Vietnam Service

Marine Aviation in Vietnam

The 1965 buildup of Marine aviation in Vietnam paralleled that of the III MAF ground forces. Following the landing of the 9th MEB in March, two Marine fixed-wing squadrons, VMCJ-1 and VMFA-531, later relieved by VMFA-513, joined MAG-16 at Da Nang in April. MAG-16 had been, until that time, the MEB's composite helicopter group. In May, the wing established its forward headquarters in Vietnam, and the next month MAG-12 arrived at the newly built SATS airfield at Chu Lai. On 14 July, MAG-11 headquarters assumed operational control of the fixed-wing squadrons at Da Nang from MAG-16. These now included the photo reconnaissance squadron, VMCJ-1, and two F-4B Phantom n squadrons, VMFA-513 and VMFA-542, the latter squadron having arrived on 11 July. After the President's 28 July proclamation announcing further reinforcement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the deployment of a second helicopter group, MAG-36, and another missile battalion, the 2d LAAM Battalion. The first elements of the helicopter group arrived on 31 August. The LAAM battalion followed 10 days later.

On 2 September, Colonel William G. Johnson, the MAG-36 commander, established his headquarters on the Ky Ha peninsula, north of the SATS field, where construction had begun on a helicopter facility for the Chu Lai base. When the group arrived, 'the helicopter pad had been fully graded and about one-third or more of the matting laid .. . . '¹ The MAG-36 squadrons remained at Da Nang until Ky Ha was operational. By the end of the month, most of the MAG-36 units, including HMM-362, HMM-364, VMO-6, H&MS-36, and MABS-36, were at Ky Ha. The only exception was HMM-363 which had relieved a detachment from HMM-161 at Qui Nhon.

The other Marine helicopter group in Vietnam, MAG-16, also had moved into new facilities. Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor, who relieved Colonel King as group commander on 7 August, established his headquarters at Marble Mountain Air Facility on Tiensha Peninsula, across the Da Nang River from the main base. The group's aircraft were operating from Marble Mountain by the end of August. In August 1965 MAG-16 consisted of three medium helicopter squadrons, HMM-261 and -361 at Da Nang and HMM-161 at Phu Bai with a 10-plane detachment at Qui Nhon, one observation squadron, VMO-2, and two support squadrons, MABS-16 and H&MS-16. In September a six-plane detachment of Sikorsky CH-37C heavy-lift helicopters from HMH-462 was attached to H&MS-16. There was a continuing rotation of helicopter squadrons between Marine fixed-wing squadrons, as well as the helicopter units, continued to deploy to Vietnam. MAG-11, under the command of Colonel Robert F. Conley and his successor in November, Colonel Emmett O. Anglin, Jr., made three more squadron changes during 1965. On 15 October, VMFA-115 replaced VMFA-513, which rotated back to Japan. VMFA-323 relieved VMFA-542, which also returned to Japan on l December, and on 19 December, a F-8 Crusader squadron, VMF(AW)-312, joined MAG-11 at Da Nang. Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Savage, at the time commanding VMFA-542, later commented: 'These rotations were used to refurbish and change aircraft and train new aircrews as overseas tours drew to a close.

MAG-12, under the command of Colonel John D. Noble, 16 May-18 September, and later Colonel Leslie E. Brown, 19 September through the end of the year, operated from the SATS airfield at Chu Lai. Three A-4 Skyhawk squadrons, VMA-225, VMA-311, and VMA-214, made up the aircraft group in July 1965. A fourth squadron, VMA-211, joined MAG-12 on 11 October. Although the group remained at basically the same strength, there was a rotation of squadrons between Iwakuni and Chu Lai. The fixed-wing squadrons of MAG-12 engaged in the rotation program during this period were VMA-224 for VMA-225, 30 September-4 October, and VMA-223 for VMA-311, 14-19 December. At the end of the year, Brown's group consisted of VMA-211, VMA-214, VMA-223, and VMA-224.

By the end of 1965, most of the elements of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had arrived, although a rear headquarters remained in Japan. Brigadier General Marion E. Carl, the assistant wing commander, arrived at Da Nang on 31 August to assist the wing commander, Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon, who also was Deputy Commanding General, III MAF. Colonel Harry W. Taylor assumed command of the rear headquarters (1st MAW Rear) at Iwakuni on that date; he still controlled a sizeable organization. MAG-13 with three fixed-wing squadrons remained in Japan, and one helicopter squadron was on Okinawa. One transport squadron, VMGR-152, and elements of a second, VMGR-352 (Fwd), with several service and supply elements of the 1st MAW, also remained under the rear headquarters' operational control. In addition to these units, two Marine helicopter squadrons, one attached to the Seventh Fleet SLF and the other to the U.S. Army's Field Force Vietnam in n Corps, were not available to III MAF. In spite of these exceptions, the preponderance of General McCutcheon's operational units were in South Vietnam supporting General Walt's ground forces. By December, 9,402 of the 12,655 officers and enlisted men of the 1st MAW were in South Vietnam.

