In the previous class, we have studied the OBJECTIVE standard by which an action, thought, or omission is judged as good or bad; this objective standard is the moral LAW. We also discussed the SUBJECTIVE reference point (by "subjective" we mean something in the person or subject who acts); this subjective norm is each person's CONSCIENCE. Each person applies the objective norm to his own actions with the aid of his conscience which, as we have seen, is no other than his own intellect when it evaluates the goodness or evil of an action.
The next question is WHICH ASPECTS OF AN ACTION SHOULD THE CONSCIENCE EXAMINE IN THE LIGHT OF THE MORAL LAW? The answer becomes clear when we examine what elements go into an action.
These are called SOURCES OF MORALITY, because the goodness or evil of the action stems from them.
Thus the Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCCC 367; cf CCC 1750) teaches us that
The morality of human acts depends on three sources:
The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the "SOURCES," or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.
1.1 How does the OBJECT determine whether an act is good or bad?
First of all, we should note that the term "object" does not refer either to the physical object of the action, or to the physical act, but to its moral object, insofar as it is subject to the above-mentioned norms of morality. Thus, for example, the object of a robbery is not the stolen money (physical object) or its transfer from one place to another (physical act), but in the unjust taking away of something from its owner without his consent. Furthermore, two acts which are physically similar may be morally different, as in the physical similarity and moral difference between using a knife to stab an innocent person and using it to perform a surgery. The difference between the two lies in the objective or the end of each act.
In Our Moral Life in Christ (New Jersey: Scepter - MTC, 1997), A Fernandez and J Socias explain the way the object of an act determines its morality.
The object determines the morality of an act; thus, it is not moral to steal, lie, blaspheme, etc. On the contrary it is good to tell the truth, be just, and respect God's name. The human act receives its goodness or malice PRIMARILY from the object and the nature of the act itself, not from the intention. For example, adultery is always an evil by its object, independently of the purpose of the one who does it. So, when the moral object is in itself an absolute evil, the action in question is an INTRINSICALLY evil act. [Emphasis supplied.]
Looking exclusively at the object (without taking intention into account), we can classify human actions into:
When we study the commandments, we are examining the OBJECTIVE or SUBSTANTIAL morality of actions, we are inquiring into their INTRINSIC goodness or evil, we are speaking about their ESSENTIAL and PRIMARY morality, independently of the intention of their respective doers. This goes against the opinion of those who think that the goodness or evil of an action depends solely or mostly on the intention of the person acting, or the circumstances in which he finds himself, or on the prevailing social practice, thus making morality subjective and relativistic.
Were there to be no objective morality of actions, there would be no point in talking about good and evil. People will find themselves trapped in the quicksand of diverse and conflicting human opinions. As Saint Paul says in his Letter to the Ephesians (4:14), such men will be
tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the cunning of men, by their craftiness in deceitful wiles...
He also says in the Second Letter to Timothy (4:3-4)
3 For the time is coming when people will not endure sound teaching, but having itching ears they will accumulate for themselves teachers to suit their own likings, 4 and will turn away from listening to the truth and wander into myths.
Thus, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (the future Benedict XVI) declared in his homily before the Conclave on 18 April 2005:
How many winds of doctrine have we known in recent decades, how many ideological currents, how many ways of thinking. The small boat of the thought of many Christians has often been tossed about by these waves--flung from one extreme to another: from Marxism to liberalism, even to libertinism; from collectivism to radical individualism; from atheism to a vague religious mysticism; from agnosticism to syncretism and so forth. Every day new sects spring up, and what St Paul says about human deception and the trickery that strives to entice people into error (cf. Eph 4:14) comes true.
Today, having a clear faith based on the Creed of the Church is often labeled as fundamentalism. Whereas relativism, that is, letting oneself be "tossed here and there, carried about by every wind of doctrine," seems the only attitude that can cope with modern times. We are building a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one's own ego and desires.
