17.05.2023

Nuclear Weapons Monitoring Group
Report II 

Finland and the Challenges of Nuclear Weapons Policy 

Finland, NATO and Nuclear Weapons

Finland, which supports universal non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament like the other Nordic countries, has joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, in whose strategy nuclear weapons play an important role. Therefore, nuclear weapons will inevitably become part of Finland’s security policy. However, it is up to Finland to decide in what way it politically supports or operationally participates in a deterrence policy based on the possibility of using nuclear weapons. Decisions regarding Finland’s position on nuclear weapons are significant, and when making them, aspects related to nuclear arms control must also be taken into account. This background memorandum aims to contribute to fact-based public debate as a basis for these decisions.

We have divided the memorandum into chapters dealing with general information on nuclear weapons, NATO nuclear policy, Finland’s position and sets of recommendations.

I Nuclear weapons

In this chapter, we present general background related to nuclear weapons, their effects, as well as existing treaties and international and humanitarian law regulating these weapons. 

1.1. Background

Nine countries – China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States – maintain nuclear arsenals, which at present are estimated to contain approximately 13,000 nuclear warheads in total. Most of these countries are modernising and expanding their nuclear arsenals with new means of delivery, warheads and command systems. The strategies of the nuclear weapon states primarily aim at deterring other nuclear weapon states’ first strike by maintaining a credible second-strike capabilities. Most of the nuclear weapon states have also not renounced the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapon states or non-nuclear-weapon states in order to control escalation.   Furthermore, a nuclear deterrent may be used as a cover for wars of aggression, as demonstrated by Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine. It has been suggested that, although the existence of nuclear weapons may have prevented wars between nuclear weapon states, they have also enabled lower-level military conflicts and interventions by nuclear weapon states without the involvement of other states in them (the stability-instability paradox).  

Due to the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, their very existence involves immeasurable risks. False alarms, misunderstood intentions, various accidents and technical failures can lead to a nuclear disaster. These risks are multiplied in crisis situations. Over the decades, there have been several close calls and hundreds of nuclear weapon related accidents due to both technical and human errors.  Catastrophic accidents and escalation leading to the use of nuclear weapons have so far been avoided, but as the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has said, luck is not a strategy. The only certain way to eliminate the risk of the use of nuclear weapons is complete nuclear disarmament.          

1.2. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons              

The humanitarian and environmental effects of nuclear weapons are catastrophic. In 1945, more than 200,000 people died in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a result of the use of two relatively small nuclear bombs in densely populated areas. The immediate lethal effect was caused by heat and a pressure wave, and further away by radiation.  There is no exact information on the number of people who have died and fallen ill as a result of nuclear weapons tests, but the radioactivity that has entered the atmosphere in connection with them is estimated to have caused half a million cases of cancer worldwide.  

Large-scale use of nuclear weapons would change the climate by causing a nuclear winter. Nuclear explosions and subsequent firestorms would inject huge clouds of soot into the air, which would spread throughout the Earth’s atmosphere, dimming the sunlight and lowering the temperature by several degrees. According to research, the change could last up to 10 years, which would significantly impair the production of food crops and thus cause a global famine.  For example, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, in which each side would use fifty 15 kt nuclear warheads similar to the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, would not only cause local human and environmental destruction, but also affect food production in the entire Northern Hemisphere, pushing 255 million people into a famine. If 250 nuclear warheads with a destructive power of 100 kt (less than two per cent of the nuclear warheads in the world) were used in the war, the temperature would drop by more than six degrees and food production in the Northern Hemisphere would decrease so much that more than two billion people, including all those living in Finland, would die of starvation.  A full-scale nuclear war would threaten all life on Earth through both direct and indirect effects.

As the nuclear weapon states themselves have stated on several occasions, a nuclear war cannot even theoretically be won under any circumstances. Even the party carrying out a first strike that destroys all of the opponent’s nuclear weapons would have to bear the global effects of such attack on climate and food production.

New research confirms the statement made by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev back in 1985 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The original nuclear weapon states (the so-called P5 countries) confirmed this in a declaration in January 2022.

