Hume may be taken to have proved several related things regarding our understanding of relations of matters of fact. In particular he may be taken to have proved 1) there is and can be no necessary connection between any matters of fact , and related to this, 2) he may be taken to have proved there can be no really objective and independent connection between matters of fact. These two claims seem related because if there were some independent connection between matters of fact, it might be necessary. (these may result from his contention that we can always imagine the contrary of any matter of fact) He may be taken to have shown 3) there can be no known connection between matters of fact, and so 4) no relation between matters of fact that can be known to be necessary, both of which seem consistent with it being possible there is an objective connection between matters of fact, that might be necessary. (this may be proved if you take his previous point only to show what it is possible to imagine, without that necessarily showing what might be onto-logically possible which could be taken as different from what we can know to be necessary) 5)He may be taken to have shown the idea of a real objective connection between the sorts of matters of fact involved in causal relations is involved in absurdity. This is because in order for there to be such a connection the idea of the causing object or state would have to contain the idea of the affected object or state(in some way) although these ideas are distinct, and externally distinct, from one another in experience; So the idea of the one can never contain the idea of the other; so we should have to have ideas which are both distinct from each other and not contained in each other and are contained in each other and so not distinct; which is absurd. 5a)He may be taken to have shown there can be no apparently objectively self sufficient basis upon which to understand the relationship between any matters of fact; but perhaps this would be thought equivalent to the previous point. 6) He may be taken to have shown there is no rational basis for judging the relations between matters of fact other than experience, and that 7) experience does not give us a rational basis for judging the relations of matters of fact not yet experienced. Both these, again, due to the lack of any necessity between facts as found in experience, plus Hume’s account of how in reasoning regarding matters of fact we move from the impression of any object to the idea of its cause or effect may be taken as suggesting there is no other tie possible than found in the rules of the imagination, or coherence or simplicity as these are found useful for the minds handling of experience and the imagination. (If some of these points are thought to be really the same thing, still it may be helpful if i consider them separately in what follows.)
This range of proofs may be taken as presenting a challenge, because, if these propositions really are proved it must be impossible to imagine any way at all what is proved impossible could be the case. If someone can come up with a way some, all, or one of these supposed impossibilities aren’t impossible then they wont be proved after all.
Some encouragement for thinking there might be something wrong with this range of proof may be given by thinking of evolution through natural selection, which, on the face of it seems to show how the natural world is itself sufficient to bring about the development of life forms and their relationships to their presently observable states. But if anything can cause anything, or rather, 8) if it is impossible to see how anything could itself be intrinsically sufficient to bring about anything, how could the natural world be itself sufficient, or appear itself sufficient, as this theory seems to find it is? Also Russel points out in H. of W. Phil. page 692; "The fact is that, where psychology is concerned, Hume allows himself to believe in causation in a sense which, in genera, he condemns". Because a naive view of science and naturalism generally might create the impression that we are gradually discovering a more and more autonomous and self sufficient world. The thickish end of this wedge was what worried Berkeley. Then there are the difficulties with the covering law model of scientific explanation. Then again, it may seem all very well to suppose that the moon is some sort of conceptually convenient way of handling ‘moon type data’, but when people can go to the moon and run around on it and kick it, like Dr Johnston, perhaps that previous ‘all very well talk’ gets an added suspicion of being inadequate.
Kant came up with a way where some dimensions of our experience of matters of fact would be necessary, if they were based on the way human minds necessarily generate experiences of these dimensions. But, apart from this not challenging Hume's point no.5)/5a), according to the empiricism around natural selection, and that can be noticed independently, humans vary. There is no aspect in which they may not vary. It may be claimed that if some things must be admitted as necessary, although they are not analytic, then an explanation of this hypothetically could be that, concerning these aspects, the mind constructs them like that necessarily. But there isn't any aspect of the mind that can't vary. So it seems inappropriate to try and base laws that claim to be universal truths, at least throughout this universe, on variable human nature. On the contrary, if these aspects don't depend on human nature this explains how they could be universally necessary, because any variations in human nature can't affect them. But this later view requires that we can make sense of 'the world at large' in a sense that is independent of individual human natures, or even of human nature.
So rejecting Kant’s existentialist and Utopian view of human nature, let us start again with what may be thought the simplest case, if a bit extreme. (no.2) Is it impossible to imagine any way at all that some matters of fact could be really objectively connected? I think this is a possibility, because ‘they’ (emphasizing the quotation marks) considered in themselves, might be literally the same original and unchanged state throughout the time that is used to distinguish ‘them’. —If cause and effect is in doubt, then there might be no such thing. So if we experience an object that appears unchanged over some period, there may be no causal chain from the object, or creating a difference between perceptions of the object over this period. Add to this that from an empirical point of view, since there is no impression of time, we can have no idea of time as something within which changes occur and which underlies any change, on the contrary it is only subsequently to experienced changes that we can produce a notion of time, which is therefore parasitic upon such changes and not prior to them. In this connection, (This is another reason why Kant should be incoherent, because if we have no idea of time in this sense, supposing it is a condition underlying the possibility of experience is incoherent.) Hume argues that there is no impression of time, and so we have no idea of it. So, if we try to apply such an idea to an unchanged ( or as he calls it, a steadfast or unchangeable) object we are supposing ourselves to have and apply an idea that we don’t have. What we have impressions of, and so ideas of is the order in which changes are observed in and between objects. But this does not give us an idea of change in an object that should be, let alone must be applied when an object appears unchanged. This would require an idea of something that enables change, is prior to it and constitutes a change, and that must be continually applied even where no such thing is observable. But such a steadfast object might, all the same, consist of a series of distinct existences, even though, the above argument is supposed to show, the facts each possibly distinct existence might be separated into, might alternatively be all the same unaltered existence. In which case ‘they’ would be really objectively connected.