We, however, have a different goal: the Son of God, the true man. He is the measure of true humanism. An "adult" faith is not a faith that follows the trends of fashion and the latest novelty; a mature adult faith is deeply rooted in friendship with Christ. It is this friendship that opens us up to all that is good and gives us a criterion by which to distinguish the true from the false, and deceit from truth.
We must develop this adult faith; we must guide the flock of Christ to this faith. And it is this faith--only faith--that creates unity and is fulfilled in love.
We will go back to this issue of moral or ethical relativism below.
1.2 What do we mean by INTENTION or END, and how does it affect the morality of the action?
The intention or end is the MOTIVE for doing the action. The CCC (no 1752) teaches:
In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one's whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one's neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it.
Regarding the role of the intention in altering the goodness or evil of an action, the CCC (1753) explains:
Summarising what has been said until now, we can enunciate the following principles.
1.3 And the circumstances? In what way do they increase or lessen the goodness or evil of an act?
Circumstances are the accidental moral conditions that contribute to increase or diminish the moral goodness or evil of an already existing action.
According to the CCC, no 1754:
The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act.
Circumstances include:
The same point of the CCC (no 1754) explains the effect of circumstances on the act.
1.4 Good intentions or circumstances not enough
The CCC (1756) reiterates:
It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
C Belmonte (Faith Seeking Understanding vol. 2. Manila: Studium Theologiae Foundation, pp 41-42) writes:
Quite often, a single action produces several proximate effects, with different degrees of concatenation. Some may be good, some bad. We will study these actions in the light of the principles on the two primary sources of morality established above. For the sake of simplicity, we will limit the analysis to the case of one action with two effects, one good and one bad.
THREE CONDITIONS are needed to make this action good. The first two refer, as in any action, to the goodness of the object and of the end, but with the complexity caused by the double effect.
i) The FIRST and FUNDAMENTAL condition is that the OBJECT of the action considered in itself (finis operis) must be morally GOOD or INDIFFERENT.
This is often the most difficult point to ascertain, since the action has two effects. One has to determine whether the proper object of the action is the good effect or the bad one. The object is good if the good effect is what follows necessarily and by itself from the action. The bad effect, on the other hand, should follow only accidentally (per accidens)—although at times it may be sure to follow—because of some circumstance that the agent cannot avoid.
In other words, the immediate effect of the action must be the good one. This is certainly not the case when the good effect is a consequence of the bad one. This would be akin to doing something bad for a good end, and we know that the end does not justify the means.
We should not forget that we are referring all the time to the moral object, not to the physical object. Thus, to stab somebody is not "to push a knife" or "to introduce a foreign object into the organism." It is "to kill" or "to wound." In the same way, amputating a gangrenous leg in order to save the patient is not just "to amputate a limb," but "to amputate a sick limb that threatens life." Otherwise, the immediate effect of the operation--amputation--would be bad, and the good effect--health--would come later as a consequence. As we can see, the application of this principle is not always easy. We cannot just apply it indiscriminately to any case without taking all factors into consideration.
ii) SECOND, the END of the agent, his INTENTION, must also be GOOD. Therefore, the agent must exclusively seek the good effect.
iii) A THIRD condition must also be met: there must be a PROPORTIONATELY SERIOUS CAUSE for doing that action and allowing the bad effect to happen. The seriousness of the cause is measured in relation to the importance of the good effect. It should be all the more serious,
The opinion of prudent people and their behavior in similar cases are usually good guides to gauge whether there is a proportionate cause.
The following examples are illustrations of the application of these principles:
Ethical relativism claims to liberate man from the chains of dogmatism. What it actually tries to do is to make man independent of God. Ethical relativism is an echo of the first temptation of our first parents (Genesis 3:4-5):
4 But the serpent said to the woman, "You will not die. 5 For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and YOU WILL BE LIKE GOD, knowing good and evil."
This is what the moral relativists want--that each one be a god unto himself, determining what is right and wrong. It is clear that in a society where everyone decides what is right or wrong for himself or herself, only anarchy and chaos can ensue.
Ethical relativism creates division. It spawns many divergent ethical doctrines all of which reject the intrinsic morality of our actions. Here are some of them.