1.3 The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Deterrence Policy             

The basic assumption of military deterrence is that the costs of the desired behaviour (not using nuclear weapons) are lower than those of the unwanted behaviour (using nuclear weapons) and, therefore, a rational and calculating person and state chooses the former. In reality, however, nuclear deterrence is not a measurable factor of state power, but rather a decision-maker’s more or less rational assessment of the situation and the decision that follows from it.

The basis of deterrence is ensuring that unwanted action comes with a sufficiently high cost. The aim is to reinforce the opponent’s assumed cost-consciousness by increasing awareness of and belief in the capacity and intentions of the party to carry out the deterrent threat. In addition, nuclear weapon states maintain some ambiguity about their possible reactions so that opponents cannot be certain as to how far they can escalate in terms of conventional warfare or threats without triggering nuclear weapon use. 

There is also no evidence of the effectiveness and strength of the deterrent. The fact that a nuclear war has not broken out does not prove that deterrence is working. From a military point of view, the ineffectiveness deterrence cannot be proved until an attack takes place. Criminal legislation is also partly based on deterrence thinking, but even the death penalty does not act as a complete deterrent in preventing undesirable acts.

Deterrence policy is, in fact, unpredictable. It is based on the assumption that the opponent intends to act in a way that is harmful to us, but understands our ability to mete out a punishment and thus impose on him significant costs that exceed the benefit achieved by the opponent’s initial action. According to this assumption, the opponent’s decision-making is cost-rational and thus she or he will refrain from actions that are harmful to the other party. It is particularly important that the party introducing the deterrent is able to communicate the desired message to the target of the deterrent and that the message is understood as intended.

However, the logic of decision-making is rarely a predictable, rational evaluation of costs and benefits. Different people value things differently and perceptions of future benefits and costs can be based on wishful thinking. Furthermore, the human factor must be taken into account – under heavy pressure, the decision-maker’s mental stability may be at stake. While nuclear deterrence seems to be working, we cannot be sure why a nuclear war has not broken out or that it could not break out (despite the deterrent). 

Theoretically, in deterrence policy, it is also possible to consider which political or economic factors, in addition to military force, can have an encouraging effect or regulate actions through the fear of punishment.

1.4. Treaties Limiting Nuclear Weapons       

After the effects of nuclear weapons became known at the end of World War II, there were several initiatives aimed at nuclear disarmament in the UN. However, instead of nuclear disarmament, the subsequent years saw an increase in the number of nuclear weapon states, emphasising the need for non-proliferation.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was concluded in 1968 and it entered into force in 1970. In the treaty, five nuclear weapon states (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) committed to moving towards nuclear disarmament, while non-nuclear weapon states committed not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA’s safeguards. In addition, the NPT guarantees the right to peaceful development of nuclear energy for all state parties. These principles – nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use – are considered the three main pillars of the treaty. The fact that the five nuclear weapon states that are part of the NPT have not progressed towards nuclear disarmament as expected has led to tensions within the NPT.  The tensions have been rising especially since the treaty, which was initially of limited duration, was extended indefinitely in 1995.  NPT review conferences are held every five years, and the incremental goals on which states parties agreed on in 1995, 2000 and 2010 have not been achieved yet. The two most recent review conferences in 2015 and 2022 have ended inconclusively without a consensus final document.

India, Israel and Pakistan, which did not join the NPT, have tested and developed nuclear weapons, as has North Korea, which withdrew from the treaty in 2003. Other countries have also had programmes aimed at developing nuclear weapons, which they have since abandoned. As far as is known, South Africa is the only country that has given up its nuclear weapons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine handed the nuclear weapons located in their territories over to Russia.  

