NORBERT ELIAS

by Viet Phan (2023)

Norbert Elias found success late in life. His most important work, The Civilizing Process, first published in 1939, remained in obscurity for some thirty years before its rediscovery, when it made Elias into an intellectual celebrity in Germany and the Netherlands. In America, Elias’ work was perhaps best known in the sociology of sport, although his work can also be considered foundational to the sociology of emotion and the sociology of the body. Elias’ “figurational sociology” continues to offer fresh perspectives on sociology and sociological inquiries.

Born in 1897 to a Jewish family, Elias attended Breslau University, earning his Doctorate in Philosophy in 1924. Fundamentally breaking with the Kantian philosophical tradition, however, Elias switched to sociology, moving to Heidelberg under the mentorship of Albert Weber (younger brother to Max Weber). He became friends with Karl Mannheim in Heidelberg, following him to the university of Frankfurt before escaping from the National Socialist Party in 1933 to Paris, then London. There, he was reunited with his old friend, Sigmund Foulkes, and aided in Foulkes’ development of Group Analysis in psychotherapy. His academic career interrupted, Elias remained on the fringes of academia until 1954 when he secured a university post at Leicester University, where he became a senior colleague to Anthony Giddens. The republication of “The Civilizing Process” in 1969, when Elias was already 70 years old, brought him fame, and revealed the sizable body of sociological work that he had engaged in. Besides “The Civilizing Process”, his other works – such as  “The Court Society”, “The Loneliness of Dying” (translated by Michel Foucault to French [Spierenburg 2004]), and “The Established and the Outsiders” (with John Scotson) – have since been published more widely after his retirement and, to this day, continued to be greatly influential. (See this biography provided by the Norbert Elias Foundation for more details). 

This expose focuses on Norbert Elias’ magnum opus, The Civilizing Process ([1968] 2000). This massive undertaking, originally two separate volumes (“The History of Manners” and “State Formation and Civilization”), represents not only Elias’ theory of history but also his vision for sociology – a vision that would find much affinity with that of Pierre Bourdieu’s “relational sociology.”

FIGURATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

The most productive starting point to engage with The Civilizing Process is perhaps the postscript that Elias added in 1968. I opted to start here because in this postscript, Elias clarified his sociological project, distinguishing it with that of his contemporaries, naming Talcott Parson specifically. He wrote:

“At the forefront of sociological interest at present are relatively short-term processes, and usually only problems relating to a given state of society. Long-term transformation of social structures, and therefore of personality structures as well, have by and large been lost from view.” (Elias [1968] 2000: 450)

Elias was more specifically arguing against the tendency of sociologists at the time to reduce societies as existing in states of equilibrium as opposed to examining the long and complex processes of social change over time. This vision of societies always in processes, which Elias later expanded in “What is Sociology?” (Elias 1984), is dubbed “figurational sociology” – or to use a less confusing term, “process sociology.” But what is figurational (or process) sociology? (Map One)

I suggest that figurational/process sociology entails two core tenets, which corresponds to a double rejection. The first – reflected in the above quote – rejects the notion of society as static, suggesting instead that society is always in processes of change. He argued quite forcefully, that his contemporaries had a tendency to reduce complex and variable social phenomena to “categories” that are often arbitrary, which then require the theoretician to create more and more complicated auxiliaries to account for observable facts (Elias [1968] 2000: 454-5). An examination of sociological processes, to Elias, is more than to deploy the concept of “social change” and merely point out that society is different at point A than it is/was at point B (Elias [1968] 2000: 452). What is central, he argued, is the dimension of changes: are these changes structural or nominal? Do they have a specific direction or directionless? How are different changes related to one another? For Elias, such questions can only answered through a close examination of how social life had changed over a long period of time: “The factual evidence is what matters here” (Elias [1968] 2000: 452).