Another related argument showing we can’t know that an apparently unaltered object can’t be the original existence throughout is; if we suppose all logically distinguishable states of an object, since they are logically distinct, and we can’t validly derive the existence of any such distinguished state from the idea of any other, must also be distinct existences; we would be proving a matter of fact or real existence merely from the possibility of logical distinguishing, which would show empiricism, at least on this point, was wrong. It may be asserted that empiricism is wrong in this case, but it is hard to see what independent justification could be given for the assertion, and it would be based on a logical implication from 'what may be logically distinguishable' to 'what must be a distinct existence', which doen't seem at all the same thing. It is more plausible to suppose that where there appears to be some essential difference apparent through experience this gives some justification for claiming a difference of existence. But where there is no difference observable we have, so far, no justification for supposing there must be a different existence involved, even if it is possible to suppose there is such a difference. (And if what appears to consist of a difference in experience, upon closer examination, appears to consist of a re-arrangement of unchanged experienced states, this could remove the necessity of supposing there is a new existence involved. In this connection, Lucretius, as a representative of the ancient atom-ism, says that only atoms and the void exist, and that time does not exist, and makes all change a re-arrangement.)
So now concerning No.1; ( But, there is the question of how we could know something is necessary, which is 4), even if it is possible to suppose something is necessary, which is 1))
If there is some object that remains the original existent over some period, then although perhaps at any point over that time a real change might have happened, perhaps by some cause, the original state, since it IS the ‘other’ states, could make ‘them’ necessary. For the externally distinguishable periods or times of this original state would be sufficiently established and accounted for by the original existence, since ‘they’ are it, and it is ‘them’; these distinctions being objectively unjustified in this case. It also might be that for an alteration to occur which would put a stop to the original remaining something sufficient is needed, in which case as long as there was nothing sufficient the remaining of the original would be necessary. But although that is rather guesswork; If we further suppose, by our tendency to run what could be distinct existences together, we are inclined to treat such an object as the original state, and through our niave realism which tends to suppose we are in an self sufficient environment, that needs something sufficient in the situation to alter it, then in this way where such an external cause isn’t present the ‘later’ periods of the state could seem necessary for us, given the original (this is 4), except that it isn't interpreted as LOGICALLY necessary). But this would also show why there wouldn’t be any guarantee if this were the case that it is the case; because an original existent that merely sits original and unaltered wont be able to produce any guarantee to any other state that that is the case.
Nevertheless, this form of necessity may seem related to necessity based on the analytical, because analytic necessity is based on not going beyond what is stated in the premises for a valid conclusion, similarly this sort of factual explanation is based on (literally) apprently not needing to go beyond states we already have experienced.
It is interesting in this connection to consider William Kneale's suggestion that necessity between factual relations (causal necessity) might be like mathematical necessity in a case where a theorum has yet to be proved true or false. In either case, it is claimed the truth of the matter is necessary, and our current ignorance of this necessity doesn't show it isn't. However, on my present analysis, some factual relations might be necessry, we may realise why and how they are necessary, but there still couldn't be any epystemological necessity for the case. So the case is not the same as mathematical necessity, where the conceptual apparatus involved in the basic rules may be supposed known with sufficient certainty and might be capable of showing the suggestion is a theorum, or not. In the case of factual relations, on the contrary, the basic rules to be followed are not established for us by the facts, because they are not, for instance, 'these things in themselves and an information beuraux'. But although we can never know with certainty what the objective facts are, we can still see how their relations might be necessary, and could see if the facts are consistent with that, or if there is anything in them against it.
All this may seem very speculative and metaphysical, but it is to do with what Hume can legitimately claim to have proved impossible. To consider this we do not claim any certainty, or any guarantee, or even any probability. We nevertheless consider how there might be a real connection between matters of fact that can be logically distinguished as external to one another, how there might be a necessity between such facts, and how our normal, unconscious attitude to such facts might find the relation necessary mirroring the reason it may objectively be necessary. And this is in spite of the fact there could be no necessary, or probable relation of such facts established from a logical analysis of their separately considered ideas. This also illustrates how, if we can avoid drawing conclusions beyond the original existent of an object that original state will itself appear, which is consistent with it being, intrinsically sufficient for the existence of those states only superficially distinguishable from it. This in turn gives another reason, apparently not considered by Hume, why we might suppose, or believe in the continued (and independent) existence of body; If we can avoid drawing conclusions beyond objects the continued existence of those objects, considered in themselves, will appear to form an independent and objectively self sufficient environment, which is capable of producing and explaining our experiences of it.
