Although parental academic socialization may be a product of culture, ethnic/racial minority status may play a significant role, above and beyond the impact of culture, in shaping parental academic socialization and its implications for adolescent adjustments.

This study examined Korean adolescents living in South Korea (N=524), China (N=267), and the U.S. (N=408) who share the same heritage culture but have different social positions (ethnic majority or minority). We found that Korean adolescents as an ethnic/racial minority in the U.S. or China reported higher parental academic socialization than those in South Korea as the majority, supporting a significant role of social positions in how parents practice academic socialization. We also found that the distinct practices of academic socialization function differently in adolescent adjustments. Parental commitment to education, parental involvement, and autonomy support were associated with adolescents’ higher school engagement, but achievement-oriented psychological control was associated with more depressive symptoms and antisocial behaviors. Our findings highlight the role of academic socialization as an adaptive strategy for ethnic/racial minorities to succeed in host societies and the generally universal role of parental academic socialization in adolescent adjustments.

Killing in war often inflicts severe moral injuries in the form of guilt, shame, and remorse on the soldiers engaged in war. I contend that addressing soldiers’ moral injuries requires reconceptualizing the act of killing in war conducted by soldiers. When soldiers kill by fighting justly in a war legitimately initiated by their state, they do not kill in their personal capacity. Instead, they kill on behalf of and in the name of the people. While they share the responsibility for the killings as citizens of the warring state, their responsibility is no greater or lesser than that of any other citizen due to the exclusionary power of legitimate directives. Only if the citizenry takes up the moral responsibilities for the killings in war, through collective mourning, public apologies, and fair compensations, can soldiers be liberated from the crushing emotional burdens of harming their victims.

Today, there are essential questions about China's expanding interests and increased number of its nationals abroad. How the central government plans to extend its control and protection beyond China’s sovereign border also has implications for the very concept of China and national sovereignty. In the 19th and 20th centuries, to protect their citizens, Western countries resorted to extraterritoriality in those foreign countries deemed uncivilized or relied on a network of consulates and embassies that responded to the rationale of international law shared by the civilized world. China had no permanent missions abroad before introducing international law, and it did not establish forms of legal protection for its citizens abroad until the late 19th century. How did the central state change how it saw, controlled, and protected Chinese overseas from the late Qing period to early Republican Period? How has it understood extraterritoriality and the role of newly formed diplomatic missions abroad? This work explores the evolution of Chinese legal protection of its people overseas and its application and understanding of extraterritoriality to protect Chinese abroad in the late Qing period.

How do states implement demolition while keeping social discontent in check? While supporters depict state-led demolition as benefits targeting the urban poor, critics view it as unfair deals perpetuating urban inequality. This article interrogates the local politics of demolition—how state actors frame and justify large-scale demolition. Drawing on ethnographic and archival evidence, I identify an emerging frame of demolition in contemporary urban China: the welfare frame. I argue that, through framing demolition as welfare, the state stages urban problems and strategizes policy solutions so that they fit the state’s developmental agenda. Transcending the dichotomy between good and bad demolition, the welfare frame reveals a state that is both responsive and performative, striking a delicate balance between accumulation and legitimation. Using demolition as an example, I highlight the power of framing, by which the state stitches together conflicting interests and justifies its controversial behavior as legitimate.

Background. The facilitative interpersonal skills task (FIS) is a performance-based task designed to assess therapists’ capacity for facilitating a collaborative relationship between therapist and patient (Anderson et al., 2009). Performance on FIS is one of the most robust therapist-level predictors of outcomes (Anderson et al., 2016; Heinonen & Nissen-Lie, 2020). However, feedback on therapists’ FIS has limited scalability because rating FIS requires specialized training and is time intensive. In this study, I will report on the development of an AI-based automatic FIS rating tool.

Methods. Machine learning training data (FIS rated Zoom recordings of participants’ responses to the simulated clients) was collected for 334 response clips from 47 participants. Each response is being rated for FIS by 3 graduate students. The team of 8 trained raters achieved reliability (ICC>.80) and participated in weekly consensus meetings with the developer of FIS.  Multi-modal machine learning applications were used to integrate all behavioral audiovisual markers available to human FIS raters (a combination of linguistic, paralinguistic, and visual data).

Results. Initial reliability of this proof-of-concept prediction model of human-rated FIS ratings (total scores and 8 item scores) based on the combination of speech (voice and text) and visual markers will be reported. If further validated, this model may be used for the evaluation of effectiveness of trainings and for the development of FIS feedback tools for more targeted training, supervision, and deliberate practice (Chow et al., 2015; Clements‐Hickman & Reese, 2020; Miller et al., 2020).

This paper traces the creation of “socialist sonority” through Sino-Soviet documentary exchanges in the first decade of the People’s Republic of China. Socialist sonority, as the article theorizes, designates artistic techniques in socialist documentary film that explored the expressive capacity of sound documentary, which could reconfigure the auditory and sensory structure and anticipate the birth of new socialist subjects. Using untapped documentary footage, periodicals, theoretical writings, and memoirs, the article chronicles extensive Sino-Soviet documentary exchanges in the 1950s through avenues of co-production, translation of Soviet film theory, institutional visits, and material transfer of film technology, which propelled PRC documentary to become an audiovisual medium that broadcasted the symphony of socialist construction and educated the sensorium of socialist citizens. Moreover, the paper illustrates that the Sovietization of Chinese documentary film was contingent on the polysemy of documentary theory, local cultural conditions, indigenous interpretations, and the changing geopolitics of the Cold War.

This is an overview of the main branches and examples of space-for-space economy which could be described as goods and services designed to supply space-bound customers. Space economy is a young and fast-growing sector with a high rate of commercialization. In 2021, it grew 9% year-over-year, and a share of private ventures reached 77%. Yet most of these enterprises work in the space-for-earth sector, which means they are using outer space to provide goods and services for consumers based on Earth. Only 5% of revenue generated by global space industry belongs to space-for-space economy. The most prominent example is SpaceX – the first private company to send humans to space, but it is not the only one, as more projects are evolving into operational businesses. Despite its small size, space-for-space economy may show a rapid growth in the next decade, as new technologies allow humans to venture more vigorously into space exploration and colonization. The main types of space-for-space economic activities will include payload and crew delivery to space stations and celestial bodies (such as the moon or Mars), space tourism, space mining (extraction of resources on celestial bodies), construction of spacecrafts and space bases, both in orbit and on surface (also using the resources extracted in space), reconnaissance, communication and navigation in deep space (in orbit or on surface of the moon or other celestial bodies), and even growing plants to supply astronauts with fresh food.