The five nuclear weapon states’ promises regarding nuclear disarmament have not been fulfilled.  The nuclear weapon states have maintained nuclear arsenals, and the global stockpile that have grown since Russia and the United States ceased to reduce theirs is expected to grow in the coming decade.  In addition to this, the NPT has recently been challenged by, for example, the AUKUS cooperation between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States for nuclear-powered submarines fuelled by weapons grade uranium, the uncertain future of the Iran nuclear deal, the deployment of nuclear weapons in five NATO member states and Russia’s intention to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus. Some of the member countries also find the regulations related to nuclear energy production to be discriminatory.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The frustration of non-nuclear weapon states at the reluctance of the nuclear weapon states to move towards nuclear disarmament contributed to the UN General Assembly’s decision to negotiate a new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. The treaty, which entered into force in January 2021, aims to promote nuclear disarmament through the total ban of these weapons and the associated comprehensive stigmatisation, following the model of the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. The total ban also includes the threat of nuclear weapon use, thereby challenging the deterrence policy based on nuclear weapons. 

The nuclear weapon states and NATO have opposed the treaty, and not a single NATO country has signed it. However, NATO member Norway played a central role in initiating the process which examined the humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons, and which contributed to the creation of the ban treaty. The Netherlands, on the other hand, participated in the TPNW negotiations as the only NATO country on the initiative of its national parliament, although ultimately it voted against the treaty. 

Finland and Sweden have not signed the treaty, although Sweden was involved in the treaty negotiations and voted in favour of the TPNW at the UN.  The United States later pressured Sweden not to sign the treaty. 

Finland, Sweden and Switzerland as well as the NATO countries Belgium, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands and the US ally Australia attended the first meeting of states parties to the TPNW as observers in summer 2022.  However, the treaty divides opinion within NATO. In 2021, more than fifty former prime ministers, foreign ministers and defence ministers of US allies, including two former Secretaries General of NATO, issued a plea to all the leaders of non-nuclear weapon states to sign the treaty.

Bilateral Arms Control Treaties

Since Russia and the United States own most of the world’s nuclear weapons, reducing the number of nuclear weapons has mainly depended on arms control treaties between those two countries. Although their nuclear arsenals have shrunk to less than a quarter from the height of the Cold War, they still account for more than 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons. In recent years, China has modernised and increased its own nuclear arsenal, which nevertheless is still clearly smaller than the thousands of weapons held by Russia and the United States.  However, especially the United States has considered it important for China to join the previously bilateral process of nuclear arms control. 

Recently, the bilateral treaty system has crumbled and key treaties have collapsed. In 2002, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) concluded in 1972 prohibiting strategic anti-ballistic missiles, which had paved the way for treaties limiting nuclear weapons.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) concluded in 1987 that prohibited intermediate-range ground-launched missiles on both sides fell apart in 2019 when both parties withdrew from it. Suspicions about Russia’s treaty violations as well as the missile defence project advanced by the United States in Europe, which Russia found troublesome, had an impact in the background. However, the parties have announced that they will refrain from exceeding the treaty’s limitations.

Negotiated in 2010, New START is the only treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons that is in force. The parties decided to extend the New START treaty for five years in 2021.  However, in March 2023, President Putin announced that Russia would suspend its participation in the application of several obligations of the New START, although not outright withdraw from the treaty.  Before this, Russia had already suspended its participation in the inspections related to the verification of the treaty and in the bilateral advisory commission.

The so-called tactical nuclear weapons are not covered by any treaty. The term is intended to distinguish shorter-range nuclear weapons that may be used on the battlefield from intercontinental strategic weapons with more destructive power. Therefore, the term “tactical weapon” is sometimes replaced with “non-strategic weapon”.  Along with intermediate-range nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons are associated with the controversial idea of limited/regional nuclear war. During the Cold War, the regional use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre of war may have been judged to reduce the risk of global nuclear war by providing an opportunity for lower-level escalation. The problem, however, is that escalation processes are fundamentally uncontrollable. Thus, tactical nuclear weapons of lesser destructive power may lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons. 

Regional Treaties Limiting Nuclear Weapons

There are five zones in the world that have been declared nuclear-weapon-free by mutual agreement, covering most of the Southern Hemisphere in addition to Central Asia. The zones contribute to reinforcing the norm against nuclear weapons in their regions. The key challenge is that not all nuclear weapon states have ratified the additional protocols included in the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, in which they would commit not to use nuclear weapons against the nuclear-weapon-free zones. Only in the case of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which covers Latin America, have all five nuclear power states that are part of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ratified the relevant protocol.