But this isn’t the end of what this barest possibility of a real objective connection makes possible. Considered carefully, trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond objects is not the same as trying to describe the objects, which description is then supposed to contain the explanatory properties linking matters of fact to others. So, following this possibility, in as far as we succeed there will be no evidence we are within ‘our conceptual scheme’. It has been a popular philosophical view that we can never get outside all conceptual schemes. But while it may be true that we must have one view or another, and whichever view we take of any facts and their relationships, there are always many others we could have taken, still it does not follow that any view we take must depend on our linguistic abilities and conceptual scheme, because it might be the case that our view depends on trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond objects, not in describing the facts, but in trying to avoid going beyond them, and instead of placing descriptions on them, trying to get rid of descriptions by which in hindsight we were placing on the subject and which we supposed necessary for handling it. Such a case is illustrated by the theory of relativity getting rid of the idea of absolute space. Or by the Copernican system getting rid of the need for so many epicycles which were previously required to describe planetary motions, or natural selection getting rid of the need for a grand designer. This, getting rid of layers of description is one species of simplicity. --But, following Hume, it is normally supposed we must ADD descriptions TO 'facts' (if there are any such things) in order to understand them and our world. But since experience comes loaded with theoretical content, there are no theory neutral experiences, it is supposed. On the present view, by contrast, facts become clearer through persueing objective explanation. Ideally, they will never change but will gradually become clearer just as we gradually recognise and get familiar with any new and unfamiliar situation, such as finding our way around a new building, or town. --But this is just a possibility I am examining.
But consequently if we ever come to examine reduction in this spirit, we will not be dealing with deducing some phenomena from others or descriptions of them, or statements about them, but are, or will be, trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond some states, or phenomena in order to find, or arrive at, the phenomena to be explained. This might, for example, involve the use of tally marks to check if quantities we notice before have remained unaltered.
There are at least two other aspects that may be worth mentioning in considering the mere possibility of avoiding drawing conclusions beyond objects in attempts to see how what we find in experience could form a self sufficient environment, composed of independent objects, the continued existence of which appear themselves sufficient to produce our experiences of it. Firstly; If we think the contents of a situation should be themselves sufficient to bring about what is experienced to happen in the situation, then this gives a basis for induction, because, if we suppose another situation, apparantly identicle to the first, since it appears to have the same contents, which should be sufficient to produce what happened in the first instance, they should also produce that same result in the new instance, otherwise there must be some difference between the situations after all. In which case we will have a motive for a carefull empiricle re-examination of one or both instances to find a difference we have missed. And if this were our attitude it would make us think what is found in a particular instance must be the case in all similar instances (especially, but not necessarily, if we feel we understand that particular instance), which can be easily confused with supposing we have actually found it to be the case in all instances. It also provides a basis for distinguishing cases where it 'must' be the case from cases that are superficially similar, but which don't refute the basis for our original generalisation because they can be distinguished as having different contents from that original case.
The second thing is that the extent to which contents of a situation appear objectively self sufficient, is something that could be judged without mentioning the word 'truth'. And without having to have an idea of truth that is external to this process of judging apparent objective self sufficiency, but which is 'corresponded to' by it. But still we might want to say that each judgement is itself true or false. Thereby pointing out if the above objective is or isn't gained. Alternatively, we might want to say that any particular case where a situation appears self sufficient that that is objectively the metaphysical, transedental and ontological end of the matter, and so is in this sort of sense the absolute 'truth'. (So we use 'true' in these cases to indicate success in approaching a Piercian limit, but the limit approached isn't a pragmatic one.)
But let us start again and ask, ‘Is there any possibility of an apparently objectively intrinsically satisfactory explanatory relation between matters of fact, even though (in some sense) there is no necessity apparent?’
Again, I think there is a possibility of this, which I will illustrate by taking cases which I claim appear intrinsically UN-satisfactory, which will illustrate what would be necessary for them to appear intrinsically SATISFACTORY. (But evolution through natural selection may also be taken as a case that claims to show how the world is itself intrinsically sufficient to account for current life forms and their relations, because that is how it makes the need for god as a grand designer to account for these relations, redundant.)
So I will take as my example the miracle of the feeding of the five thousand. This is supposed something that is impossible to account for, except by the miraculous intervention of god. What seems obviously impossible about the case is how five loaves and two fishes could feed five thousand people and leave enough crumbs to fill twelve baskets. There is not enough to do it. There is a big difference between the amount we start with and the amount required and that we finish with. If this is the reason why this case is puzzling, this does not have to have anything to do with such hypotheses as that ‘its not normally the case that we can feed five thousand people with such a small amount’. For example there may be lots of cases that appear to normal experience quite insufficient to bring about thier effects, e.g. it may be quite usual for creatures to reproduce, but that does not stop new births being represented as the miracle of life. And in fact, to prehistoric ignorant peasants there may be no end of things that are quite usual, the seasons, rain, wind, tides, the whole of the natural world and thier own consciousness and emotions within it, but seem quite miraculous. But more similarly to the above example, the magicians trick of pulling a rabbit out of an empty hat may seem puzzling, no matter how many times the trick is performed, and although we expect it and are quite bored with it. This is because an empty hat is intrinsically insufficient to produce a rabbit, and this is apparent no matter how usual the case is. So, if this is the reason such cases seem miraculous or impossible, if we remove the big differences apparent in situations and show how what happens is just a re-arrangement of the same old stuff that was always there this should be felt to explain the case sufficiently.
But let us start a new once again and ask; Is it possible to see how any states of affairs could intrinsically be supposed adequate to bring about some alteration?
This question does not ask for an ACTUAL connection between the state explained and the state upon which the explanation is suggested or based.