The second tenet of figurational society is the rejection of the individual and society as separate bodies. Elias was again explicit here: “…the structures of personality and of society evolve in an indissoluble interrelationship” (Elias [1968] 2000: 365–67, 456). For Elias, the solution to the classical sociological problem of agency and structure is the recognition that they were never separated: Shifts in the social structure (which Elias sometimes called “figurational changes”) always parallel a change in the individual psychological structures. As such, sociologists can glean larger changes in the social structure by looking closely at how the individual psychological structure shifted over time. In line with the first tenet of figurational sociology, Elias described these changes as “to become”, for which there is evidence for – rather than “to be”, for which evidence cannot be provided because the definition of a “state can be arbitrary. If we put these two tenets together, we quickly see that figurational sociology is a relational sociology with respect to time. In other words, a social state does not exist per se, rather, it always exists in relation to the state of society of another time.

THE CIVILIZING PROCESS

The abstractions of what constitutes figurational sociology become clear once we engage with Elias’ core arguments on the civilizing process. It is productive, I think, to consider The Civilizing Process as an exemplar of how figurational/process sociology should be conducted. In his argument on this long history, Elias urged sociologists to think about how, through marshalling a considerable body of evidence, that we can say “some groups of people have become more civilized”, for “it can never be said with certainty that the people of a society are civilized” (Elias 2000 [1968]: 456).

The civilizing process, to Elias, denotes a very specific transformation of human behavior, that of manners – which are reflective of broader structural changes. In looking at the manners of the table while eating, for example, he reminded us:

“Forms of conduct while eating cannot be isolated. They are a segment – a very characteristic one – of the totality of socially instilled forms of conduct. Their standard corresponds to a quite definite social structure” (Elias [1968] 2000: 59).

Accordingly, Elias amassed a huge body of evidence to trace the slow, sometime non-linear, and uneven transformation of manners that corresponded to an equally slow, non-linear, and uneven transformation of broader societal structures from the 14th to 19th century in Europe. Through this analysis, Elias engaged in a double tracing of the changes in the individual psychological structures (or “affective structure”) and the changes in societal structure, thus drawing a connection between these lines of changes. Throughout his argument, Elias constantly put these lines parallel to, and in crossing with one another, suggesting that they are part and parcel of the same, larger, “civilizing process.” Elias stressed that the civilizing process had neither been a product of human “rational” long-term planning, nor had it been “a sequence of unstructured and chaotic changes” (Elias [1968] 2000: 365). Rather, the civilizing process constituted a host of changes observed at the macro and micro levels that were demonstrably reflections of each other (Map Two). 

We see in this theory map a double movement. The first, at the macro level of social structure, surveyed the shift from decentralized medieval societies ruled by regional warrior nobilities (the knights) to monopolized absolutist states (Elias [1968] 2000: 187-94). The formation of absolutism and the court society was accompanied by three concurrent important developments. Elias pointed to, first, the growth of the money sector of the economy that enabled the concentration of economic resources in the hands of kings and princes with their centralized tax apparatus, and away from the warrior nobilities who are dependent on fixed rents (Elias [1968] 2000: 191-94). This economic concentration enabled a monopoly of force, which in turns strengthen the ruler’s revenue generation through tax collection (Elias [1968] 2000: 268). This monopoly of taxation and military force in the hands of the monarch heralded the rise of the absolutist state. The functioning of these states and their people were further conditioned by two other trends: an increase in the complexity of society and the division of labor, and consequentially, the increasing functional interdependencies between the different sectors of society (Elias [1968] 2000: 191-94, 220-25, 379-82).

It is within these trends that the court society was gradually shaped, evolving from a previously simple division between the warrior nobility, exemplified by the knight and the peasant, to a significantly more complex “court society.” Finding their prestige and economic fortune increasingly dependent on the monarch, and under increasing pressure to differentiate themselves with the rising bourgeoisie with their growing economic power, warrior nobilities became increasingly “pacified”, adhering to stricter codes of conducts in the court (Elias [1968] 2000: 387-97). For their part, the monarchs were no less constricted, even when they held all the power. The kings and princes of the absolutist court were in the unenviable position of having to balance the power of the nobilities and the bourgeoisie, the latter also looking to enter the court (Elias [1968] 2000: 194, 386-87).

