Abstract: We defend Shapiro's (2006) Contextualist theory of vagueness against a number of anti-Contextualist arguments due to Rosanna Keefe (2007). We argue that Keefe's arguments are a variation on familiar anti-Contextualist arguments in other philosophical domains, e.g. knowledge ascriptions and other attitudes, predicates of personal taste, epistemic modals, etc. Moreover, Keefe's arguments are self-defeating: if they were correct, then even what we call "external contextual factors" like comparison class, or aspects of vague predicates that everyone (including Keefe) agrees are sensitive to contextual influence, would not be sensitive to context. In essence, the problem with Keefe's arguments is that they assume an overly narrow conception of what a context is. We offer a simple response to these arguments, at least with respect to "external contextual factors", and suggest that the same response extends to anti-Contextualist arguments in other domains: all such arguments presuppose an overly narrow conception of context. We then ask whether "internal contextual factors", i.e. those aspects of vague predicates which are purportedly subject to contextual influence but are unlike comparison class, should be thought of similarly. We argue that they should not; rather, they are probably better understood on the model of what John MacFarlane (2014) calls "Non-Indexical Contextualism".Â
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