This seems quite possible because we can suppose, just like someone putting parts together to form a new mechanism, what would happen in a situation if a particular type of causal characteristic found conjoined wth some object were placed in it. Natural selection may also give a good example of this, as it notices what happens under domestication with breeders working on variations in their animals and plants by selective breeding changing and emphasising characteristics of them, and supposes that if there were natural constraints on breeding, these constraints might also change and emphasise characteristics of breeds by some variations being more successful at breeding than others. It then has to provide evidence this has been the case. Similarly, if flowing water seems to have a particular effect on sand on this planet, although perhaps there are a range of effects it can have on sand, so none of them is constant, if a similar effect is seen on another planet, we can suppose that water might have produced that effect, and so have been present. And this would tend to show which contents might be in that other situation and how it could be it-self sufficient to produce those characteristics if water had been there.
This sort of explanation does not have to rely on what is constantly found in order for us to suppose or use it. Perhaps this can be further illustrated by the following argument;
We have the covering law model of scientific explanation, whereby we deduce from a supposed generally found property of an object found in a present instance, together with the initial conditions of the present instance, what will happen. But we cannot see how the object considered solely in the present instance could produce anything. But, if the object has the property, in the present instance, that the general law makes us expect, then it would produce the effect given by the general law and initial conditions. But we can see in a particular instance if an object behaves similarly to as stated in the general law, which is a requirement of the previous statement. So we can see in an extended instance if the object has those properties or continues to have them, as is granted by the general law. But in that case we should be able to see, in an extended instance, what such an object, continuing with those properties should bring about. Or supposing an object was found with such properties, what it would bring about, independently of any assertion that it is generally, or universally the case it is found to act like that. This gives a motivation for concentrating on particular instances; we might be able to see how in a situation objects and the way they are found to act in that situation are themselves capable of explaining what happens there. This gives another possible derivation for the necessity from it being based upon it always having been found something is the case "making" us expect it will also be the case in a particular instance; Instead we couldn’t see how what happens in the situation could come about if the apparent contents didn’t behave like that, and we couldn’t see how a different result could come about if the contents do continue to behave like that. Both views making the contents of the situation apparently sufficient to produce what occurs, independently of any general law.
What has this to do with cause and effect?
>>> > Hume’s classic example of a cause effect relationship is that involving the collision of two billiard balls. This example has the consequence of emphasising logical differences between the causing and effected objects and prior and subsequent motions of these objects. But it is possible to find examples that de_emphasise such logical distinctnesses and consequent supposed distinct existences apparent across a causal situation. For example; If we take a ball being pushed into a bucket of water:
>>> >
>>> > >>> > > > The ball appears to continue along with its apparent property of being impermeable to water and its volume, the water seems to continue along with its volume and properties of being fluid which consists in its shape being easily altered, it also seems to have weight which continuing with its fluid property of continuing volume but easily altered shape makes it tend to spread out at the bottom of its container, or across an area: the bucket seems to continue together with its property of being impermeable to the water and its volume: the consequence of the continuation of these factors together in the same situation is that as the ball is pushed into the water the water has to go somewhere else, otherwise its liquid property and volume couldn’t continue, but the continuation of the buckets properties means it can’t go through or outside the bucket, so the water level rises inside the bucket in line with the extra volume of the ball as it enters the water.
> So the result, or effect, in this case seems to be naturally understood, as what must happen in a situation if the various objects and properties found (by experience) at the start of it are to continue through the situation. So we do not appear to be drawing conclusions beyond any of these objects and properties in our understanding of this situation, but are seeing what does (or would) happen if we didn’t have to draw conclusions beyond any of them, as they all continue in that situation together. And if this is how we can adequately understand factual situations , how could we equally adequately understand a situation where one of these objects or factors changed without the change also coming about through a re-arrangement of constituents within IT?
But this may ràise bigger issues. Everyone knows that Archemedes proved many propositions in “On floating bodies”. He proves that an object lighter than a fluid will rise in the fluid using the postulate that in a fluid that part pressed the more will move towards that part pressed the less. Now, if he is relying on a logical relationship in this proof how is that consistent with it being supposed established that there are no logical relations between such, causal, matters of fact? But, again, if there are such logical relations why and how should this show us what must happen between matters of fact? If, on the other hand, it is possoble to see how these objects could themselves bring about the result ‘proved’, which might naturally seem to be what he has proved, why do we need some other seperate-from-considering-the-matters-of-fact way of reasoning to give that result? If we did need such another way of reasoning between how we think the objects themselves do it, then this would seem to show we can’t actually see how the objects themselves could do it after all. But, i think we can.
The question is “ what could be the nature of these ‘proofs’ he gives?”. According to the Humean account given by Hemple he must use some general idea of behaviour, or law, specify initial conditions, and deduce from a combination of the two what must happen. But, appart from this not seeming to be what he does, it seems implausible to suppose that the individual experiences of Archemedes could amount to anything general enough to amount to be a fare sample for something claiming to be a law necessarily correct throughout the universe. It is also not that plausible to suppose he could notice the volume of a liqud tends to continue (e.g.). If we suppose a liquid in a particular bucket, or a modern bath, it seems plausible to suppose he could guess the volume continues, by the way the water rises as another object is pushed into it, (but even this case wouldn’t be universal since there are sponges and objects that disolve or compress), but to notice this in a Roman bath seems more doubtful. But since there are cases volumes lessen, or form and disappear (as we should now say), in evaporation, condensation, precipitation and sinking into the soil and flowing away, and taking a drink, he might conclude from his experience that volumes of water don’t continue. Archemedes also starts with what he calls a postulate, which gives some evidence he is not appealing to what he thinks is a law (but who knows what is or isn’t a law?).