Control of Marine Aviation

Control of Marine aviation in Vietnam was a very sensitive issue. Many Marine aviators remembered their experience in Korea where the 1st MAW had been under the operational control of the Air Force. They believed that Marine aircraft had been used unwisely, at least from a Marine point of view, and had not furnished the Marine infantry with the close air support that could have been provided if the Marine command had retained control of its aviation. Marine generals were determined not to allow the Korean experience to repeat itself.

In 1964, when air operations were undertaken over Laos and North Vietnam, Admiral Sharp authorized General Westmoreland to designate the senior U. S. Air Force commander in Vietnam as coordinating authority, since both Air Force and Navy air units were participating in these operations. When the decision was made to land Marines at Da Nang in 1965, it was natural for Admiral Sharp to direct that a similar arrangement be devised to coordinate the fixed-wing aviation of the 9th MEB. General Karch reported directly to ComUSMACV and coordinating authority was granted to the Air Force component commander, Major General Joseph H. Moore, for matters pertaining to tactical air support and air traffic control.

This emphasis on coordinating authority was reaffirmed by CinCPac in late March 1965, just before the assignment of a Marine fighter squadron to the MEB. General Westmoreland had wanted to put the Marine F-4 squadron under the operational control of General Moore, but Admiral Sharp immediately objected and repeated his earlier guidance.⁴

One month later, Admiral Sharp published a directive on the conduct and control of close air support. He stated that close air support was the chief mission of U.S. aviation in South Vietnam and that top priority was to go to ground troops actually engaged with the enemy. Sharp maintained that such support should be directly responsive to the ground combat units. The directive also noted that 'nothing herein vitiates the prior CinCPac provision that ComUSMACV's Air Force component command shall act as coordinating authority for matters pertaining to tactical air support and air traffic control in South Vietnam.

After receiving CinCPac's instruction, General Westmoreland ordered that a revision be made to his air support order. The new MACV directive, published on 13 July 1965, reiterated CinCPac's appointment of General Moore as the coordinating authority. In addition, the order charged him with the responsibility of insuring that coordination was established between his service and the other allied commanders. General Walt retained operational control of Marine aviation, but to insure maximum use of all aircraft, the III MAF commander was to notify the 2d Air Division daily of those aircraft available in excess of his requirements so that additional sorties could be allocated.* Finally, Walt, as Naval Component Commander, Vietnam, was charged with preparing joint operating instructions, in coordination with General Moore, to insure an integrated air effort.

Concurrently, with the revision of MACV's air directive, General McCutcheon met with Major General Moore to coordinate air efforts as related to air defense operations. Moore wanted operational control of all air defense, but McCutcheon pointed out that the F-4B Phantom II was a dual-purpose plane, capable of both close air support and air-to-air defense. To relinquish these aircraft would deprive the Marine ground commanders of an important supporting arm.

Nevertheless, General McCutcheon recognized the necessity of having one overall air defense commander. After several meetings between the generals and their staffs, it was decided to publish a memorandum of agreement to set forth the basic policies, procedures, and responsibilities. Under this agreement, the Air Force had overall air defense responsibility. McCutcheon designated those Marine forces that would participate in air defense. He agreed that the U. S. Air Force had the authority to handle alert aircraft, designate targets, and control HAWK missile readiness status, including firing orders. Generals Moore and McCutcheon signed the document in August 1965.

The revised MACV air directive and the memorandum of agreement provided the basic policy for command, control, and coordination of Marine aviation, an arrangement completely satisfactory to General Walt. These arrangements were to remain unchanged until 1968, when General Westmoreland received approval from higher authority to establish a single management system for tactical air control.

Reference: The Marines in Vietnam 1965: The Landing and the Buildup

Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor, the 1st MAW chief of staff in the spring of 1965, recalled: 'The arrival of VMFA-531 and VMCJ-1 marked the end of a long period of planning, coaxing, cajoling, begging, and outright pressure to obtain space for these units to operate out of Da Nang .... During the early planning stages, high level commands battled in the Pentagon, CinCPac, and in the Far East over who would conduct air operations out of Da Nang. Navy and Marine commands invoked the nebulous authority of Marine Air-Ground task forces. But these plans . . . were overtaken by events. The Air Force was there-and, they invoked the military equivalent of squatters rights . . . they occupied the entire east side of the airfield. The USAF was extremely unwilling to move around and vacate more space for the deploying Marine fixed-wing air units . . . .Finally under the weight of plans approved at high levels, and with Marine deployment dates irrevocably approaching, the Air Force finally gave in. Some promises about future construction to enlarge their area, commitments of Marine support of various projects, and a lot of sweet talk did the trick.' Aircraft facilities remained overcrowded until the helicopter field at Marble Mountain was opened and the expansion construction of Da Nang Airfield was completed. O'Connor observed: 'The final area occupied by two Marine fighter squadrons and the VMCJ-1 squadron was of such restricted size that effective operations were only marginally possible . . . .The three units were like three peas in a pod, but they were operational.