should describe how william kneal principles of necessitation doesn't deal with Humes seeming to show the relation is impossible. but according to me the relation can be necessary, we can realise how it is necessary, but it will not be logically necessary, because the nesecity involved is not on the alaytic/logical model/plan.
the absence of neccesity is involved with the absence of a criteria which could guarantee the truth of causal relations, but this does not show there are no criteria for judging how causal relations may be objectively adequate, as they sometimes seem to be.
one thing being 'like' another. in the sense of 'like' involved there is no representation as we are not trying to describe the subject, an object may be 'like another if going by its properties it is indistinguishable form another object that is not in fact present. this is how the image on the retina/a camcorder is taken. any image can be taken as a representation. but this does not mean it has to be for it to be like another object, and that can be what is involved in perception.
this is one aspect of how, apparently, we can't avoid describing/representing/conceptualising experience. another aspect is with what is to count as 'the same' in different experiences, e.g. motion may be 'the same, if an object is stationary, or it may be the same if it moves (according to gallileo) etc.
these are various ways causation can't be objective, supposedly.
If we are trying to avoid drawing conclusions beyond objects, this requires our intention. But if we don't need to draw conclusions beyond some objects, so they are sufficient for what occurs, this relation of them will hold independently of our intentions. If the continued existence of an object passing behind a screen is sufficient to account for its appearance at the other edge of the screen, this is true independently of our checking that it could be true, and the result of our check is something about the object, not our intentions for it.
If we make a judgement with tally marks to check if some objects have changed this may depend on our intentions, but whether a group has changed or not, which may be judged with the aid of tally marks, is not something that depends on our intentions. But how do you know if you are judging if a group is the same or changed with some tally marks? The tally marks don't tell us, the group doesn't tell us. Our intentions might tell us, or they do tell us (supposedly), but where are they and where is this 'telling us'? But if an object is sufficient for what happens, and this doesn't depend on our intensions, then judging whether it is sufficient is looking at something that is independent of our intensions. Does it make sense to judge if something is itself sufficient in a different way to what this requires? We could all of a sudden use our tally marks in a different way, but then we wouldn't be judging the independent nature of the objects(?). If a rule is based on an objectively defined result, or object/objective then we wont be following the rule if it ignores this result/objective. But this result/objective is not 'our intensions'. If we ignore the objectivity of what we are doing with our rule, which is stated in a vacuum, then we don't know how to follow it, what its point is.
This is not an argument to the best explanation, but an argument about the nature of the best explanation.
Hume's impossibility of objective cause and effect can be linked to Parmenides proof that change is impossible, and by a solution to each. Change is possible, according to the ancient atomists if it only involves a re-arrangement. Thus Lucretus says that only atoms and the void exist, and that time does not exist. This makes the void exist. The void is a remaining emptiness where atoms can be re-arranged, but as time does not exist, these re-arrangements aren't a succession of states that now exist and now don't exist, coming into being from non existence and passing away to nothingness. What happens is atoms and the void always exist so there is no coming into being from nothing nor passing away into nothing, what comes to be and passes away are arrangements of atoms, but these arrangements aren't something extra that have their own existence in time, so that this extra existence comes to be and passes away. They are entirely composed of the only things that do exist, and that continue; atoms and the void. --But Parmenides might have taken the opposite view to this and supposed every time and arrangement is a state of existence that always exists, it is only that we experience their existence successively.
But just as every coming to be is naturally supposed something new similarly the effect in causation is supposed to be something new brought about by the cause. Because it is something essentially new, in order to get to it, we must essentially go beyond whatever is supposed in the situation before the effect arrives. If on the other hand the effect is just a re-arrangement of already existing materials brought about by the continuing existence of the cause as it comes in contact with them nothing new need be in fact involved. This can explain how cause and effect could be objectively linked; by the continued existence of factors that, through their continued existence are just re-arranged. An example of this would be a ball being pushed into a bucket of water. As the ball continues into the water the water has to rise, or it couldn't continue.
That may give an objective hypothetical possibility, but if the plain person is trying to understand a situation, one option is to want to see how the contents of the situation are themselves responsible and sufficient for bringing about what happens in the situation. This attitude might fall in with the plain persons naïve realism. This would appear the case if all that is involved are re-arrangements of factors that can be found in the situation, a re-arrangement that is brought about by the continued existence of those factors, as they continue through the situation.