Interpretation B
Munich was the triumph of appeasement but it also marked its failure and this was largely down to Chamberlain. Hitler then took advantage of Chamberlain’s actions and this also wrecked appeasement. Munich happened because of a mixture of Chamberlain’s fear of war and also his good intentions and faith in diplomacy. In hindsight, fear was the more important of those two things.
From ‘English History 1914–45’, a book written by the British historian AJP Taylor. It was first published in 1965
This question gives you an interpretation and asks you to identify historians and historical schools that would disagree with it.
This requires you to intitally, and very briefly, identify what the argument being made is. This could include identifying what the school of thought is.
You then should explain how at least one other school of thought would disagree and what specifically they would disagree with.
For Level 4 and Level 5 - you should also explain why they would disagree. This could be because:
They have access to different sources
They constructed their interpretations in different contexts.
Examiner Report : The above answer received Level 5 - 23/25.
Nazi Germany crossed the frontier of Poland and the world went to war in September 1939. How many warnings had previously been issued to the rulers of Britain? Hitler himself had written it in ‘Mein Kampf’; the million speeches delivered by the Nazi leaders on the hustings of Germany; the denunciation of Versailles; the institution of Conscription in Germany; the Rhineland; Spain; Austria; Czechoslovakia; Munich; Prague – these and countless more. How many further proofs were needed?
The Polish army was utterly obliterated. All the facts of Germany’s prodigious capacity for war were known. Mr. Churchill had reiterated them to the House of Commons over the previous years. No room was left for doubt. The Nazis had been spending prodigiously. In the year before the war they spent £1,650,000,000 on armaments alone. Our rulers turned themselves to the task in a more leisurely manner. The British Government did not exert itself to any great extent in the arming of our country, even after we had clashed into war with the most tremendous military power of all times.
An extract from Guilty Men by Cato, published in 1940.
There was widespread and sincere admiration for Mr. Chamberlain’s efforts to maintain peace. However, in writing this account it is impossible for me not to refer to the long series of miscalculations and misjudgements which he made. The motives which inspired him have never been questioned. The course he followed required the highest degree of moral courage. To this I paid tribute two years later in my speech after his death.
An extract from The Gathering Storm by Winston Churchill, published in 1948.
‘Winston Churchill – The Valiant Years’ holds promise of developing into a stimulating and engaging series. ‘The Gathering Storm’, first of 28 projected filmed episodes, was shown last night. After tracing Sir Winston’s family roots in America and Britain, the program moved rapidly through war’s prologue period, from 1931 to 1939, when Churchill, a statesman in discard, a lone voice whose vibrant words were ignored, was forecasting the holocaust which Adolph Hitler would unleash.
A review of a US TV documentary from 1960 called Winston Churchill – the Valiant Years. The first episode was based on Churchill’s book The Gathering Storm.
The central flaw in Churchill’s version of events is that it amounts to no more than an exercise in self-promotion. The sheer unlikeliness that everyone was out of step but our Winston is obscured by his iconic status as the man who won the war and as ‘the prophet of truth’ before it. His whole reading of events leading up to World War Two was badly flawed, and looks good only with the advantage of hindsight. … It is also worth noting that Chamberlain could hardly have been that bad a choice as prime minister, or Churchill would hardly have seconded his nomination – a fact he somehow omitted from his memoirs.
British historian John Charmley, writing in 2011.
The Orthodox view of Appeasement is now definitely on trial. The disenchantment has not spread to politicians or the reading public in Britain and the United States. But within the academic world of professional historians it is no longer so widely or easily accepted. Historians are now concerned to understand the processes which German and British politicians went through and the different kinds of advice they were receiving and the pressures that were on them. This is a welcome change from the dismissal of all of those involved in Appeasement as stupid, weak and ill-informed.
British historian Donald Cameron Watt, writing in 1965.
Appeasement in 1938 was a natural policy for a small island state gradually losing its place in world affairs, shouldering military and economic burdens which were increasingly too great for it, and which as a democracy had to listen to the desire of its people for peace.