In discussing the trappings and interdependencies of the members of the court society, we have already started to glean into the realm of “good” conducts and manners as a means of differentiation. Elias suggested that there was an ongoing “interpenetration of the standards of conduct between the nobility and the bourgeoisie” (Elias [1968] 2000: 386, 421-35): One group (the bourgeoisie) looking to become the “in-group” and the other (nobles) sought to defend their prestige through ever sophisticated manners and the technologies that accompanied these new forms of conducts (such as the forks and the handkerchiefs). This is the second movement in the double movement in Elias’ thesis, which centered on the changes in the structure of individual affects, or the complex shifts in the affective lives of people. Part of what makes Elias’ argument on the inseparability of the individual psychological changes and broader structural changes is his ability to discuss the details of human conduct, always in the context of broader structural changes. Elias creatively made use the historically mundane manuscripts on manner education to construct a colorful shift in the most minute detail of everyday human rituals, from table manners, eating etiquettes, and the handling of bodily functions, to appropriate behaviors in the bedroom, how men-women relationships should be approach, and norms governing aggressiveness (Elias [1968] 2000: 72-172).

Three interrelated transformations stood out in the civilizing process. Firstly, our manners became more and more “automatic”: Manners went from conscious efforts to appear appropriate before our social betters to things “unsaid” (Elias [1968] 2000: 83, 117-18, 127). Secondly, our threshold of shame and repulse towards inappropriate manners became increasingly lower, commensurate with the self-discipline we impose on ourselves (Elias [1968] 2000: 108, 155-57). Finally, and in conjunction with the pacification of society, we became more self-restraint, less ruled by our immediate emotions and drive, and more by “fore-sight” of the consequences of our action in an increasing longer chain of relationships (Elias [1968] 2000: 379-82). Importantly, by focusing on the text on mannerism of the time, Elias promptly reminded us that our new sensibility around proper manners and conducts did not come about on their own, but rather a laborious and deliberated process of instilling one structure of affect with another over time.  

It is important to note that across these transformations, the overarching direction has been towards a reduction of contrasts: While these transformations were first observed in the court society to differentiate themselves with other social classes, interdependency between these classes, together with the increasing economic power and influence of the bourgeoisie led to the gradual diffusion of these practices over time. Thus, Elias argued, we gradually moved from a high contrast concept of “courtoisie” to a concept of “civilité” (“civilization”) that is lower in contrast but higher in variations, which were the results the variations across different societies (Elias [1968] 2000: 87-90, 382-87).

ELIAS AND BOURDIEU 

Habitus, Fields, and Figurations

It is not particularly hard to draw a connection between the sociological work of Norbert Elias and that of Pierre Bourdieu. For both these theorists, the notions of “habitus” and the conception of sociological realities as “fields” (for Bourdieu) or “figurations” (for Elias) are central to their respective projects.

Before Bourdieu brought the term “habitus” to mainstream sociology, Elias had been using “habitus” extensively in his discussion on the directional change of the affect structure for the individual towards “automatism.” Throughout his discussion of the history of manners, Elias reminded us that new forms of human conduct were not at all linked to a process of “rationalization” (Elias [1968] 2000: 97-9, 366-67). The invention and use of the fork or the handkerchief, or specific usage of speech were not at all “rational” decisions based on health concern but were rather centered on a project of differentiation between “good” behaviors by the nobilities and the “vulgar” common practices (Elias [1968] 2000: 93-99, 366-67). Indeed, those in the nobility: “…are neither able, nor do they attempt, to justify… why in a particular case this form of a word is pleasing and that displeasing” (Elias [1968] 2000: 422).