Among the NATO member states, the eastern part of Germany, the area of the former GDR, is nuclear-weapon-free according to the Two Plus Four Treaty signed in connection with German reunification and approved in 1990 by both Germany and the former occupying powers. This applies to both nuclear warheads and means of delivery.  

Test Ban Treaty

In 1963, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States concluded the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) banning nuclear tests and other nuclear explosions under water, in the atmosphere and in outer space. The treaty allowed underground tests as long as the radioactive material did not spread to the territories of other states. China, France and North Korea are the only nuclear weapon states that have not signed the treaty. France discontinued in the 1970s all tests which would be in violation of this treaty and China in the 1980s.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) concluded in 1996 replaced the PTBT and prohibited nuclear tests underground as well. However, the treaty is still not in force because only France, Russia and the United Kingdom have ratified it among the nuclear weapon states. Although the CTBT terminated the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the terms of the latter are still in effect. The only nuclear weapon state that has conducted nuclear weapons tests since the year 2000s is North Korea. However, none of the countries that have signed the treaty have violated it. The United States is key to the fate of the treaty, as China has announced that it will ratify the treaty immediately after the US. On the other hand, Russia, which has ratified the treaty, has expressed its readiness for new nuclear tests if the United States were to conduct them first.

1.5. International and Humanitarian Law

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is based on international humanitarian law. Humanitarian aspects were brought to the fore on a large scale for the first time in the process of examining the consequences of nuclear weapons between 2010 and 2014 that laid the groundwork for the treaty. The process emphasised the basis for a total ban, i.e. the fact that nuclear weapons do not, as is characteristic of weapons of mass destruction, distinguish between soldiers and civilians. In addition, due to the extent of the effects of the use of nuclear weapons, the delivery of sufficient relief aid would not be possible.

In addition to the TPNW, the legality of the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons has been discussed both in national courts and at the international level. The Tokyo District Court is the only court to have issued a verdict in 1963 regarding the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (the Shimoda Case). The court ruled that the bombings were unlawful under the laws of war. The laws of war in question are largely still valid law as customary regulation related to the Hague Conventions (1899, 1907).

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) commented on the legality of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use in its 1996 advisory opinion (The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons). The ICJ deemed that it cannot definitively state whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence. At the same time, however, it considered that, on the basis of provisions relating to the use of armed force in the UN Charter and the laws of war, the use of nuclear weapons is hardly reconcilable with the regulation of the use of armed force.

The Marshall Islands, on whose territory the United States conducted numerous nuclear tests in the 1940s and 1950s, filed a lawsuit against nuclear weapon states for not fulfilling their obligations with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. However, in 2016, the ICJ deemed that there is no actual dispute between the parties and, therefore, did not take up the case.  

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concluded at the UN stipulates that every human being has the right to life. The UN Human Rights Committee, which is part of the system that oversees the covenant, deemed in 2019 that the use or threat of nuclear weapons violates this right to life. 

II Nuclear Weapons and NATO

This chapter discusses the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s deterrence policy, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, nuclear exercises and reservations regarding NATO’s nuclear weapons policy. 

Although the North Atlantic Treaty does not mention nuclear weapons, the nuclear deterrent provided by the United States has been part of NATO’s policy since the beginning. The nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom (strategic-range submarine-launched missiles) and France (submarine-launched missiles and air-launched cruise missiles) are an “independent part” of NATO’s deterrence. An essential part of NATO’s deterrence is that the alliance reserves for itself the possibility of using nuclear weapons first (first-use policy).

The role of nuclear weapons in the alliance’s policy was mentioned clearly for the first time in the 1957 Strategic Concept. Since 2010, NATO has defined itself as a nuclear alliance. However, the United States began deploying tactical nuclear weapons on the soil of European NATO allies in 1954 (“extended nuclear deterrence”), and since 1957 has agreed to an arrangement whereby European allies hosting tactical nuclear weapons on their soil also take responsibility for their use “in time of war”. The above-mentioned Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to other states, but the United States as well as NATO and its member countries interpret that the treaty will cease to be valid in the event of a war. According to NPT, a member state may withdraw from the obligations of the treaty only after providing three months’ notice. The aforementioned arrangement regarding United States nuclear weapons is referred to as nuclear sharing. The UK and France do not apply this policy with regard to their own weapons. 