>>
>> According to the present view, all he needs to do is specify some particular conditions and show what, if they continue, the result will be. The result is not a result of the nature of his definitions, but his definitions specify conditions that can be found. What he proves is that if those conditions are found, and continue, what the result must be. He doesn’t prove that if we find those conditions they must continue, and so the result will be... So Hume is still right in that given any specific conditions nothing logically follows about what will happen. But inspite of this Archemedes does not need a general idea hovering over the particular in order to go beyond it and deduce (and prove) what will happen as the case changes, because he can show, given the continuation of particular objects and properties, what must happen. This is what he appears to me be doing, and that is what I think he is doing.
But, as a preliminary; given a ball, what does its solid property consist in? All we see is a certain type of behaviour, how do you know that amounts to anything objectively existing in the situation?
A solid behaviour is different from a behaviour of being impermeable to liquid, it is different from liquid behaviour, or the behaviours by which we compare weights. But sticking with a solid behaviour; it consists in not being able to get other things to pass into or through an object. Either other objects wont go to the place an object occupies or the object moves. And this difficulty or impossibility starts immediately adjacent to the solid objects shape. To the question "why do I think this indicates some existence in the situation?" Firstly if we suppose it is a state of or in the situation, and it continues, this can be used to explain what happens in the situation, from the continuation of what is found in it. Secondly we suppose that the situation forms a self sufficient system, so if some behaviour appears in the situation we suppose there will be something in the constituents where that behaviour occurs sufficient to produce it.
"This may be all very well, but these are suppositions we can do without. You don't KNOW that what you are supposing is correct. All that matters from a practical point of view is that our predictions come out right. What you say hasn't changed this fundamental point that such suppositions represent an unnecessary layer of theory, something we can do without".
What I am arguing against is the claim that it is impossible, in principle, to see how cause and effect could be an objective feature of an independent reality. The objection in the previous paragraph to what I am doing claims that what I am supposing is not necessarily correct, and is something we could do without. Neither of these objections concerns whether it is in principle impossible. If it is not in principle impossible then a) it may be our normal, or part of our normal attitudes b) it may still represent an ideal of objective explanation (which part of our normal attitudes tend towards), no mater if we could avoid supposing it. Progress with this ideal would appear to make our understanding capable of being objective in that it seems to discover a reality that does not depend on ourselves. Saying this is an un necessary layer of theory we can do without makes our theories dependent on our handling of the situation, this is a bit of theory my approach can do without. So the above view is irrelevant, strictly, to what I am arguing, and also does not tend to be a theory neutral approach as it pretends to claim.
there is no such thing as ‘a factor involved in a situation independent of theory’, just as there is no such thing as an experience, independent of theory. We can’t separate out a ‘neat’ experience, so similarly we can’t separate out any ‘neat’ factors or objects in experience. But, the view that there are no neat theory less experiences results from supposing that theories must result from adding something to ‘experience’. Plus the view that all matters of fact bring theoretical content with them. This view results from Hume’s, who argued we can’t make objective sense of explanation/causal relations between matters of fact. On my view the theoretical content facts may bring with them is not something added to them, instead it is (legitimately) got by avoiding going beyond them. Thus theoretical advances come by GETTING RID of layers of theoretical description added to the situation e.g. a grand designer, in the case of life forms and relationships, or absolute space in the case of kinetics.
But there are still a range of questions to be asked in the present Archemedian case.
From an empirical point of view what is meant by ‘thrust’, and further more, what is meant by a fluid, or by a substance, or object?
Platoe would have objects as examples of 'ideas' or arcitypes which represent them. Aristotle has objects composed of essences,(essences are the objects real or true ideas, or stuff) what they really are, and accidents, what they really are when it is found combined in situations or placed with other objects. Pragmatic empiricism has objects as series of experiences, or possible experiences, collected together in the most conveniet or simplest way. On the present view, we are trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond what we experience. So, if something is continuous in time and space with an experience, even if it has changed, it is possibly an object. If some quantity of this changed, but prospective object, seems to remain continuously with the original, this is another reason to identify them. If what is continuous with the original, has some quantity preserved, can be returned to what is apparently the original, and we can see how the preserved quantity can stay preserved constructing the apparent alteration, then these are added reasons to suppose what is experienced is a continuing existence, which may then be marked by the word 'object' or 'substance', depending on whether the amount is physically split up or remains continuous. An example of this is Descartes wax. (But, humans, or ships, although they seem to continue, also change, and may on close examination, be completely different at different times. Which can seem shocking.)
A fluid is something whoes shape may change, that can often be easily split up; in the form of a gas its size may change. Most liquids tend to keep their volume (although I have no experience enough to prove this as a fact). A reason for supposing a fluid is a continuing substance is if it maintains its weight. In order to tell if something maintains its weight we need to know its volume at different times. This is more easily done with a liquid than a gas because the later more obviously depends on pressure and may be harder to stop mingling with other gases. Liquids can also have things dissolved or suspended in them. In all this objects or substances, are not distinguished as the possibly infinite appearances wich are collected together under a paticular concept; a concept which would seem to have to exist and be compared to any of these instances to see if they belong to it. Instead they are what result from trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond what we experience, to see if there may be an object or substance in particular continuous instances, and then comparing this with other cases, e.g. an instance of a liquid with another instance. Such comparisons can be sloppy, something may seem a clear liquid similar to something else, or more refined, both may have the same weight per volume, both may dissolve similar substances of similar volumes at similar temperatures. Both may be split up into similar gases by a particular process, etc. etc. Then we may trace the new case into an infinite variety of variations as we use some of its properties as markers for if we have or have not gone beyond it.