An extract from The Realities Behind Diplomacy by British historian Paul Kennedy, writing in 1981.
Chamberlain should be defended as a master politician pursuing the best, perhaps the only, policy possible in the difficult circumstances of Britain’s declining power. Not only was Chamberlain’s policy sensible, popular and of long standing, it was also skilfully executed: at Munich Hitler was out-manoeuvred. Subsequently British policy was to ‘hope for the best and prepare for the worst’. When Hitler proved in March 1939 that he could not be trusted, Chamberlain’s policy sensibly became one of deterrence and resistance. His careful handling of affairs through his whole premiership ensured that war came at the best possible conjuncture with the nation united and prepared.
An extract from an article called ‘Appeasement Revisited’ by British historian David Dilks, 1972.
Chamberlain succumbed to the temptation to believe that actions which were specifically his own were triumphing. Hitler helped. He appealed to Chamberlain’s vanity and encouraged Chamberlain to think he had a special influence over him. Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, encouraged Chamberlain even though he lost the confidence of his own colleagues in the Foreign Office. Chamberlain’s appeasement was not a feeble policy of surrender. He never pursued ‘peace at any price’. But he made big mistakes, especially after Munich. He could have built a strong alliance with France. He could have tried to ally with the USSR but he refused to try in any serious way. Chamberlain refused to listen to alternative views and his powerful personality probably stifled serious chances of preventing the Second World War.
An extract from Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War by British historian Robert Parker, 1993.
The early writers about appeasement were severely critical because it was a failure of morality and willpower. By contrast, most of the later works have concentrated instead upon the compelling strategic, economic and political motives behind the British Government’s policy during the 1930s. In seeking to explain appeasement, however, they have also tended to justify it. Yet the fact remains that some Cabinet ministers recognised that the dictators would have to be opposed. By 1939 at least, making concessions to Germany was neither as logical nor as ‘natural’ as might have been the case in 1936 or 1926. Instead, it was increasingly viewed as a policy which lacked both practical wisdom and moral idealism, but it was still being pursued in Downing Street. Individual conviction – in this case, Chamberlain’s – obviously plays a critical role here.
British historian Paul Kennedy, writing in 1993.
So how did my pre-emptive strategy stand up to a computer stress test? Not as well as I had hoped, I have to confess. The Calm & the Storm made it clear that lining up an anti-German coalition in 1938 might have been harder than I’d assumed. To my horror, the French turned down the alliance I proposed to them. It also turned out that, when I did go to war with Germany, my own position was pretty weak. The nadir [low point] was a successful German invasion of England, a scenario which my book [had ruled out] as militarily too risky!
British historian Niall Ferguson writing in an article for the New York Magazine, 16 October 2006.
It was easy to criticise Chamberlain from the side-lines. It was more difficult to suggest a constructive, coherent alternative. Critics were often confused and divided amongst themselves. One of Chamberlain’s critics, Leo Amery, can be found in writing supporting at least four different approaches to dealing with Hitler.
So what were the other options open to Chamberlain?
1 Isolation and absolute pacifism
2 Economic and Colonial Appeasement
3 League of Nations
4 Alliances
5 Armaments and Defence
6 War
All of these options were considered by Chamberlain. Some were rejected and some were actually tried. In his ultimate failure Chamberlain’s achievements deserve to be recognised. It is difficult to believe that the Nazis could have been deterred. War was the regime’s main aim. In failing to achieve peace Chamberlain did at least make clear where the blame lay. History should give him credit for this.
An extract from Alternatives to Appeasement by British historian Andrew Stedman, 2011.
To the dismay of his British colleagues and his French allies Chamberlain alone, motivated by his anti-Bolshevik prejudice, deliberately sabotaged the chance of an Anglo-Soviet alliance in 1939. Such an alliance would have been a workable solution for discouraging, or if necessary defeating, Hitler.
British historian Louise Shaw, writing in 1987.