During the Cold War, tactical nuclear weapons have also been deployed in other countries allied to the United States, such as Japan and South Korea. The armament of the Soviet troops stationed in certain countries of the Warsaw Pact also included nuclear weapons.

The idea behind nuclear sharing and limited nuclear war has been that, should a nuclear war start, it would not immediately expand into an intercontinental conflict threatening the leading powers of the military alliances, but that nuclear weapons could be used in a more limited way to support conventional warfare in European countries. This was thought to increase the credibility of nuclear deterrence by lowering the threshold of using nuclear weapons. Allied countries would thus become the battlefield of a possible nuclear war. However, many European NATO countries have supported the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the European continent, seeing this as an opportunity to influence the nuclear weapons policy of the United States. The deployment solutions and agreements implemented under the leadership of the United States are generally kept secret from the parliaments of these countries and from the public. Some NATO member countries are known to have given up hosting nuclear weapons on their territory (Canada, Greece, the United Kingdom), but the United States and NATO neither confirm nor deny the presence of weapons and warheads in the member states.  

A significant share of the tactical nuclear weapons was withdrawn by the early 1990s. However, the deployment of nuclear weapons continues in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Bases in these countries have stockpiles of air-launched nuclear bombs, the number of which is estimated to be approximately 100 in total. All the countries hosting tactical nuclear weapons are also modernising their dual-use aircraft capable of nuclear bombing. The tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are under the US military command system during peacetime. However, in times of war, the President of the United States can decide to transfer control of them to the host countries. According to NATO, the decision also requires the approval of the UK Prime Minister and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

Russia is estimated to have approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons, some of which it plans to deploy in Belarus.

The policy of nuclear sharing has been widely criticised since the Cold War. The military benefits of nuclear sharing were questioned especially during the term of President Obama, when the Foreign Minister of Germany publicly proposed withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from the country. However, the critical voices within NATO have since died down.  After the annexation of Crimea, and especially with the war in Ukraine that started in 2022, the importance of nuclear weapons in deterrence policy has been emphasised in the alliance’s statements and documents. Yet, apart from their symbolic value, tactical nuclear weapons still have no clear military significance. They have lost their original purpose as instruments of “regional nuclear war” that was considered possible in Europe during the Cold War. NATO’s nuclear deterrent primarily relies on the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States. 

2.1. NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group includes all NATO countries, except for France, which wants to keep the decision-making power about its own nuclear weapons completely to itself. The NPG addresses issues related to the alliance’s nuclear weapons policy, such as the technical security of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and matters related to nuclear arms control. Through participation in the NPG’s consultations and information sharing, the NATO countries have traditionally had greater access to information and more possibilities to influence US nuclear weapons policy than other allies. The NPG can also be seen as a channel for a unified nuclear deterrence culture and “burden sharing”, with non-nuclear-weapon states also being drawn into it. The countries hosting nuclear weapons have traditionally had the most say in the NPG.

2.2. Nuclear Exercises 

In addition to the five countries hosting US nuclear weapons, some of the other NATO allies take part in the burden sharing related to nuclear weapons by participating in the yearly Steadfast Noon military exercises in which nuclear strikes are simulated. The support provided to them by non-nuclear-weapon states (SNOWCAT, Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics) includes protecting and escorting bombers carrying nuclear weapons, readiness to destroy the opponent’s air defences as well as aerial refuelling of nuclear bombers. The United Kingdom and the United States participate in these exercises, but France does not. The number of NATO countries taking part in these exercises has increased. In addition to the nuclear weapon states and the countries hosting tactical nuclear weapons, only a few other NATO countries used to participate in these exercises, but in 2022, there were as many as 14 states taking part. The use of nuclear weapons is not rehearsed in NATO’s conventional military exercises. Russia is also actively drilling the use of tactical nuclear weapons in its own military exercises. In the increasingly tense global situation, communicating about military exercises to the adversaries is essential to prevent misinterpretations. For example, in 1983, the Soviet Union misinterpreted NATO’s Able Archer military exercise as preparation for nuclear war.