Empiricaly the force an object has is shown by what happens to other objects when its about, but it may be supposed to continue with this force even if no-one can observe anything happening to other objects. The pressure an object exerts is shown by the tendency of other stuff to move out of the way of an object, wich is not the same as it actually moving. Weight is one way an object can exhibit force and exert pressure.
Logically, if one thing presses less and another thing presses more, the thing that presses less should move until it is no longer pressed less, except there are plenty of cases where something has a weight applied but does not move. So, on the basis that the weight continues, the object it is applied to should press back equally if it doesn't move. But we do not want to follow logical relations between the meaning of words, but to follow actions and types of actions and to see what would happen if they continue in a situation or are found in a situation. The meanings of words can be useful if they are used to indicate which particular relations, or types of relations between matters of fact are found, or are supposed found in a situation. The consequence of what happens in the situaition is then the result of these types of relation being in the situation, not a consequence of the meaning of words pronounced about it. And pointing out the consequence of the meaning of the words used for a situation will not point out why what happens in the situation does so, unless the meanings of the words are used to point out what is in the situation and it is appreciated how those factors actually being in the situation would produce the result.
In Archemedes case his first few examples consider what would happen to a liquid in a spherical type arrangement around a centre of gravity, and that this spherical arrangement would be the arrangement it should form if the liquids shape was determined by its weight acting to a point. This supposes that the liquid will continue, and that it is the same liquid throughout, with the same weight per volume property. The pressure of any part of the liquid (fluid) will vary with its depth in the fluid as it will have the weight of all the fluid above it pressing on it. If one part of the 'sphere' extends further from the center of gravity than the other parts, there will be more weight pressing on those parts below it than on the parts next to them left and right in the sphere, so the greater pressure should push the other parts of the liquid away, which will mean the part that extends further will fall, and the other parts will need to rise (relative to the center). If now we put an object with less weight per volume than the liquid in the liquid, this will mean, when the liquid as a whole is a sphere, that the parts under the lighter object will be pressed less, than the parts of the liquid next to them. This case will thus far be similar to the case where the liquid was all the same weigh but not a sphere; the parts pressing more should fall, the parts pressed less shoud rise, when they reach the surface and are above the natural 'sphere', because pressed less; They will then flow sideways and the column with the lighter object will continue up, until equalibrium is reached.
There seem here then two proofs that a lighter object in such a fluid (liquid) will rise. The one is based on the similarity of the case to that where there is a higher column of the fluid above the spherical supposed around the rest of the sphere. The other is based on the continuation of the properties of the water and the object in the second situation. But before I get to that there is a difference between the two situations (although this does not remove the previous point); In the first case the higher liquid presses down more and so move the surrounding liquid out of the way and falls. In the second case the lighter column is pushed up by the heavier surrounding liquid, and then flows to its surroundings, because it is higher than they are. In reality, in the first and second case, both these factors should be working simultaniously. The liquid, when higher, will press down more, and also tend to flow sideways at the top into its surroundings.--The 'two' proofs involved seem not exclusive of, but re-inforcing of each other; To suppose a liquid pushing less will flow away from a liquid pushing more, may be interpreted as the continuation of factual properties against each other. This may be temporarily hidden by introducing a solid into the fluid, but remembering the first case helps (me at least) see how the same factors are still at work through the second case, which can then be considered independently of its similarity to the first case--although doing this is helped by the effective similarity.
It seems notorious in philosophy that we can describe anything in any terms (Paul Feynman, in ‘Surely you are joking Mr Feynman’), Karl Popper in his attempted demarcation between science and pseudo science; also Quine with his indeterminacy of translation, Wittgenstien with ;his alleged problem of how we could know we are going on in the same way, may tend towards producing this sort of opinion. But if it is possible to describe anything in any terms then it should be possible to re-describe cause and effect relationships in the above terms that de-emphasise the logical distinctnesses apparent between states of the relationship and emphasises the continuation of factors within the relationship: thus billiard balls continue, the amount of motion continues (roughly), the billiard balls property of excluding other objects immediately adjacent to their shape continues; it is the continuation of all these factors together in a situation that requires when one ball moves towards the other the other must move out of the way with some loss of the original balls motion, otherwise either ball or the motion couldn’t continue.
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>>> > (On the other hand, fires spread, life grows, entropy increases (but enropy increases because what happens is just a re-arrangement of energy and matter that continue), falling bodies accelerate)
But although I have taken it as possible to re-describe this situation in 'my' way, as pointed out above, we should not be trying to 'describe' or place a description on the situation at all. Instead, we should be trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond objects, with the objective of seeing how the contents of the situation could themselves be sufficient to produce what happens in it. And if we have this as our objective, to see how the contents of a situation are themselve sufficient, it will be no good if what we do depends on 'our description', or needs to depend on 'our understanding', or anything about us; because then the contents of the situation wont appear to be themselves sufficient. Thus the principle, or objective is not a-priori, in that it is not KNOWN to hold, and it is not independent of experience, since it consists in seeing how what is experienced could itself produce what happens. But it is also not empiricle in the statistical sense which tries to use experiences as a way of gaining some probability, or believed probability or necessity as to what will happen. On the contrary, it seems at least possible that we might often decide what is probable or improbable, or possible or impossible, based on what we can intrinsically understand can happen. without there being any prior probability that what we can understand will happen, and inspite of the fact that w2e often can't understand what does happen.