The question in September 1938 was whether we wanted war or whether we would give peace a chance – and it was just a chance. I was constantly being told that these dictators are only bullies and if you stand up to them they will run away. Well, the one thing we do know is that that would not have happened. Hitler proved that. If we had gone to war in 1938 we would have fought with outdated biplanes instead of Hurricanes and Spitfires and I don’t think the people were sufficiently united. For a democracy to fight a war you have to be united and the people were divided.
Conservative politician and political writer Lord Hailsham, speaking years later. He was a Conservative MP in 1938.
The personality of Chamberlain is central to the discussion of Appeasement. He had a rather inflated sense of his own judgement and abilities and was unwilling to listen to anyone but himself. It could be said that he saw himself acting in the name of God or history. This earned him the disapproval of his people and historians.
Historian Donald Cameron Watt, writing in 1991.
The leaders of the democratic states assumed that all those playing the game shared and accepted certain essential principles. All should, and hence would, agree that peace was preferable to war and that negotiation was more productive than fighting. These views were hardly appropriate for dealing with the Nazis, the Fascists, or the militarist Japanese leadership. Men like Chamberlain and Daladier, as well as their foreign ministers, because of their personalities, upbringing, education, and beliefs, barely understood a leader like Hitler. They, like so many others of the old élites, belonged to a world where statesmen made sensible choices, where rules and conventions were observed, and where men avoided bluff and reckless behaviour. The cataclysm of 1914–1918 had left the French and British leaders with the visceral horror of another war. Hitler suffered no such concerns.
British historian Zara Steiner, writing in 2011.
‘The Gathering Storm’ has been one of the most influential books of our time. It is no exaggeration to claim that it has strongly influenced the behaviour of Western politicians from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush.
Its central theme – the futility of appeasement and the need to stand up to dictators – is one that has been taken for granted as a self-evident truth in Western society, both during the period of the Cold War and subsequently.
British historian John Charmley, speaking in 2011.
The problem of negotiation with Russia was difficult enough under the Czars; now there has been erected the additional barrier of a fanatical Communist ideology. The pledges and agreements of the Russian Communists, like those of the Nazis, could not be trusted. Treaties have proved useful to the Kremlin as instruments for binding the hands of other countries, and freeing the Soviets to pursue their own world-conquering objectives. The American public, at least by 1947, concluded that a head-on clash between the American democratic system and the Soviet socialist system was inevitable, unless the Moscow directorate was prepared to deviate sharply and sincerely from the aim of world revolution.
US historian Thomas Bailey, writing in 1950. This was one of the earliest accounts of the Cold War, titled America Faces Russia.
Russia today is regarded as a grave threat to our nation, to our freedom, to the peace of the world. What makes it a threat? Looking close we see a clue: giant portraits of communist leaders on public display. These leaders have caused the world to stand guard. Here in Russia you see the reason why so many nations are building up their defences. Here in Russia you see the reason why we in the US are spending billions of dollars in defence production – why your family is paying the highest taxes in history. The leaders of Russia tell us their only concern is the defence of their own nation. Is this true, or are they really set on world conquest?
An extract from the script of an educational film made in 1952. Called simply Communism, the film was widely shown in US schools.
Soviet writers agreed on the importance of the Truman Doctrine in contributing to the conflict between East and West, but they regarded their country’s response as defensive. In their opinion, American imperialism was the cause of the Cold War. This view reflected an official line which was consistently maintained throughout the Cold War. For example, only a day after the Truman Doctrine was enunciated, Soviet news agencies criticised it as part of a calculated strategy to expand the capitalist system throughout Europe. The Marshall Plan was similarly condemned as an American plot to encircle the Soviet Union with hostile capitalist states. In addition, the United States was accused of endangering Soviet security by creating NATO and proceeding to remilitarise West Germany.
British historian Joseph Smith, summarising the Soviet view, 2001.
