From a practical point of view there is nothing impossible in creating an accurate reproduction of something in a different place. Every camcorder as it is filming does this. It is true that the picture on a camcorder screen may be a different size from the object it is filming seen independently of this screen, but the shapes involved bear the same proportions to each other and their colors can be made to match. So, even if we cannot give a completely self sufficient explanation of how this is possible in the sense I will try to explain and maintain, it is evidently a practical possibility, no-matter how-many verbal inconstancies and contradictions may be generated by discussing the picture on the camcorder screen while tacking it to BE the objects and scene it is picturing--and this is the purpose for which it was designed. So also the double existences involved with the pictures on a camcorder screen and what it is picturing are an engineering fact, and as such there is no impossibility involved with such a double existence as this fact presents an example of.
If there is no impossibility in the achieved purpose of a camcorder screen reproducing what can be seen independently of it, I will suppose there is no impossibility in supposing what can be seen in perception may, accurately enough for my purposes, reproduce states of the world as they are independently of the perception, and will often take for granted that is what happens, although, as with a camcorder screen, it is easy to see how this may often go wrong in various ways.
If we can avoid drawing conclusions beyond a 'somewhat' as a situation develops then that 'object', considered in itself, appears sufficient to be that part of the situation as it is experienced to develop. If, for example, I see a point of light in the sky that seems to persist for some time without apparently altering and if I suppose this point of light is an unchanged object over this period then I can suppose I can trace the unchanged existence of this object over that period of time, without going beyond it, and just by this fact appreciate that its continued existence is sufficient to produce and account for its continued experience (obviously ignoring the mechanics of how it is possible to experience some state removed for an observer, but this I am assuming is the purpose of perception, just as it is the purpose of a camcorder screen to reproduce the properties of a state that is independent of the camcorder.) I can still suppose its unchanged existence is sufficient to account for its experience in this way, even if my experience of it is interrupted by a period of time when I don't experience it, but I must suppose its unchanged existence continues independently of my experience so that I can avoid drawing a conclusion beyond that existence so it can itself be sufficient to account for my experience after the gap. In this way, because I am trying to appreciate how the point of light in the sky itself can itself be sufficient for my continued experience of it, what I am supposing is fundamentally different from merely supposing if I were to look I would see the point of light (Berkeley), or that supposing its continued existence produces a simpler and convenient way to manage my various experiences of this, now fictional, or linguistically constructed 'object'. All these try to construct the objective 'object' from our experiences, but what I am trying to do is to account for our experiences by means of the objective existence I presume my experiences can supply hints or knowledge of. This is my naive realism. In order to try and suppose this I have to do whatever is necessary to suppose a self sufficient and independent system of such objects, and this seems to require that I try to avoid drawing conclusions beyond the objects I see or experience. Since I am not supposing my experiences are just individual experiences, but independent objects this may seem as if these objects are intentional--they are more than bare experiences, they are experienced AS independent objects. But the reality of the situation, by my method, does not depend on intentional objects in this or any way. It depends on avoiding drawing conclusions beyond what is experienced, AND THAT process makes them objects existing independently that are capable of explaining my experiences.
If an explanation is objectively self sufficient in this way then Occam’s razor would disallow any other explanation, but this may seem redundant since the explanation is objectively self sufficient anyway, so anything else posing as an explanation for the same thing is evidently a waste of time, e.g. the idea of God is not needed once natural selection shows how apparent design comes about, or the idea that your wife has done the washing up is unnecessary if you have done the washing up.
On the DN model of explanation there is supposed to be one universal truth whoe’s truth we believe because it is found in experience, or because we find its generality useful in handling experience. But in order to recognise a present instance as an instance of this universal truth we must be able to recognise instances as similar to one another. The requirement of the universal truth is to motivate using a present instance as an indicator of what will happen. But if we can recognise what happens in a present instance, and recognise another instance as similar to the first a motivation for thinking the second instance should behave like the first is realism; the contents of situations should themselves be sufficient to produce what occurs, if therefore we have two indistinguishable situations they should both produce the same result or else there should be some difference between them after all. This is because, if they themselves produce what occurs, and there is no difference between them how could they produce something different?
For instance you see bubbles come from under a warm soapy cup, you wonder why this is. thinking what is in the situation brings about the bubbles coming from under the cup you examine different situations of upturned soapy cups until you notice that removing the warmth makes bubbles stop appearing, warming it again produces bubbles. This suggests a universal law that warmth makes air expand. Thus we have a universal law based on instances viewed with a belief in real explanation, not explanation of instances base on a universal law.
It may be a departure from empiricism to work with the assumption that the contents of situations should themselves produce what occurs, in this way. But on the other hand the fact that two situations that seem similar may often produce different results gives a big motivation for the close consideration and investigation of these situations on this realist basis. It also, ideally requires not going beyond what can be found in experience. On the other hand the many experiences view of empiricism leads to trying to encompass these experiences by some descriptions, when anything can be used to describe anything, and these descriptions do not have to stick precisely to what is experienced.
It also seems simpler to suppose we compare one experience with another and suppose that if we can’t see any difference they should produce the same result, than to suppose we have a general background habit, or universal idea, which we look to to form part of a logical argument and then try and deduce a current case from this idea with the initial conditions. But perhaps theories may be learnt (as it were by rote) in that DN fashion.