Elias’ way of describing the affect structure of the individual is similar to how Bourdieu had use “habitus” to describe an individual’s “feel for the game” (Bourdieu 1998: 80). Habitus, for both Bourdieu and Elias (expressed also in other ways than “habitus”, allowed them to transcend the rational actor model while also accounting for the “interest” (or “practical reason”) of the individual across different social settings (Bourdieu 1998: 76–79).

Habitus (disposition), for Bourdieu, however, cannot be examined outside of an individual’s “social position” within a specific “field” and their “position-taking” (Bourdieu 1998: 6). The habitus embodies the individual’s social position within the social field vis-à-vis other actors taking different social positions. One’s habitus’ effect (or lack thereof) becomes demonstrable not only when an individual is thrown in a foreign social context, but also in the constraints it puts on the individual in their respective social position in the field even as it allows them to “play the game.” Elias, for example, documented the same psychological uneasiness that the individual experience outside of their social position as Bourdieu noted when the petty bourgeoisie in their contact with the court society:

“The attempt to achieve the poise of the upper class leads in most cases to a particular falseness and incongruity of behavior which nevertheless conceals a genuine distress, a despair to escape the pressure from above and the sense of inferiority” (Elias [1968] 2000: 431)

Elsewhere, the connection to Elias was more obvious, not least because Bourdieu directly quoted Elias on how court nobles hold extraordinary privileges as members of court society but also constrained by it and forced practice the restrictive courtly manners:

“In the last analysis this compelling struggle for ever-threatened power and prestige was the dominant factor that condemned all those involved to enact the burdensome ceremonies. No single person within the figuration was able to initiate a reform of the tradition” (Elias, as quoted in Bourdieu 1998: 26).

This specific quote (among many others), in conjunction with Elias’ emphasis on the increasing interdependence both in broader society and within the courts in The Civilizing Process (such as that characterizing the relationships between the monarch, the nobles, and the bourgeoisie), also made clear the connection between Bourdieu’s “field” and Elias’ “figuration.” Like Bourdieu, in his analysis of the court noble, Elias did not only focus on the individual but rather the “figuration” of relationship that they are in. Another way to draw this connection is to think of Elias’ “figurations” as the characteristics of a Bourdieusian “social position” in a specific “field.” The concept of “figurations” is therefore a broader concept than “social position” as it denotes both the position and the field.

From Relational Sociology to Figurational Sociology

Reading Bourdieu and Elias side by side both clarifies and inspires. The Bourdieusian contribution is first, a more formal articulation of relationality into concepts of “positions”, “dispositions” (habitus), and “position-taking.” These concepts are equally central to Elias’ theory, although they were more “shown” than formally “theorized.” Power, and more importantly, types of power (“capital”), was also more explicitly theorized for Bourdieu. Once more, this is not to say that power did not feature in the civilizing process. Power, for Elias, permeated all social relations and figurations, and like Bourdieu, the question for Elias was less “who has the power?”, but rather, “how was power exercised?”

The clarity afforded by Bourdieu’s theory of field, through focusing his analysis on a particular slice of history at a particular time, certainly came with a cost. In Practical Reason, Bourdieu wrote:

“Social science should not construct classes, but rather the social spaces in which classes can be demarcated, but which only exist on paper. In each case it should construct and discover (beyond the opposition between constructionism and realism) the principle of differentiation which permits one to re-engender theoretically the empirically observed space.” (Bourdieu 1998: 32)

This passage seems to suggest that Bourdieusian analysis can be applicable not just across different societies, but also different societies over time, where different “cuts” of history offers insights to the potentially varied logic of differentiation of their specific time. Seen this way, Bourdieusian theory offers a vision for theorizing social change, contra its common critiques of it being only a theory of social reproduction and not of change (Fowler 2020). At the same time, while Bourdieu did expand his analysis to different contemporary societies (Bourdieu 1998), his focused analysis provided less room to explore possibilities of theory application for historical examination and change.

