory has its own ontology, which defines what ‘is’ in international relations to be studied, which are the most important entities and what is the relationship between them. ‘Epistemology’, in turn, is the theory of knowledge. It specifies how we obtain and produce knowledge. Again, every IR theory has its own epistemology and the distinction between ‘positivist’ and ‘post-positivist’ approaches, introduced in the next section, relates closely to the issue of different epistemologies.
Methodology, finally, brings ontology and epistemology together. It provides the basis for analysing ontological units grounded in an epistemological stance following a certain method. In the case of neo-realism, for example, to be dealt with in Week Two, the ontological units are states, the analysis of which is grounded in a positivist epistemology in line with the methodology of truth as correspondence. As Steve Smith argues, ‘I see neither ontology nor epistemology as prior to the other, but instead see the two of them as mutually and inextricably interrelated’ (Smith, 1996: 18). In the next section, we will focus further on different epistemologies and concentrate here on the distinction between positivism and post-positivism as the two dominant modes of producing knowledge in IR and social sciences more widely.
THINK POINTS
Do not newspaper articles demonstrate that empirical research is possible without explicit theoretical conceptualisations?
Is it correct to argue that ontology and epistemology are inextricably related or can the politics of ontology or epistemology be regarded as primary?
Positivism versus post-positivism
One of the key dividing lines between groups of IR theories is along the dichotomy of positivist versus post-positivist epistemology. Positivism is characterised by the general attempt to transfer the methods of natural sciences to social sciences and to identify causal relationships in social sciences along the lines of ‘if A, then B’. The main method is to develop and test hypotheses against empirical reality, revealing the tenet of ‘truth as correspondence’ with the underlying assumption of the separation of subject and object. Only if we distinguish between ‘us’, the researcher as the observer, and the object of our enquiry, and only if we assume that the researcher has no impact on the object of our study, is it feasible to achieve such an understanding of how knowledge is obtained? Additionally, positivists adopt the tenet of the ‘methodological unity of science’ with the underlying assumption of naturalism. What is valid in natural sciences, where researchers attempt to identify causal laws in nature, is assumed to be also the case for social sciences and the study of human interaction.
Finally, positivist approaches are characterised by the tenet of ‘the value-free nature of scientific knowledge’, based on the assumption of the separation of facts and values. Because positivists assume that the investigator and his/her own normative assumptions can be separated from the objective of investigation, scientific research is assumed to reveal simply the objective facts of empirical reality. The analysis of normative values is considered to be a separate undertaking of non-scientific and ultimately inferior quality. Unsurprisingly, considering these main tenets, ‘a theory of international relations needs to perform four principal tasks. It should describe, explain, predict, and prescribe’ (Kegley, 1995: 8). Since identified causal relationships make it possible to foresee what is likely to happen in the future, social scientists can predict future events and advise policy-makers accordingly.
There are, however, major problems with positivist analyses. In order to identify causal relationships, positivists have to carve out some part of reality, the boundaries of which are held constant. ‘Theory becomes possible only if various objects and processes, movements and events, acts and interactions are viewed as forming a domain that can be studied in its own right’ (Waltz, 1995: 69). This is a defence on the basis of principles of parsimony - meaning only taking severely simple assumptions as your point of departure. As a consequence, positivist theories are static and ahistoric and, therefore, cannot account for structural change in the very parameters of what is deemed to be stable a priori as part of such a domain. Moreover, in order to identify causal regularities in human interaction, the rationale of actors’ behaviour has to be held constant. Nevertheless, how can social action guided by human subjectivity be objective? Finally, by separating between values and facts, positivists overlook that their own assumptions have already constituted parts of the structure and causal relationships they try to explain. There is, hence, a certain level of naivety and lack of self-reflexivity in positivist approaches. Overall, the social purpose of positivism as ‘problem-solving’ theory is the maintenance of the status quo.
Post-positivism, by contrast, accepts that theories always have a direct impact on research in that they establish who the key actors and what are the most important processes to be examined. Therefore, the assumptions of one’s own approach, from a post-positivist perspective, have to be problematized. Equally, as a result of this acknowledgement, post-positivist approaches deal with the social and political purpose of theory, realising that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox, 1981: 128). Thereby, they also define the ethical and practical horizons of theorising. In contrast to positivist approaches, it is not considered possible to identify generalizable causal relationships and to make predictions. Nevertheless, post-positivist theory allows for the study of change. Furthermore, it comprehends that theory is part of shaping reality as a practical activity. There is no objective world, but the perception of the ‘real’ world is mediated by the adopted theoretical lenses. Thus, what we think the world is has a decisive impact on the shape of reality. In sum the social purpose of post-positivism as ‘critical theory’ is to understand structural change and to pursue emancipatory aspirations towards a better world.
THINK POINTS
What could be considered to be the advantages of a positivist approach over post-positivism?
If objective social science research is impossible, does it still make sense to pursue a social scientist line of enquiry?
‘Great Debates’ in IR
We can identify three so-called ‘great debates’ in IR. First, the 1930s and 1940s were dominated by scholarly controversy between liberalism and realism. The establishment of the first Chair in IR at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth in 1919 was a key moment in the formal establishment of IR as a discipline in the social sciences. Liberal thinkers’ post-World War One focus was on the avoidance of war. They analysed the causes of the ‘great war’ and queried how it had been possible that such a slaughter had taken place, despite the fact that there is a harmony of interests amongst human beings to forge universal values. Criticising the secretive diplomacy between absolutist, non-democratic countries prior to 1914, they concluded that institutions were key to realising security in the future. Most importantly, this included representative democracy at home and inter-state co-operation in global institutions abroad with the latter resulting in the establishment of the League of Nations in Geneva/Switzerland in January 1920.
