Empirical Industrial Organization

Professors:

Andras Niedermayer

Chènes 1, office B136

e-mail: andras.niedermayer@cyu.fr

 

Régis Renault

Chènes 1, office A106

e-mail: regis.renault@cyu.fr

 

Informations on the course :

 Master 2 economic analysis/ESSEC Ph.D. 1st and 2nd year

Course load: 27 hours, 9 sessions; 3 hours per session

 Overview:

 In this course we will cover mainstream empirical industrial organization methods. The main goal is to provide a set of tools necessary to undertake empirical analyses typically performed in Industrial Organization. Most methods that will be reviewed in this course are not limited to empirical IO, but can be used in a variety of different fields (such as health, finance, and environmental economics).

 Prerequisites

Microeconomics, Econometrics

 

Course Objectives:

The objective of the course is to provide the students with an appropriate understanding of key empirical industrial organization models.

After having attended the classes, the students will:

-     have an overview of seminal and recent papers in empirical IO

-     understand core empirical methods

-     understand the data requirements for each methods to be implemented

·     have a working knowledge of Python

Evaluation

Homework assignments: 50%

Final evaluation: 50%

PROBLEM SET 2

PROBLEM SET 3


Course outline

Chapter 1. Monopoly and price discrimination. SLIDES.

Chapter 2. Aucton theory. SLIDES

Chapter 3. Discrete choice random utility models. SLIDES

Chapter 4. Estimation of demand and marginal cost.

Chapter 5. Estimation of bargaining models.

Chapter 6. Auction econometrics.

Chapter 7. Econometrics of price discrimination.

 

Readings

Monopoly and price discrimination.

 

Tirols, J. (1988): The theory of industrial organization. MIT Press.

 

Laffont, J.J., and D. Martimort (2002), The theory of incentives. Princeton University Press.

 

Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic theory, 18(2), 301-317.

 

Auction theory

 

Krishna, V. (2009), Auction theory. Academic Press.

 

Discrete choice random utility models

 

Anderson, S.P., A. de Palma and J. Thisse (1992): Discrete choice models of product differentiation. MIT Press.

 

Estimation of demand and marginal costs 

 

Steven T. Berry, “Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation,” Rand Journal of Economics, 25, 242-262, 1994.

Berry, S., Levinsohn, J., & Pakes, A. (1995). Automobile prices in market equilibrium. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 841-890.

Nevo, A. (2000). Mergers with differentiated products: The case of the ready-to-eat cereal industry. The RAND Journal of Economics, 395-421

Berry, S., & Pakes, A. (2007). The pure characteristics demand model. International Economic Review, 48(4), 1193-1225

Goldberg, P. K. (1995). Product differentiation and oligopoly in international markets: The case of the US automobile industry. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 891-951

Nevo, A. (2011). Empirical models of consumer behavior. Annu. Rev. Econ., 3(1), 51-75.

Estimation of bargaining models

 

Crawford, Gregory S., and Ali Yurukoglu. 2012. “The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets.” American Economic Review 102 (2): 643–85.

Dafny, Leemore S. 2010. “Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive?” American Economic Review 100 (4): 1399–431

Ho, Katherine, Justin Ho, and Julie Holland Mortimer. 2012. “The Use of Full-Line Forcing Contracts in the Video Rental Industry.” American Economic Review 102 (2): 686–719.

Horn, Henrick, and Asher Wolinsky. 1988. “Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger.” RAND Journal of Economics 19 (3): 408–19.

Grennan, M. (2013). Price discrimination and bargaining: Empirical evidence from medical devices. American Economic Review, 103(1), 145-77.

Auction econometrics

Paarsch, Harry J., and Han Hong. "An introduction to the structural econometrics of auction data." MIT Press Books 1 (2006).

Guerre, Emmanuel, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. "Optimal nonparametric estimation of first‐price auctions." Econometrica 68.3 (2000): 525-574.

Krasnokutskaya, Elena. "Identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity." The Review of Economic Studies 78.1 (2011): 293-327.

Econometrics of price discrimination

Luo, Y., Perrigne, I., & Vuong, Q. (2018). Structural analysis of nonlinear pricing. Journal of Political Economy, 126(6), 2523-2568.