Teacher: Régis Renault
Office: A106, Chênes 1, Cergy.
Tel: 01 34 25 72 28
E-mail : regis.renault@cyu.fr
Web page : https://sites.google.com/site/homepageofregisrenault/
Course outline.
For a background on the economic analysis of work and organizations you can read the following slides not covered in class.
Chapter 0 Setting the stage. SLIDES
The four lectures will be devoted to the following chapters.
Chapter 1 Work incentives in organizations. (Roberts, 2004, chapter 4, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, chapters 5, 6 and 7). SLIDES
Chapter 2 Internal labor markets. (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, chapter 11. Auriol and Renault, 2008, Introduction, Sections 4 and 5 ). SLIDES
Chapter 3. Extrinsic and intrisic work motivation. (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003: introduction) SLIDES
Chapter 4. Matching working agents to organizations.
Grading
Bibliography (in progress).
Auriol, Emmanuelle and Régis Renault (2008). Status and incentives. Rand Journal of Economics, 39(1), 305-326.
Bénabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2003). Intrinsic and exrinsic motivation. Review of Economic Studies. 70. 489-520.
Besley, Thimothy and Maitreesh Ghatak (2005). Competition and incentives with motivated agents. American Economic Review, 95(3), 616-636.
Besley, Thimothy and Maitreesh Ghatak (2008). Status incentives. American Economic Review, 98(2), 206-211.
Kosfeld, Michael and Suzanne Neckermann. (2011). Getting more work for nothing? Symbolic awards and worker performance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(3), 86-99.
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1992). Economics, organization and management. Prentice Hall.
Roberts, John (2004). The modern firm: organization design for performance and growth. Oxford University Press.