However, empirical developments soon led to a questioning of liberals’ positive assumptions about human nature and the role of institutions. The rise of fascism in Italy during the 1920s and of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s and both countries’ belligerent stance at the international level resulting in the outbreak of World War Two in 1939 caused a fundamental rethinking of war and peace in IR. Realism emerged as the dominant IR theory. Drawing on Thomas Hobbes’ understanding of life as nasty, brutish and short, and accepting human nature as conflictual, realists consider the struggle for power as endemic in IR. States are the key actors and war is the result of inter-state rivalry. There is no natural harmony of interests nor can institutions support the creation of such a harmony. Conflict, arising due to scarcity in the eyes of E.H. Carr (1939/1946) or sinful human nature in H. Morgenthau’s (1948/1978) understanding, will always be persuasive.
The second so-called great debate in IR occurred in the 1950s and 1960s between the traditionalists and the behaviouralists over the appropriate methodology in IR. It was the latter who demanded an increasing focus on ‘scientific method’ with an emphasis on data and mathematical models to study decision-making. These scholars demanded more rigour in reasoning and the application of scientific concepts, while traditional research in IR had largely relied on historical and humanist methodologies. In the words of Chris Brown, ‘the aim of behaviouralists was to replace the “wisdom literature” and “anecdotal” use of history represented by Morgenthau and the traditional realists with rigorous, systematic, scientific concepts and reasoning’ (Brown, 1997: 36).
The third great debate, finally, is related to the increasing prominence of post-positivist approaches from the early 1980s onwards, including feminist, Marxist, post-structuralist and post-colonial theoretical advances. The issues dealt with reflect precisely the different epistemologies between positivism and post-positivism outlined in the previous section. Importantly, while post-positivist approaches agree on their rejection of positivism, they differ significantly over the foundational basis of IR theory (Smith, 1995: 26). While post-positivist feminists regard the division between male and female gender as the basis from which to analyse IR, historical materialists emphasise the way the social relations of production are organised and the agency of class fractions. Post-structuralism, in turn, supposedly rejects foundationalism focusing instead on how different discourses intersect with each other.
Finally, as Steve Smith (1995: 16) makes clear, there is a danger in presenting the history of IR theory in the form of Great Debates. It presents IR theory as too clear cut a history, potentially overlooking that certain approaches live on. Moreover, it tends to over-estimate unity within theories, while conceptualisations outside the debate are overlooked. However, as long as these caveats are kept in mind, the Great Debates provide some useful way contouring the development of IR theory over time.
Conclusion
As discussed in this lecture, no empirical research is possible without theoretical conceptualisations. The particular epistemology and ontology of a specific approach influence heavily what is studied 'how' and what findings are established. Hence, different approaches can investigate one and the same empirical issue in IR and may analyse rather different phenomena and come to a variety of conclusions. Theoretical approaches, therefore, operate as distinctive lenses, through which we can study the world.
Students of this module are not expected to adopt a certain approach for their own analysis. They are completely free in deciding which line of theoretical enquiry to pursue when carrying out research. However, they are expected, first, to be able to justify the selection of their approach through a critical engagement with other IR theories. Second, they have to demonstrate the capacity of reflecting critically about the basic assumptions of their own approach and in what way these assumptions influence their analysis.
The distinction between positivist and post-positivist approaches, the third great debate in IR theory since the early 1980s after the debate between liberalism and realism in the 1930s and 1940s and the debate between traditionalists and behaviouralists during the 1950s and 1960s, is crucial for the structure of this resource. From Week 2 onwards, we will be first looking at various positivist approaches including (neo-) realism, liberalism and constructivism, before moving towards post-positivist approaches in Week 5, discussing first feminist IR theories, then historical materialist approaches as well as post-structuralism and post-colonialism. Week 9 is dedicated to the agency-structure problematique in IR, while Week 10 focuses on the role of ideas in IR. Both sessions will allow us to compare once more the various IR theories and their respective positions on these conceptual themes. Week 11 will provide a final overview of the module.
Exercise: Positivist or Post-positivist?
References
Brown, Chris (1997) Understanding International Relations. Houndmills: Macmillan.
Burchill, Scott and Andrew Linklater (2013) ‘Introduction’, in Scott Burchill et al (eds.) Theories of International Relations, Fifth edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-31.
Carr, E.H. (1939/1946) The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: Macmillan.
Cox, Robert W. (1981) ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10(2): 126-55.
Kegley, Charles W. (1995) ‘The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics: An Introduction’, in Charles W. Kegley (ed.) Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 1-24.
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948/1978) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth edition. New York: Knopf.
Rosamond, Ben (2000) Theories of European Integration. London: Palgrave.
Smith, Steve (1995) ‘The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory’, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) International Relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 1-37.
Smith, Steve (1996) ‘Positivism and beyond’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.) International theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 11-44.
Tickner, J. Ann (1997) 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists', International Studies Quarterly, 41(4): 611-32.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1995) ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, in Charles W. Kegley (ed.) Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 67-82.
Zalewski, Marysia (1996) '"All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up": theory, theorists, theorising', in in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.) International theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 340-53.
Textbook chapters
Burchill, Scott and Andrew Linklater (2013) ‘Introduction’, in Scott Burchill et al (eds.) Theories of International Relations, Fifth edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-31.
Smith, Steve (2016) ‘Introduction: Diversity and Disciplinarity in International Relations Theory’, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Fourth edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Introduction.
Spindler, Manuela and Siegfried Schieder (2014) ‘Theory in International Relations’, in Siegfried Schieder and Manuela Spindler (eds.) Theories of International Relations. London: Routledge, pp. 1-21.