On the present view, the reason we believe in “the continued existence of body”, and so in their distinct existence is that that is how our surrounding situation, or the world around us, can appear a self sufficient system; a system contemplation of whoes contents themselves appear as sufficient to explain why what happens must do so. Berkeley asks how we can suppose something exists without our supposing it? He does this so as to argue against the coherence of supposing an independent, self sufficient, world. But on the contrary it is necessary for things to exist unthought of if the world is to be self sufficient. Realising that the world, or a situation, would not be objectively self sufficient if e.g. an object doesn’t continue to exist between being observed at A and being observed at B is how we give content to the supposition of its continued existence separately from any active suppositions of its existence throughout that period.
> What I am proposing may be taken as an ideal of factual explanation,( persuing the mere possibility that objects and properties in a situation themselves bring about what occurs, in opposition to Hume, who is supposed to have proved this is impossible). In that case actuall factual situations may appear to show this ideal isn’t or can’t be fullfilled, or may really present cases where it isn’t fullfilled. Quantum mechanics might be thought to present an example of the later. But, as an ideal, what I am proposing should not be described as depending on our understanding (or human understanding) because the aim is to see how the contents of a situation are THEMSELVES sufficient to bring about what occurs, this wouldn’t be the case if what we accomplished needs to depend on our understanding, or was seen as depending on it. What i am proposing might also, or instead, be taken as a description of a natural attitude we find ourselves with in factual situations, independently of it being a viable ideal. The miracle of the feedng of the five thousand, or the magicians trick of pulling a rabbit out of an empty hat may both illustrate how if there is a large difference between what enters a situation and what is found to result from it we find this puzzling, and may do so no matter how often this happens in our experience (as with life forms originating and growing. But “the Golden Bough” may also supply many instances of other attitudes to the influencing and the influence of situations for one another.) Thus magnets can seem puzzling, no matter how used to them we may be as there doesn’t seem to be anything there, so how could the situation be self sufficient? Similarly with Newtonian gravity at a distance. (But this isn’t the only thing puzzling about magnets.)
>>> > If we want to compare things to see if they remain the same or differ, one way of doing this is to use tally marks. Tally marks are not names of objects. If you use them to compare sheep in a groups at different times no particular sheep must be matched with any particular tally mark. They also represent an ideal, because the point of them is to find out if there is a difference between a group of sheep at different times. This means that the amount of sheep in a flock may often, or mostly differ from the amount at some different time indicated by the tally marks, but the tally marks will still represent what what they would be if they are the same. If we now replace tally marks by an ordered series of words, such possibilities as that the tally marks might merge, or get lost will seem to be reduced (this will also be the case if we replace tally marks by taking our fingers or body parts in a particular order since we would be unlikely not to notice the appearance or body parts that appear or dissapear.), so that no matter how many times we put three sheep with four sheep and found five or eight sheep, either because some had died or bred, the correct word to arive at will always be seven because this series of words has been introduced to replace the tally marks, the tally marks have been introduced to track these sheep (or objects) and we could tell, with this small amount, that the sheep tracked have differed or something has gone wrong with our tracking procedure if this isn't the result. Because we are dealing with an ideal, if we don't get the 'right' result we can say that is not what is meant. So its not a case of something that might be found to be wrong, but 3+4 objects , as above may easily result in 5 objects. At the same time this isn't really a result of the meaning of the words because trying to analyse the words won't get you very far, its a result of their being used as part of procedure for checking. --Once we have an ordered series of words, replacing tally marks, we can use them for all sorts of other things, and we can view them merely as a series and analyse the properties of the series.
Suppose we want to know if our number of sheep are the same or different. So for each sheep we make a mark || and keep the marks. Subsequently we return to our sheep and for each sheep we mark off one of the marks. If when we run out of marks we run out of sheep, we have the same number of sheep we had previously, according to this way of checking. If we run out of sheep before we run out of marks we have less sheep, if we still have more sheep after we’ve run out of marks we have more sheep than previously. In this way it doesn’t matter how many times our marks can’t be matched up to our sheep. It may ALWAYS come out differently, that will just tell us that our sheep aren’t the same as they used to be. In all this the tally marks may be still working perfectly well.
Let us now suppose we have a bunch of sheep and mark |||||||, we then have another bunch of sheep and mark |||||, now if we combine the bunches and there are the same amounts as previously we must have ||||||||||||. If the combination of the bunches of sheep don’t come out with one sheep per mark this is still a way of telling the number of sheep have changed, and it is a reason to suppose they have not changed if we can match one sheep to each mark. Again this is independent of it being usually the case that if we have some objects and put them with others we must find a group of the original objects preserved and combined. So it seems that if we have ||||||| objects and another ||||| objects we’ve GOT to have |||||||||||| objects, otherwise this method of checking will be a failure.