Simplicity also comes about because, if we are trying to draw conclusions beyond factors to see how they produce what occurs it would seem likely we have got to find some factors in a situation that can produce many different results. A feeling for this can be seen in the ancient atomism, where a few types of atoms are supposed, by their various combinations, as with letters of an alphabet, to account for a vast array of different phenomena. But this also seems to go back to Thales ‘water is the principle’, or ‘everything is water’; if we have two things the question arises ‘why should there be two things?’ but if we have one thing from which both can be constructed we explain both and we are only left with the problem of explaining that one thing. But then it may be wondered if this method can work any further, I’m not committing myself.
Ron will probably think that we can always describe any situation in various mathematical ways, so, if we are trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond objects this can always be done, you just have to invent some ‘geometry’ according to which what may have seemed different objects according to one geometry are now the same object. But perhaps I can illustrate why this is not what is meant and is not trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond factors, but is trying to describe them instead. Which is not at all the same thing.
The Ptolemaic astronomy had many epicycles which were supposed to govern the motion of the planets. They kept having to be increased and it was felt this was very artificial and posed the problem with each epicycle why that planet should go round it when there didn’t seem to be anything there? The Copernican system, even if it may not have been always quite so accurate as the Ptolemaic, seemed to do away with a vast array of those problems, only leaving the problem of why and how the planets should go round the sun in their place? This was in itself no worse than each of the individual previous problems, but much more nearly the same problem for all planets, where on the previous basis there were a growing number of problems of this type, but each peculiar to each planet. So by comparison the Copernican system can be though of as sticking more closely to what can be observed in the situation, which simultaneously makes it simpler. It’s not just simpler. And its not a matter of describing what happens in terms of objects, but a matter of sticking more closely to what can be observed and trying to avoid going beyond it. Similarly, absolute motion is a notion introduced in order to describe physical motions according to the Newtonian system. But this notion doesn’t stick to anything observable in the situation, getting rid of it on the basis of relativity can thus be judged as getting rid of a layer of description previously inclined to be un-noticed and thought necessary in dealing with these situations. But instead of this it seems to have been more likely concluded that we just have a variety of possible ways of describing the situation, some more useful and general than others, the fact that relativity seems to stick more closely to what can be experience is interpreted as its positivism, which is compatible with nothing existing when it is not experienced, and sticks closely to experience in that sense. But the motivation seems rather to try and stick to what can be experienced IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN WHAT CAN BE EXPERIENCED, it is not just to stick to experience.
Since, with this sort of motivation, we can be driven to stick more closely to what is experienced, and so recognize parts of our view that aren't based on what can be experienced, it is a method of getting clear on what IS experienced, which avoids the normal logical analysis or philosophical introspection that tries to distinguish definitely experienced sense data.
Since we are trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond what is experienced in accounting for experiences our experiences cannot be essentially changed by this process. So, if a solid object is found to be in fact explained in terms of atoms buzzing in mostly empty space this can only be because atoms buzzing in mostly empty space in the way supposed will produce every property of the solid objects we experience, as they are experienced, otherwise there would be a part of our experience of solid objects atoms buzzing in mostly empty space can't explain, so it wouldn't represent an adequate explanation of that.
It is said that experience comes with 'aboutness', we do not simply experience, but experience things as having a significance. To some extent this may be a mistake, based on the view that experience comes with CAUSAL significance, but we can't derive causal significance from what may be supposed directly experienced, because it involves going beyond what is directly experienced. But on my view it only involves going beyond what is directly experienced in so far as we think what is experienced plays a part in explaining a distinguishable state of affairs, but can't see how it itself is sufficient for that. In as far as we can see how it is sufficient for that we are not going beyond it, although we are often required to go beyond the personal aspect of this experience to allow this. This is also how the objective reality of a situation is judged, by how self sufficient it appears in terms of its contents, by if we need to go beyond these contents, not by any character of aboutness or intentionality experiences may be had with. But then there is a cultural aspect to aboutness, a world culturally thought ruled by God may be supposed to have a different character from one understood through the laws of science. But this just shows it is possible to distinguish this sense of cultural experience from what is more directly experienced, the reality of the world is based on the latter and explanation based on that sense-- which then leads to a different cultural sense and world view. This does not deny there is such a different cultural experience, but may illustrate its limitations. Similarly if you are in love although everything can seem transformed, still the laws of nature are the same, and someone can perform the same experiments with the same results and make the same judgments about them.
If this is an objective standard of explanation that does not depend on concepts or descriptions then it is immune from gerrymandered concepts like grue. We are not trying to satisfy a concept in our dealings with the world, but are trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond factors in experience. If the contents of experiences can themselves be sufficient to produce what is experienced to occur this is not something that can depend on any description, or concept. It requires giving ourselves over to the nature of experiences and trying to avoid any differences in order to produce the differences seen.
Wittgenstein’s ‘problem’ of rule following is that any attempt at determining a rule eventually requires that we assume a rule in order to determine one, so at bottom we have a form of life, not an objective standard for a rule. But ‘real explanation’ relies on being objectively self sufficient, otherwise it doesn’t work, so it is an independent standard.
These two matters are muddled in with questions of certainty. Real explanation is not known as certainly an independent standard, but from this fact we can’t conclude that it isn’t an independent standard, and it does appear to be an independent standard.