Bernardo Moreno


Full professor at the Universidad de Málaga

I am full professor at the Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica.

March 2019 (spanish) and English give you more information about my academic profile.

Short view

Research Areas

Social Choice, Mechanism Design, and Political Economy

Selected and Recent Publications

  • "Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel" (joint with Salvador Barberà, and Dolors Berga) Forthcoming, Social Choice and Welfare, 10.1007/s00355-019-01196-4.
  • "Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness" (joint with Dolors Berga, and Guadalupe Correa-Lopera) Economics Letters Volume 181, August 2019, Pages 199-202.
  • "Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two alternatives case", (joint with Salvador Barberà, and Dolors Berga) in W. Trockel (ed.) Social Design.
  • "Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules"
    (joint with Ismael Rodríguez-Lara and María del Pino Ramos-Sosa)
    forthcoming Social Choice and Welfare.
  • Barberà, S.; Berga, D.; Moreno, B.  "Domains Admitting Ex Post Incentive Compatible and Respectful Mechanisms: A Characterization for the Two Alternative Case" Social Design. Essays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz (ed. Walter Trockel). Springer International Publishing, 2019. 
  • Barberà, S.; Berga, D.; Moreno, B.  "On the Different Forms of Individual and Group Strategic Behavior, and Their Impact on Efficiency ." Co-utility: Theory and Applications (ed. Josep Domingo-Ferrer,David Sánchez).  (CHE): Springer International Publishing, 2018. 
  • "Immunity to credible deviations from the truth" (joint with Salvador Barberà and Dolors Berga), forthcoming Mathematical Social Sciences (2017).
  • "Group Strategy-proofness in private good domains" (joint with Salvador Barberà and Dolors Berga). American Economic Review. 106(4):1073-1099 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141727 (2016)
  • Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? (2012) (joint with S. Barberà and D. Berga), Games and Economic Behavior, 75, 490-509.
  • Top Monotonicity: A Weak Domain Restriction Encompassing Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and Order Restriction (2011) (joint with Salvador Barberà), Games and Economic Behavior, 73, 345-359.
  • Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? (2010) (joint with Salvador Barberà and Dolors Berga). Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 1648-1674.