American foreign policy in the years 1945–54 was a drive to expand American capitalism through the world. Because Communism was the greatest enemy of this drive, American diplomacy had to oppose Communism everywhere in the world. The Cold War was not a conflict between Russia and the United States but an American campaign to dominate the world and reshape it in its own image. The Soviet threat to the West was a mirage conjured up by the Truman administration. NATO was created in order to regulate Western Europe to suit Washington’s needs. American policy in Germany was designed to make Germany a fortress of capitalism in Europe. And the Marshall Plan was designed to shape Western Europe’s economy to suit Washington. Instead of helping Europe, it strengthened Russian control over Eastern Europe.
US historians Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, writing in 1972 in The Limits of Power.
My undergraduate education at the University of New Hampshire, 1959–1963, featured, first, the work of George F. Kennan and, second, the “nationalist” school of Samuel Flagg Bemis, known for his grand narrative of American exceptionalism and benevolent imperialism. My superb professors showed me that an intellectual’s responsibility was not only to build knowledge but also to be a sceptic of doctrine, a critic of fashionable thinking. From my graduate-school years of 1963–1967, I emerged a “revisionist.” There is no mystery why. Influencing me were the horrific Vietnam War, the assaults and embargo against Cuba, and the invasion of the Dominican Republic—events that spawned anti-war teach-ins, protest songs such as Phil Ochs’s “Cops of the World,” the Fulbright Senate hearings, and essays by public intellectuals such as Henry Steele Commager on the abuse of American power. I took special notice of Senator Wayne Morse’s vote against the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and his bold statement that “our hands are dripping with blood in Southeast Asia.” The concurrent civil rights movement, antipoverty campaign, women’s rights advocacy, and environmental movement also encouraged new ways of thinking, challenging prevailing assumptions and worldviews—especially at the University of California, Berkeley, in the days of the Free Speech Movement.
US historian Thomas G. Paterson, describing how his views on the Cold War changed through this period, writing in 2007.
After I submitted my first PhD chapters about 1940s foreign policies, based on research into newly opened documents in the Truman Presidential Library and other archives, one of my advisers groaned, “You may be right, but this will ruin your career.”
After … I published an article in the American Historical Review on “Red Fascism,” which explored U.S. images of totalitarianism that moved policymakers toward an uncompromising, sometimes emotional, Cold War posture, contrary letters flowed to the journal, some impugning our scholarly integrity.
After my lecture at a military academy, one faculty member insisted that I had no business speaking on the Cold War because I had not lived through its early tortuous years. When I asked him what his own field of study was, he replied: “The Civil War.”
At a professional meeting, one panellist uttered in essence “Go back to Russia where you belong,” implying my critical approach somehow meant I was apologizing for the Soviets’ brutal behavior in their empire or that I saw a moral equivalency between the United States and the Soviet Union. I did not, but that charge became familiar in the traditionalists’ criticism.
Herbert Feis, the State Department official turned diplomatic historian, belittled the writings of Revisionists as “just poor imitations of Communist official doctrine.” A newspaper headline blared: “College Board Bans 5 Books from Curriculum.” One of the five was the foreign-relations history textbook I wrote. During fierce debate, one board member declared that our text contained “a lot more funny pictures of Republicans and nicer pictures of Democrats.”
Historian Thomas G. Paterson, describing how traditionalists reacted to his and others’ revisionist works.
I have proceeded on the assumption that foreign policy is the product of external and internal influences, as perceived by officials responsible for its formulation. In seeking to understand their behavior, I have tried to view problems of the time as these men saw them, not solely as they appear in retrospect. I have not hesitated to express judgments critical of American policy-makers, but in doing so have tried to keep in mind the constraints, both external and internal, which limited their options. If there is a single theme which runs through this book, it is the narrow range of alternatives open to American leaders during this period as they sought to deal with problems of war and peace.
In contrast to much recent work on the subject, this book will not treat the “Open Door” as the basis of United States foreign policy. Revisionist historians have performed a needed service by stressing the influence of economic considerations on American diplomacy, but their focus has been too narrow: many other forces – domestic politics, bureaucratic inertia, quirks of personality, perceptions, accurate or inaccurate, of Soviet intentions – also affected the actions of Washington officials.