But, things can go wrong with this means of checking. It is confusing just to have a list of marks. It is less confusing if we split them up, e.g. ||||| ||||| ||. But we still might get muddled and forget where we are in the marks. There is no guarantee we won’t mark the same sheep twice, or miss some out or that they might just appear of disappear for no reason. The marks might themselves disappear or re-appear. To avoid this we might take an object to mark where we can’t see how this could easily happen. Such as a piece of bone. Alternatively we might replace the marks by some series, such as parts of the body, taken in a particular order, or by a series of words conventionally to be taken in a particular order. But we still might get muddled, or mistake or miss remember the conventional order of the objects or words.
But now if we’ve replaced our marks so that we arrive at 7 and 5 respectively and, and arrive at 12 in their combination and ask the question, how do we know that 7+5=12? We can reply that it must do, otherwise this method of checking has failed. But if 7+5 is looked on as a way of making a PREDICTION, as to what will, or must, happen, this is a different matter. It seems that often, as a prediction, it may come out wrong. But it can’t come out wrong if we use it as a way of checking that the objects remain unaltered and then regard this as a prediction as to what word we will arrive at IN THE CASE WHERE THEY HAVE REMAINED UNALTERED as we mark them off.
Frege argued against the history of numbers being relevant to understanding their current use and import. But it seems from the above this isn’t true as it shows the question why 7+5=12 is capable of muddling different uses. It is also the case that if we have a series of words as a replacement for a series of marks, to use as a check on objects, or amounts, then these words will not require the existence of some supper object, any more than placing a mark for a sheep requires it. But we could, now we have the series of words, regard the distinct words as names of the positions in this series. But in that case, that is what they will name; positions in the series.
Again, if we are marking objects with tally marks as a way of checking if the objects or amounts remain unaltered, we could never get to a position after which we said ‘5’ (although indigenous people often have a limit to their number system after which they say ‘many’). We couldn’t get |||||||||||||||||||| [after this it always must be |||||], not because we couldn’t find ourselves always doing that, and even thinking this is a perfect way to keep a check and make comparisons of items and compare quantities, but because, no-matter what we thought, it would no longer be an effective way of doing so.
“Let it be supposed that a fluid is of such a character that, its parts lying evenly and being continuous, that part which is thrust the less is driven along by that which is thrust the more; and that each of its parts is thrust by the fluid which is above it in a perpendicular direction if the fluid be sunk in anything and compressed by anything else.”
Subjectively there is a feeling of effort or strain associated with the word, but few things could be more obviously distinguishable and apparently distinct than such a feeling and the visible motion of some object. So considering such a feeling in itself is unlikely to provide an apparently self-sufficiently adequate reason for the motion of any object. Disregarding such feelings then; one object can be said to thrust another if there appears an alteration of the second objects motion or position in the direction of and after contact with the motion of the first. As with billiard balls there are an infinite number of possible cases, the result should be in the same direction as the original motion and depend on the centre of gravity of each object in relation to the other upon contact. But also spin and the surface of both objects will be relevant. Then there is weight which is known by springs and balances and motion in the weighty object and its ability to move other objects, as above. An object is known to be heavier than an object it outbalances on the principle that either side of the balance is identical to the other, so when objects are placed on each, if one side falls this should be due to the objects on that side having a greater tendency to fall than those on the other side. This can be checked by swapping the sides the objects are on.
Let’s employ the weight of different objects in an example; Let’s suppose we have a fluid that will lift 1gram per cm3 on a balance, and an object that is 1cm3 and will lift ½ gram on the balance, we place the object on the surface of the fluid. Obviously, (if it is impermeable to the fluid and doesn’t squash) if it sinks fully into the water it will lift 1cm3 of water, which is 1gram, but on the balance it would only lift ½ gram. Of course, it is logically possible that the same things will act in a different way in the different situation. It is also logically possible that these ‘objects’ don’t continue but are new states each instant with no intrinsic connection to each other, other than some degree of similarity. But, if on the other hand these objects continue, as they seem to the ability of the solid object to lift ½ gram, when it was on the balance would explain its ability to lift ½ gram of the liquid when placed in the liquid, and its not lifting any more, in which case it would float.
It becomes clear from Archimedes’ diagrams and this definition that the reason objects lighter than a fluid will float if placed in that fluid is not because there is a pressure difference between the fluid at the top and bottom of the object (water itself has this pressure difference, but doesn’t move), but because there must be a pressure difference between the vertical column of the fluid and object, and the surrounding columns of fluid, and this pressure difference will appear under the object. And where there is a pressure difference that part that has less pressure is thrust the less and that which has more pressure is thrust the more, so the less thrust part will be set in motion by the more thrust part, until the thrusts or pressure has equalled out. This must be the case, if the weights act vertically, the weights are what produce any pressure, and the object in the fluid weighs less than an equivalent amount of fluid. Since the pressure under the object is less than in imaginary columns next to it and since fluids flow where they are thrust more to where they are thrust less.
But saying ‘fluids flow from where they are thrust more to where they are thrust less’ may make it seem that this is a defining characteristic of fluids, so that if we have a fluid it must behave like this. On the contrary, in this case, ‘fluid’ is just used as a shorter term for something that maintains its mass, but not necessarily its shape, or size. We can see this because it seems possible to imagine an object that deformed its shape and or size but in some situation pushed back with double the force it was pushed with. In that case we could still decide to call this a fluid, but it wouldn’t be considered in the above, not because it can’t be a fluid, but because it doesn’t move from where it’s thrust more to where it’s thrust less. It is only if something does THAT that we are considering, and pointing out the consequences.