3.1 Situation ethics
A Fernandez and J Socias write (Our Moral Life in Christ, p 112) :
Situation ethics maintains that moral good and evil result from the situation in which the person finds himself. Hence, it is said that the act cannot be judged alone, but only in its circumstances. It is also called CIRCUMSTANTIAL ETHICS. For example: John decided not to get drunk on Friday night since he was driving, but on Saturday he got drunk because he was home and no one would be hurt by his action. Thinking that he acted morally in not driving drunk, he has ignored the question of the morality of drunkenness itself.
Situation ethics was refuted by Pius XII and has declined. A new theory developed, however--consequentialism.
3.2 Consequentialism
The Encyclopedia of Catholic Doctrine (Indiana: Sunday Visitor, 1997, p 140) explains:
The term "consequentialism is closely related to two others: utilitarianism amd proportionalism. An ethical theory is consequentialist if it says: Choose that action that will produce the best consequences (or least bad consequences) in the long run.
A Fernandez and J Socias give the following example:
For example, suppose that a young man pressured his girlfriend intoprocuring an abortion because they are both young and have very little money with which to support a child, and have discovered theough pre-natal tests that the child will be born severely handicapped. He argues that it is better to abort the child because, inthis way, the child will not suffer a life of pain, their families will not be burdened by the child's handicap, and they will not have to face the huge financial burden of caring for a handicapped child. For the consequentialist, this action is morally justified because he judges the consequences which will result from his actions to be good. ... If the consequences will be evil, then the action ought to be avoided; but if there are good effects, the act can be done even if the act itself is evil.
They also point out at least three errors of this position.
- The effects are overvalued, so that it ignores the principle set by St Paul: never do evil top bring about a good (cf Rom 3:8)
- It justifies the morality of means, regardless of their nature, and violates the basic moral principle, "the end does not justify the means."
- The question can be raised: good follows for whom? It could happen that the advocate of consequentialism may consider those consequences that are good for him, but not good for another person or for society. Thus, the advocates of this ethical system can use immoral means, or seek immediate personal gain, and, in the end, become egotistical. The fact that it is also known as ETHICS OF INTENTION makes even clearer its fundamental flaw, since good intentions do not justify immoral acts. Besides, who can measure the intention of an individual?
3.3 Proportionalism
Proportionalists argue that the goodness or evil of an action shluld be determned by compaing the proportion of good and bad in alternatives for choice. Whatever seems to be greater good or lesser evil determines what one ought to do. The problem that this poses is how one is to measure that proportion, since usually many goods are at stake, and different people weigh different things in different ways. The absence of an objective reference point makes moral decision arbitrary.
4.1 What "Merit" Means
The CCCC (426; CCC, 2006-2010, 2025-2026) explains:
In general merit refers to the right to recompense for a good deed. With regard to God, we of ourselves are not able to merit anything, having received everything freely from him. However, God gives us the possibility of acquiring merit through union with the love of Christ, who is the source of our merits before God. The merits for good works, therefore must be attributed in the first place to the grace of God and then to the free will of man.
There are TWO KINDS of merit. C Belmonte writes (Faith Seeking Understanding vol 2, p 44):
In the case of PERFECT MERIT (DE CONDIGNO), there is an equivalence between the value of the act and the reward. In this case, we can say that the reward is nearly a duty of justice, at least by virtue of the promise made. Thus we can merit an increase of grace and eternal salvation by virtue of the Redemption achieved by Christ.
If merit is not due to that strict equivalence, but to a certain fittingness or to the liberality of the one who rewards, we have IMPERFECT MERIT (DE CONGRUO). Thus, in the supernatural order, the graces one may win for another person are merited de congruo. There is a certain analogy between non-supernatural good actions and this type of merit.
4.2 Do we have a right to deserve anything from God?
The CCC (2007), says:
With regard to God, there is no strict right to any merit on the part of man. Between God and us there is an immeasurable inequality, for we have received everything from him, our Creator.
