Publications
2026
• On the Social Optimality of Direct Democracy (with D. Berga & G. Correa-Lopera). Forthcoming in Theory and Decision.
2025
• Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability under variable agendas (with S. Barberà, D. Berga, & A. Nicolò), International Economic Review — Studies how variable agendas reshape the relationship between Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability.
• Voting equilibria and public funding of political parties (with G. Correa-Lopera), Social Choice and Welfare — Analyzes how public party funding changes equilibrium policy outcomes when voters face uncertainty about the realized scenario.
• Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems (with S. Barberà, D. Berga, & A. Nicolò), Social Choice and Welfare — Unifies the logic of Arrow and Gibbard–Satterthwaite via a weak pairwise justification principle.
2024
• The Borda and Condorcet winners coincide for lexicographic preferences (with P. Salmaso), Economics Letters — Shows that under lexicographic preferences, Borda and Condorcet winners coincide, aligning two leading selection criteria.
2022
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), Games and Economic Behavior — Shows how restricting environments can restore incentive compatibility in interdependent-values settings.
2020
• Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), Social Choice and Welfare — Synthesizes how domain restrictions generate fruitful possibility results in social choice.
• Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness (with D. Berga), Economics Letters — Studies when preference reversals interact with group strategy-proofness and what this implies for collective outcomes.
2019
• Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness (with D. Berga & G. Correa-Lopera), Economics Letters — Links Condorcet-consistency of scoring rules to preference structure (single-peakedness) and clarifies when scoring behaves “as if” Condorcet.
• Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two alternatives case (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), in Social Design (ed. Trockel) — Characterizes domains where ex post incentive compatibility can coexist with a “respectful” requirement in the two-alternative case.
2018
• On the Different Forms of Individual and Group Strategic Behavior, and Their Impact on Efficiency (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), in Co-utility: Theory and Applications — Clarifies how individual vs group strategic behavior affects efficiency and what robustness requirements imply.
2017
• Immunity to credible deviations from the truth (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), Mathematical Social Sciences — Studies robustness to “credible” misreports and characterizes when truthful outcomes survive disciplined deviations.
2016
• Group Strategy-proofness in private good domains (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), American Economic Review — Derives foundational limits and possibilities for group strategy-proofness and efficiency in private-good domains.
2013
• Some new domain restrictions in social choice, and their consequences (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), LNCS (MDAI) — Introduces new domain restrictions and derives implications for social choice properties.
• Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains (with R. Martínez), Review of Economic Design — Analyzes how separability restrictions interact with strategy-proofness and characterizes admissible rules.
2012
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), Social Choice and Welfare — Characterizes strategy-proof rules on single-dipped domains and derives tight range restrictions.
• Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), Games and Economic Behavior — Studies monotonicity and reshuffling invariance and identifies domains where they fully characterize strategy-proofness.
• Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary range and arbitrary domains: characterization results (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), International Journal of Game Theory — Characterizes group strategy-proof rules with binary outcomes and relates alternative group-SP notions.
• Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional (with P. Amorós, R. Martínez & S. Puy), SERIEs — Models three-verdict judicial decisions and studies strategic issues under restricted preferences.
2011
• Top Monotonicity: A Weak Domain Restriction Encompassing Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and Order Restriction (with S. Barberà), Games and Economic Behavior — Proposes top monotonicity as a unifying restriction covering major classic domains.
2010
• Individual versus Group Strategy-proofness: When Do They Coincide? (with S. Barberà & D. Berga), Journal of Economic Theory — Identifies conditions under which individual and group strategy-proofness coincide and when they differ.
2009
• Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences (with D. Berga), Social Choice and Welfare — Studies how allowing indifference (plateaus) changes strategic requirements relative to strict single-peakedness.
• Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections (with S. Puy), Theory and Decision — Provides conditions under which plurality performs well in three-candidate settings.
2007
• Output Subsidies and Quotas under Uncertainty and Firm Heterogeneity (with J.L. Torres), International Journal of Business and Economics — Compares quotas and subsidies under uncertainty and heterogeneity and characterizes policy trade-offs.
2006
• Bargaining with Waning Commitments (with P. Amorós), Economics Letters — Models bargaining when commitments erode over time and derives implications for delay and agreement dynamics.
2005
• The Scoring Rules in an Endogenous Election (with S. Puy), Social Choice and Welfare — Studies scoring rules when the electoral environment is endogenous and interacts with strategic incentives.
2002
• Single-Peaked Preferences, Endowments and Population-Monotonicity, Economics Letters — Studies population-monotonicity under single-peaked preferences with endowments.
• The Scholarship Assignment Problem (with P. Amorós & L. Corchón), Games and Economic Behavior — Models scholarship allocation as an assignment problem with efficiency and incentive considerations.
2001
• Implementation of Optimal Contracts under Adverse Selection (with P. Amorós), Review of Economic Design — Studies implementability of optimal contracts under adverse selection and incentive constraints.
1999
• Pigouvian Taxes: A Strategic Approach (with J. Alcalde & L. Corchón). Journal of Public Economic Theory 1(2), 271–281.