Work in progress
• Native and Migrants (joint with Carmen Beviá and David Medina) — Studies how migration interacts with collective decisions and policy outcomes.
• Group threshold when making a decision (joint with María Gómez-Rua and Elena Molis):
This paper analyzes how groups aggregate individual evidentiary thresholds, proving that the average is the most consistent rule while highlighting a fundamental conflict between supermajoritarian rules and coherent preference aggregation
• Collusion when players take turns (joint with Luis Corchón and Guadalupe Correa-Lopera) — Studies collusion sustained by turn-taking patterns and when rotation disciplines deviations.
• Neutrality, pairwise justifiability and serial dictatorships (joint with Dolors Berga and Pietro Salmaso) — On the universal domain and across all agendas, neutrality plus strong pairwise justifiability and strong decisiveness force collective choice correspondences to be serial dictatorships.