4.3 So how is it possible that we can claim a reward for our actions?
The answer to this lies in
It is a completely Trinitarian initiative. The CCC (2008) teaches us:
The merit of man before God in the Christian life arises from the fact that God has freely chosen to associate man with the work of his grace. The fatherly action of God is first on his own initiative, and then follows man's free acting through his collaboration, so that the merit of good works is to be attributed in the first place to the grace of God, then to the faithful. Man's merit, moreover, itself is due to God, for his good actions proceed in Christ, from the predispositions and assistance given by the Holy Spirit.
It says further in point 2009:
Filial adoption, in making us partakers by grace in the divine nature, can bestow true merit on us as a result of God's gratuitous justice. This is our right by grace, the full right of love, making us "co-heirs" with Christ and worthy of obtaining "the promised inheritance of eternal life" [Council of Trent (1547): DS 1546] The merits of our good works are gifts of the divine goodness [cf Council of Trent (1547): DS 1548]. "Grace has gone before us; now we are given what is due.... Our merits are God's gifts" [St Augustine, Sermo 298, 4-5: PL 38, 1367].
In other words, everything is a gift, and what God expects of us is to contribute the tiny little portion of our "Yes" to His plan and to His grace. The CCC (2011) teaches us:
The charity of Christ is the source in us of all our merits before God. Grace, by uniting us to Christ in active love, ensures the supernatural quality of our acts and consequently their merit before God and before men. The saints have always had a lively awareness that their merits were pure grace.
This is how St Therese (St. Therese of Lisieux, "Act of Offering" in Story of a Soul, tr. John Clarke. Washington Dc: ICS, 1981, p 277) prayed:
After earth's exile, I hope to go and enjoy you in the fatherland, but I do not want to lay up merits for heaven. I want to work for your love alone.... In the evening of this life, I shall appear before you with empty hands, for I do not ask you, Lord, to count my works. All our justice is blemished in your eyes. I wish, then, to be clothed in your own justice and to receive from your love the eternal possession of yourself.
4.4 Can we merit the initial grace of justification? If not, what can we merit?
We must first ask what justification means. The CCCC (422) says:
Justification ... is the merciful and freely-given act of God which takes away our sins and makes us just and holy in our whole being. It is ... given to us in Baptism. Justification is the beginning of the free response of man, that is, faith in Christ and of cooperation with the grace of the Holy Spirit.
The CCC (2010) tells us that the first grace needed for FORGIVENESS and JUSTIFICATION is completely GRATUITOUS--we cannot merit it. (In this point, we coincide with the teaching of Martin Luther--justification cannot come bye works.) Afterwards, we can merit grace for our SANCTIFICATION, and TEMPORAL GOODS.
Since the initiative belongs to God in the order of grace, no one can merit the initial grace of forgiveness and justification, at the beginning of conversion. Moved by the Holy Spirit and by charity, we can then merit for ourselves and for others the graces needed for our sanctification, for the increase of grace and charity, and for the attainment of eternal life. Even temporal goods like health and friendship can be merited in accordance with God's wisdom. These graces and goods are the object of Christian prayer. Prayer attends to the grace we need for meritorious actions.
4.5 What are required for an act to be meritorious?
C Belmonte writes (Faith Seeking Understanding vol 2, p 44):
For an act to have merit--assuming always the promise of God--the following conditions must be met:
The degree of merit of an action depends on the greater or lesser charity possessed by the agent. It also depends, as a necessary condition, on the intensity of the act of the will orienting the action to the supernatural end.
4.6 Grace of Final Perseverance
The CCC 2016 notes:
The children of our holy mother the Church rightly hope for the grace of final perseverance and the recompense of God their Father for the good works accomplished with his grace in communion with Jesus [cf Council of Trent (1547): DS 1576].
C Belmonte writes (Faith Seeking Understanding vol 2, p 44):
Strictly speaking, final perseverance CANNOT be merited, not even with imperfect merit. However, we can say that it can be merited DE CONGRUO in a BROAD sense.