In racial stereotype research, White samples/subjects are usually used to study White perceptions of Black and Asian targets/objects. This research suggests that Blacks are stereotyped as low on warmth, low on competence, and high on physicality, while Asians are low, high, and low on these three stereotype contents respectively. But do Blacks and Asians share these White racial stereotypes? It remains unclear whether they are limited to White perceivers. We therefore explored the racial stereotypes of Whites, Blacks, and Asians simultaneously as both perceivers and targets in two studies across five countries. In Study 1 (N = 702), we explored the racial stereotypes that White, Black, and Asian Americanshold of each other. In Study 2 (N = 6508), we explored whether the findings from Study 1 traveled to four Asia-Pacific countries (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and China). The White Americans and White Australians in our surveys replicated existing findings on the racial stereotypes of White perceivers, but Black and Asian perceivers differed in consistent ways. Specifically, each racial group stereotyped their own ingroup race as warmer than the others, suggesting ingroup favoritism. All three racial groups also consistently stereotyped Asians as high on competence but low on physicality, while perceiving Blacks as low on competence but high on physicality. In short, treating Blacks and Asians as both the objects and subjects of racial stereotype research contributes to a less Eurocentric and more comprehensive understanding of racial stereotypes.

Existing literature on multiethnic, multilingual societies emphasizes that a common national language is critical for enhancing shared identity and cohesion across groups. Beyond the widely acknowledged nation-building purpose, I argue that national language promotion carries unique significance for authoritarian regimes, as it may serve to bolster regime support. Drawing on large-scale surveys, original interviews, and online community discussions, I examine this argument in authoritarian China, which has achieved a dramatic success in disseminating a common language called "Putonghua" in recent decades. By leveraging cross-cohort and cross-locality variation in the exposure to Putonghua as a medium of instruction following a major language reform in 2001, I find that greater exposure to Putonghua at school results in heightened regime support. Individual-level evidence suggests two possible mechanisms: first, increased consumption of television political news, an important vessel for state propaganda, and second, greater access to higher education opportunities essential for material well-being. Despite some backlash against the risk of stifling diversity, the regime has managed to broaden its support base by cultivating more aligned and contented younger generations, especially among Han dialect speakers compared to ethnic minorities. This study has implications for politics of language and identity, state-society communication, and sources of authoritarian support.

This talk addresses questions in ecocriticism on the place of literature for rethinking ecological practices in the time of Global Warming. It argues that reading is itself an ecological practice as it is an experience of moving in space and time, yet that the possible openness of such an experience was often foreclosed early in the West around the construction of narratives of going home and establishing empires in ancient Greece and Rome. Nonetheless, the man or god of the winds, named Aeolus, provides a trace of both the promise and the threat of such openness in ancient epics by Homer and Vergil. My talk offers a reading of Aeolus as a form of spatial and temporal ambiguity that provides an uncertain ecological condition for ancient narratives, yet that must be excluded for any narrative to be constructed. This argument is a synthesis of the first two chapters of my current book project Aeolus: Aporias of the Wind, which tracks the ecological implications of the figure of Aeolus from Homer to Joyce.

This paper scrutinizes the neglect of interregimatic solidarity (i.e. solidarity between collective struggles against injustice or oppression that take place in purportedly antithetical regimes) in transnational solidarity scholarship, and expounds its theoretical and practical implications. To begin with, I argue that authoritarian and demostatist regimatic contexts of oppression give rise to two regimatically distinct oppressive kinds, which track their regimatic subjects of oppression respectively, and that this fact significantly increases the risk of interregimatic missolidarization in lieu of interregimatic solidarity. In response to the question of whether, given the heightened risk of missolidarization, the ideal of interregimatic solidarity is morally and epistemically too demanding, and to the question of how its exercise could contribute to the pursuit of justice and liberation, rather than just being a symbolic gesture without practical relevance, I then turn to the notion of antiauthoritarian resilience, which is both an epistemic virtue and a moral virtue. Epistemically, antiauthoritarian resilience helps us navigate a world characteristic of authoritarian spillover, demostatist sellout, imperial standoff and capitalist scaleup, comprehend the interconnectedness of oppression across regimatic contexts, and appreciate the practical relevance of interregimatic solidarity. Morally, antiauthoritarian resilience helps us discern and discard dubious moral reasonings and dispositions that impede the exercise of interregimatic solidarity, especially parochialism and whataboutism. I conclude with some thoughts on when, for whom and to what extent interregimatic solidarity is morally obligatory, given that its realization depends on cultivating the virtue of antiauthoritarian resilience.