Drafts

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Formal Ethics

Subtracting Reasons

I present a theory of practical reasons subtraction.

Partial Reasons

I argue for a notion of partial reasons and I make it precise.

Modeling Value-Based Disagreement via Imprecise Measure Theory

I provide a model of value-based peer disagreement via Imprecise Measure Theory, which generalizes imprecise probability.

Logic

The Content of Generics

I argue for a novel hyperintensional understanding of generic sentences based on arbitrary truthmaker semantics and subtraction.

Truthmaker Semantics for Justification Logic

We explore different options to give a truthmaker semantics for several justification logics.

First-order Hyperintensional Deontic Logic

I present a version of a first-order hyperintensional deontic logic.

All-things-considered Oughts via Reasons in Justification Logic (with Tudor Protopopescu)

We argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional, and put forward a formal account of this thesis, by describing a logic of reasons based on justification logics.

Metaphysics

Identity in Higher-Order Logic and Metaphysics

I investigate the question of the identity of higher-order entities via model-theoretic notions.

First, I propose suitable notions of indiscernibility for higher-order entities and discuss preliminary issues about the adequacy of formal languages. Second, I formulate two conjectures [edit Sept. 2016: one is solved] about the relations between indiscernibility, automorphisms and higher-order equivalence, one of which depends on assumptions about large cardinals.

I then discuss their relevance for higher-order metaphysics, structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics, and the philosophy of physics.

Higher-Order Supervenience and Nonnaturalism

I argue that a higher-order supervenience principle, together with a hyperintensional account of properties, deflect Jackson-style arguments against nonreductive normative nonnaturalism.

I also prove that usual definitions of supervenience cashing out indiscernibility in terms of isomorphisms are model-theoretically inadequate.

Responsibility and Its Truthmakers

I tackle the direct argument for incompatibilism employing an exact truthmaking logic for responsibility.

Modeling Value-Based Disagreement via Imprecise Measure Theory

I provide a model of value-based peer disagreement via Imprecise Measure Theory, which generalizes imprecise probability.

A Hyperintensional Logical Framework for Deontic Reasons (with Tudor Protopopescu)

We argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional, and put forward a formal account of this thesis, by describing a logic of reasons based on justification logics.

All-things-considered Oughts via Reasons in Justification Logic (with Tudor Protopopescu)

We argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional, and put forward a formal account of this thesis, by describing a logic of reasons based on justification logics.

Metaphysics

Identity in Higher-Order Logic and Metaphysics

I investigate the question of the identity of higher-order entities via model-theoretic notions.

First, I propose suitable notions of indiscernibility for higher-order entities and discuss preliminary issues about the adequacy of formal languages. Second, I formulate two conjectures [edit Sept. 2016: one is solved] about the relations between indiscernibility, automorphisms and higher-order equivalence, one of which depends on assumptions about large cardinals.

I then discuss their relevance for higher-order metaphysics, structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics, and the philosophy of physics.

Higher-Order Supervenience and Nonnaturalism

I argue that a higher-order supervenience principle, together with a hyperintensional account of properties, deflect Jackson-style arguments against nonreductive normative nonnaturalism.

I also prove that usual definitions of supervenience cashing out indiscernibility in terms of isomorphisms are model-theoretically inadequate.