ayer

Ayer identifies Hume’s main point in his sceptical causal argument as being that ‘there is no object considered in itself that can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it’. The point being that it is inconsistent to use some ‘object’ as the basis for a causal argument while at the same time supposing ourselves able, by considering it itself, to draw a conclusion to some other object and what will happen to this other object, which will be outside the idea of the first. Ayer considers the possibility that we might make it part of the definition of an object that it behave with some other object in a particular causal way, but says that this would just make the doubt about what will happen transfer to the question how we know the definition is being accurately applied in any instance where the case is not historical. However, it is my contention, if we could avoid drawing conclusions beyond objects, this would show that those objects were themselves sufficient for whatever occurred involving them; this is so just because we did not have to draw conclusions beyond them for that occurrence. This in turn supplies a possible answer to Hume’s two questions why we suppose the continued, and so independent, existence of body; we are trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond objects so that it can appear the contents of our environment could themselves be sufficient for what we experience to occur in it, and the case of the continued existence of objects is not a distinct case from that of cause and effect, the later only appears different insofar as we fail to objectively understand the situation, and appear to have to draw conclusions beyond objects.

Hume’s scepticism regarding causes concerns the possibility of imagining any immediate connection between matters of fact, as well as the possibility of making sense of the necessity that is supposed to exist in the cause effect relationship and also scepticism regarding the necessity of supposing there is some reason or cause for any change or occurrence. These questions have an ontological aspect as well as an epistemological aspect. For instance, it might be the case that there are relationships between things that exist whereby they themselves independently of anything we may or may not know bring states of existence about, although we cannot make sense of such a thing, beyond these vague and fairly empty words. It might be the case that we can make sense of such a thing. And it might be the case that although we can make sense of such a thing, actually this doesn’t happen. It might be the case that we can make sense of such a thing, that it does happen, but we have no way of knowing with a logical necessity (or certainty) that it does happen.

Similarly to the last above possibility; it might be the case that the cause effect relationship is necessary, that we can make sense of the way it is necessary, but that this does not make the relationships involved necessary FOR US (to mention one possibility, which I think is correct). This case might be described by saying that the causal relation involves necessity but no certainty. Certainty being a psychological and potentially epistemological state of affairs, the necessity involved being ontological, so that even though our making sense of it will have an epistemological aspect, as the ontology isn’t about certainty the making sense of the necessity also cannot be about making sense of a certainty for us as to what may happen, (depending on what is meant by our ‘certainty’ here). Ayer tends to think of logical necessity in terms of what is analytic, and is looking at logical necessity to provide the necessity of the causal relationship, that is if non-Humean sense is to be made of it. So from his point of view the questions of how the causal relationship cannot be based on an analytic grasp of the matter of fact which is the cause (without going beyond it) is already mixed up with the question of the necessity of the causal relationship. So he looks on the suggestion that the idea of a cause may always include the idea of its effect as requiring something that follows logically from the causes definition, something that should be analytic given the causal objects definition. And since a definition does not say if any matter of fact satisfies it this will leave us completely in the dark about what will happen in any factual situation. Quite different from this is my suggestion that we try and avoid drawing any conclusion beyond the states found in a situation as it develops. Such attempts will not involve any definition of such a state, but a comparison of the situation at various times to see if what can be found in it at one time can also be found continuing through it at other times, with nothing else required. This will not produce any certainty about what will happen, but is designed to try and make sense of how the (factual) contents of situations could themselves be sufficient to bring about what happens. But if we happen to be naïve causal realists in the sense that we think the contents of situations DO produce what happens in them then this attitude of ours may make us think that such and such MUST happen in a given situation, because otherwise we won’t be able to understand how what happens could do so, even though there are many other situations that do happen although we can’t see how they can do. So this may produce a certainty about what must or can’t happen, which is distinct from but related to the necessity we suppose attaches to causes. The necessity will result from there being states sufficient to bring about an effect or other state and nothing in the situation sufficient to stop it. Even Hume admits that we think of ourselves as naïve causal realists in the above sense, because he recognises that his view turns this normal view on its head.