US historian John Lewis Gaddis, writing in 1972.
What is so distinctive about Gaddis’s new book is the extent to which he abandons post-revisionism and returns to a more traditional interpretation of the Cold War. In unequivocal terms, he blames the Cold War on Stalin’s personality, on authoritarian government, and on Communist ideology.
US historian Mervyn Leffler, reviewing Gaddis’ book We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War in 1999.
It was Stalin who eventually sealed the fate of Eastern Europe. However, the way that U.S. aid was originally conceived under the Marshall Plan … propelled the Soviet Union into a more antagonistic and hostile stance, including the establishment of its own economic and political bloc. We do not assume Soviet … innocence. … Nevertheless, we would still insist … that Soviet foreign policy was not just driven by ideology, but a series of responses and reactions that were just as likely to be shaped by the way others acted toward the Soviet Union as by Stalin’s own outlook.
British historians Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, writing in 2005.
From the time of their seizure of power in 1917 the Russian communists have always been characterised by their extraordinary ability to cultivate lies as a deliberate weapon of policy. Forty years of intellectual opportunism seem to have wrought a strange corruption of the Communist mind, rendering it incapable of distinguishing between fact and fiction in any field, but especially in its relations with the other powers. They have always lied to us and lied about us.
An extract from a series of six lectures by US historian George Kennan, broadcast by the BBC in 1957.
At the end of the 1940s a few Americans began to recognize and face the need to rethink the way the USA conducted its international affairs. But Truman and the other key decision makers in the US either discounted the need for such action or were carried along by the momentum of the long commitment to the expansion of US power and to reforming the world in the image of the United States. The US elite remained limited by the outlook that had crystallized during the 1890s: organize the world according to the principles of the Open Door policy and reap the benefits.
William Appleman Williams, writing in 1959. The ‘Open Door’ policy meant using US military, political and economic power to pressure other countries to adopt democracy and capitalism in the same way as the USA.
Here, then, was the difficulty after the war. The Western democracies wanted a form of security that would reject violence. Security was to be for everyone, it was not to be a benefit denied to some in order to provide it to others. Stalin saw things very differently: security came only by intimidating or eliminating potential challengers. The contrast, or so it would seem, made conflict unavoidable.
US historian John Lewis Gaddis, writing in 1997.
At present, there is no greater source of international concern than American-Soviet relations. Under these conditions the reader, deeply conscious of the frightening implications of the American-Soviet cold war, anxiously grasps the new books with the word “Russia” in their titles. But with this book the reader gets only more frustrated when he does not find anything new or of value. The study by Thomas A. Bailey, Professor of History at Stanford University is written in a lively and simple style. Yet there is something profoundly disturbing about it. The title of the book is misleading. The author expresses only the American perspective, and does not really address the relations between the countries or the reasons for the problems they face.
An extract from a review of Thomas Bailey’s book America Faces Russia, written in 1951 by John Valery Tereshtenko and published in the American Journal of Politics. Tereshtenko was a researcher and academic based in the USA, but his family was originally Russian and he wrote books and articles about relations between Russia and America.
The orthodox view of the Cold War greatly simplified the study of history for American audiences. There were enemies (them) and us and our friends. There were truth tellers (American historians) and there were liars (Soviet falsifiers). Best of all, there were no sources because no American historian could use a Soviet archive so it was very hard to challenge the view with evidence. As a consequence – and often because many American historians were either former politicians or wanted to become politicians – a great American success story unfolded as Americans and democracy were made to look very good indeed by their actions towards an unreasonable enemy.
US historian Lynne Viola, writing in 2002.
As long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union a cold war was unavoidable. Stalin waged cold wars incessantly: within the international system, within his alliances, within his country, within his party, within his personal entourage, [and] even within his family.
Most important, Stalin was a revolutionary. He never gave up on the idea of an eventual world revolution, but he expected this to result … from an expansion of influence emanating from the Soviet Union itself.
John Lewis Gaddis writing in his book We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War, 1999.