2.3 Reservations regarding NATO’s Nuclear Weapons Policy 

The deployment of nuclear weapons on the state’s territory is not a precondition for NATO membership. Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Spain have declared that they do not allow and will not accept nuclear weapons on their territory during peacetime. Despite this, Denmark permitted US nuclear weapons in Greenland during the Cold War. Although Lithuania has no such stated policy, its constitution prohibits all weapons of mass destruction in its territory.  

The introduction of nuclear weapons into Finland is prohibited by law, and deploying them on Finnish soil or sea is not militarily expedient even in times of crisis.

The United States has not deployed its nuclear weapons in countries that have joined NATO after the Cold War, despite requests by some countries to do so. 

Many NATO member countries have also opted out of the yearly nuclear exercises as a matter of principle. For example, Norway emphasised in 2022 that it has never taken part in the Steadfast Noon exercises.

The new aspiration of the United States and NATO is to move to an integrated deterrence policy, in which the special nature of nuclear weapons is recognised, but they are linked to conventional weapons and new dimensions of warfare. In NATO’s command structure, missions related to nuclear weapons are the responsibility of the United States European Command (EUCOM). Participation in these missions is voluntary. The hosting of nuclear weapons does not count towards NATO’s national capability requirements. 

III The Position of Finland

This chapter describes Finland’s traditional nuclear weapons policy, the prohibition of nuclear weapons within Finnish territory and the alleviation of tensions in the Nordic region.

3.1 Finland’s Nuclear Weapons Policy

As a non-nuclear-weapon state, Finland is committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is obliged to promote its goals. Finland’s long-term aim has been to promote nuclear disarmament and to use its position and expertise to contribute to nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. In particular, Finland has highlighted the need to bring tactical nuclear weapons under the scope of arms control. Along with other countries, Finland has also sought to reduce the role of nuclear weapons as the basis of security worldwide. 

As a responsible member of NATO, Finland must not abandon these goals, even though relying on nuclear weapons in its own security policy inevitably contradicts efforts to promote these goals. Although nuclear weapons will become part of Finland’s security policy through NATO membership, the extent of the country’s support for the defence alliance’s deterrence policy based on nuclear weapons ultimately depends on its own choices. For example, all NATO countries have traditionally given their political support to the deterrence policy based on the threat of nuclear weapons by accepting the alliance’s strategic concepts, while operational support, for example through participation in nuclear exercises, has been more limited.  When making decisions about commitment to NATO’s nuclear weapons policy, Finland must also consider the aspects related to nuclear arms control.

3.2. Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Finland 

According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, the import of nuclear explosives as well as their manufacture, possession and detonation in Finland are prohibited.  In this respect, Finland is similar to Lithuania, where the import of nuclear weapons is also prohibited by law. A Finnish citizen violating the prohibitions of the Act will be sentenced according to the Criminal Code of Finland.

The importance of the Act will increase in the future because, going forward, NATO operations and weapons depots agreed on bilaterally with the United States may be stationed in Finland. Such units will be outside of Finland’s control (extraterritorial areas), which means that Finland will be partially relinquishing its sovereignty, e.g. by guaranteeing legal immunity to the personnel of these units. If NATO operations or weapons depots agreed on bilaterally with the United States are to be stationed in Finland, it should be ensured, when drafting laws and agreements, that these regulations include a ban on importing into Finland any weapon systems prohibited in Finland, such as nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.  Finland should also keep the deployment of foreign troops and NATO operations in the country under its own decision-making authority and emphasise the defensive nature of NATO membership. 

The use of Finnish airspace constitutes question of its own. Norway does not allow its airspace to be used for the transport of nuclear weapons during peacetime. Finland should neither participate in nuclear strike exercises nor allow such exercises in Finnish airspace. These aspects must be taken into account in the negotiations that started in the autumn of 2022 for the Supplementary Defence Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) to be concluded with the United States.

