Condorcet, pairwise justifiability, and agenda effects
I study how pairwise rationales and agenda variation constrain collective choices, and how these ideas connect classic impossibility logic to operational axioms.
Selected outputs
• Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability under variable agendas — Shows how variable agendas reshape the link between Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability, delivering sharp conditions for each to hold.
• Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems — Identifies a weak pairwise principle that unifies the logic behind Arrow and Gibbard–Satterthwaite within a single framework.
Strategy-proofness and domain restrictions
I map which preference domains admit strategy-proof (individual and group) rules, and how domain restrictions recover possibility results.
Selected outputs
• Group Strategy-proofness in private good domains — Provides foundational results on when group strategy-proofness is achievable in private-good environments and how it shapes efficiency possibilities.
• Individual versus Group Strategy-proofness: When Do They Coincide? — Pinpoints when individual and group incentive constraints collapse to the same requirement, and when they diverge.
• Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? — Studies two canonical necessary conditions and identifies the domains where they become fully characterizing.
• Top Monotonicity: A Weak Domain Restriction Encompassing Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and Order Restriction — Introduces a unifying restriction that nests several classic domains while preserving tractable strategic implications.
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences — Characterizes strategy-proof rules on single-dipped domains and derives tight bounds on feasible ranges.
Incentives under interdependent values & robustness
I study when incentive compatibility can be recovered under interdependent values, and how robustness to disciplined (“credible”) deviations sharpens mechanism performance.
Selected outputs
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models — Shows how restricting environments can restore incentive compatibility in interdependent-values settings.
• Immunity to credible deviations from the truth — Studies robustness to “credible” misreports and characterizes when truthful outcomes survive disciplined strategic deviations.
• Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two alternatives case — Characterizes environments where ex post incentive compatibility can coexist with a “respectful” requirement in the two-alternative case.
Scoring rules, lexicographic preferences, and voting performance
I analyze when familiar voting rules align with Condorcet principles and how structured domains (lexicographic, single-peaked) deliver sharp predictions.
Selected outputs
• The Borda and Condorcet winners coincide for lexicographic preferences — Shows that under lexicographic preferences, Borda and Condorcet winners coincide, yielding a clean bridge between two leading criteria.
• Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness — Links Condorcet-consistency of scoring rules to preference structure, clarifying when scoring behaves “as if” Condorcet.
• The Scoring Rules in an Endogenous Election — Studies scoring rules when the electoral environment is endogenous, highlighting feedback between the rule and strategic behavior.
• Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections — Provides conditions under which plurality performs well with three candidates despite its known vulnerabilities.
Political economy & policy instruments
I model strategic policy instruments (party funding, taxes, subsidies/quotas, constitutional review) and characterize equilibrium and implementability under heterogeneity and uncertainty.
Selected outputs
• Voting equilibria and public funding of political parties — Analyzes how public funding reshapes electoral competition under uncertainty about the realized scenario.
• Pigouvian Taxes: A Strategic Approach — Studies corrective taxation when agents behave strategically, connecting Pigouvian logic to equilibrium incentives.
• Output Subsidies and Quotas under Uncertainty and Firm Heterogeneity — Compares quotas and subsidies when firms differ and outcomes are uncertain, showing how heterogeneity shifts instrument choice.
• Uniform Output Subsidies in Economic Unions versus Profit-Shifting Export Subsidies — Contrasts union-wide subsidies with profit-shifting export subsidies in integrated markets.
• Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional — Formalizes high-court–type collective decisions with three verdict categories and strategic behavior.
Matching, bargaining, and allocation design
I study allocation and bargaining problems where incentives and feasibility constraints jointly determine outcomes.
Selected outputs
• The Scholarship Assignment Problem — Analyzes scholarship allocation as an assignment problem with clear efficiency and incentive trade-offs.
• Bargaining with Waning Commitments — Models bargaining when commitment erodes over time, deriving implications for delay and agreement dynamics.
• Implementation of Optimal Contracts under Adverse Selection — Studies implementability of optimal contracts under asymmetric information and incentive constraints.