It is here that figurational sociology offers a blueprint on how such a project might be accomplished. Elias’ writing made abundantly clear that a figurational sociology is also one that is relational: Elias’ push back against “states” sociology is analogous to that of Bourdieu’s against “substantialist” sociology, only on a different axis (time). Elias’ analysis of the court society further applied this relational approach to different social “figurations” across a long period of time. The “noble”, for example, was always analyzed alongside their other social relations and the court structure to highlight the different constraints and power such figurations afforded the individual.

The clearest contribution of this mode of analysis that stretches relational sociology both across time and space is the demystification of the “habitus.” The civilizing process was a slow formation and inculcation of a “new” habitus of “civilité.” As Elias has shown, such transformation was both structural through larger social changes and agentic, through the purposeful projects of education and norm interpenetration. Importantly, the work of Elias in The Civilizing Process also brought back affect and the emotional life of the individual as an important “site” for the habitus.

CONCLUSION 

While Elias’ work had become more popular, its applications seem to remain infrequent in American sociology, especially when compared to Bourdieu’s theory of field. Perhaps this is due to the substantial requirement of doing figurational sociology: A significant “stock” of historical data to be meticulously combed through. I shared the same opinion with Paulle, van Heerikhuizen, and Emirbayer (2012), however, that Elias and Bourdieu’s works complement each other and constitute the same fundamental sociological project. A historical, process-oriented perspective in the application of Bourdieusian analysis would enrich accounts of habitus in different social contexts.

Although most obvious, Bourdieu’s work is not the only theory that Elias’ writing engaged with (both intentionally and unintentionally). We can arguably stage three other productive conversations between Elias and Durkheim, Elias and Weber, and Elias and Foucault. The link to Durkheim in The Civilizing Process is obvious – Elias extended the Durkheimian notion of interdependency (“organic solidarity”) in considerably finer detail. He not only applied this concept to describe the gradual change in social life across Europe in the medieval to late medieval times, but also went into detail on what the implications of interdependencies were for the different social groups. The parallel changes that Elias traced in broader social structure and individual affective structures can be put in contrast with Durkheim’s collective and individual consciousness, much like how Bourdieu’s had synthesized these strands under the “habitus.”

Yet another area of productive conversation between Elias and other theorists is on the State. Here, Elias’ analysis on the formation of the State not only provides a different perspective than that of Durkheim, but also can be seen as an extension or elaboration of Weber’s concept of the state as the sole holder of legitimate force (a similar project by Bourdieu). Elias’ writings can also inform more recent theorists of the state in his analysis of its tax and force apparatus (for example, Tilly 1985). Finally, the changes to individual affective structure and the move towards self-restraint and self-discipline that Elias outlined easily found an intellectual companion in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1995).

Elias should be read as an important contemporary theorist whose contribution can provide fresh perspective for sociological inquiries. He should be read for the interesting extension and conversation with past and future theorist. And lastly, he should be read because The Civilizing Process, though dense and difficult, is also a fun, colorful book about the lives of medieval knights, nobles, merchants, and peasants (with pictures in the appendix, I might add) – an illuminating piece of interactive history.

REFERENCES 

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998. Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Stanford University Press.

Elias, Norbert. 1984. What Is Sociology? Columbia University Press.

Elias, Norbert. 2000. The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. Rev. ed. edited by E. Dunning, J. Goudsblom, and S. Mennell. Oxford ; Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers.

Foucault, Michel. 1995. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books.

Fowler, Bridget. 2020. “Pierre Bourdieu on Social Transformation, with Particular Reference to Political and Symbolic Revolutions.” Theory and Society 49(3):439–63.

Paulle, Bowen, Bart van Heerikhuizen, and Mustafa Emirbayer. 2012. “Elias and Bourdieu.” Journal of Classical Sociology 12(1):69–93. 

Spierenburg, Pieter. 2004. “Punishment, Power, and History: Foucault and Elias.” Social Science History 28(4):607–36.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” Pp. 169–91 in Bringing the State Back In, edited by D. Rueschemeyer, P. B. Evans, and T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.