3.3. Alleviting Tensions in the Nordic Region

Although the expansion of NATO to Finland and Sweden, on the one hand, improves regional security, it also increases the existing tensions in the Nordic region and on the Russian borders. From the point of view of the strategic balance based on nuclear weapons, tensions are created especially by the proximity of Russia’s strategic command centres, weapons and stockpiles located on the Kola Peninsula near the border between Finland and Russia. In the Baltic Sea, on the other hand, the metropolis of St Petersburg as well as issues of security of supply, such as securing sea routes, underwater communications cables and gas pipelines, are central. In addition, attention must be paid to freedom of movement in accordance with international maritime law, the strategic position and integrity of the islands in the Baltic Sea as well as respect for the demilitarised status of the Åland islands.  From Russia’s point of view, a priority is the security of Kaliningrad and maintaining the supply routes to that region, while the NATO countries, including Finland and Sweden, see the weapons deployed in Kaliningrad as a threat.  Especially with the collapse of the INF Treaty, the question of the nature of the missiles deployed in Russia’s Kaliningrad has come up. Finland should seek to alleviate regional tensions in the Nordic and Arctic regions and prevent the risks of military escalation. 

IV Recommendations

In this chapter, we present a number of recommendations for Finland’s nuclear weapons policy based on the considerations we put forward in the previous chapters.

1.  When amending the Nuclear Energy Act, care must be taken not to abolish the prohibition on importing nuclear explosives to Finland as well as the prohibition to manufacture, possess and detonate nuclear explosives. This is important as a matter of principle despite the fact that there are no operational grounds for importing nuclear weapons to Finland. Finland can, if it wishes, also strengthen the statutory prohibition similar to the Lithuanian model in the same way as Iceland, i.e. by making political declarations or resolutions according to which nuclear weapons may not be imported into the country under any circumstances.

2.  Finland should promote the discussion about the risks associated with the use of nuclear weapons and reducing them within NATO and more widely, such as in military doctrines. In this context, in line with Finland’s traditional policy, the focus should in particular be on tactical nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the escalation risks included in the doctrine of first-use and the possibility of an accidental nuclear war due to constant high alert levels should be brought into the discussion. Finland should promote the policy of no-first use in NATO. Furthermore, the goal should be to withdraw all nuclear weapons from immediate launch readiness and to strengthen the technical safeguards for the use of nuclear weapons.

3.    Finland should seek to reduce any tensions and risks of escalation caused by the expansion of NATO by taking into account the strategic balance of the great powers. In this context, the emphasis of the first article of the NATO Treaty (1949) on respecting the principles of the UN Charter and international law and on the peaceful settlement of international disputes should be taken into consideration more strongly. Norway’s restrictions on bases of foreign states and on the organisation of international military exercises, for example, offer starting points for a discussion in which a wide range of experts should be represented.

4.  Finland should adopt a cautious approach with regard to NATO’s nuclear exercises and participation in them. NATO’s conventional military force constitutes a sufficient capability to repel attacks.

5.    Finland should maintain an open attitude towards the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and continue to participate in its meetings as an observer. Furthermore, Finland can participate in providing victim assistance to those affected by nuclear weapon use and testing as well as contribute to the remediation of environmental damage caused by nuclear weapons tests.

The members of the monitoring group, which conducts independent evaluations of nuclear weapons issues, are: Tarja Cronberg (Aleksanteri Institute, Visiting Professor, SIPRI, Distinguished Associate Fellow), Jaakko Ellisaari (M.Soc.Sc, Abolition 2000 network and Peace Union of Finland), Tytti Erästö (PhD, Senior Researcher, SIPRI), Kati Juva (Adjunct Professor, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War Co-President), Mika Kerttunen (D.Soc.Sc, Associate Professor in Military Strategy, Finnish National Defence University), Claus Montonen (PhD, Associate Professor in Theoretical Physics, Technology for Life Finland), Juha Pyykönen (Security Analyst, Lic.Soc.Sc), Erkki Tuomioja (PhD, Associate Professor in Political History), Katariina Simonen (LLD, Associate Professor in International Law and Arms Control, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs Council Member), Juha Vuori (D.Soc.Sc, Associate Professor in World Politics, Professor of International Politics, Tampere University) and Raimo Väyrynen (Professor Emeritus).