March 24, 2026 - 3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)
Ken Yahagi (University Seikei at Tokyo, Japan): Law Enforcement with Crime News Reporting.
Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical framework that integrates media reporting behavior into the optimal law enforcement model. Individuals cannot directly observe actual enforcement levels; instead, they rely on media information both to assess implemented law enforcement and to make private protective decisions that reduce potential crime harm. This information, however, may be biased. We show that when the potential harm from crime is low, demand for crime news is limited, and the media reports the true enforcement level. In this scenario, the government can influence deterrence by shaping the media's reporting strategies. On the other hand, when the potential harm from crime is high, the media misreports strict enforcement as weak, while individuals' demand for crime-related news increases as they seek to inform their private protection decisions. In this case, individuals remain uninformed about the actual enforcement level, and the government cannot influence deterrence. Our extensions demonstrate that self-interested governments with punitive preferences may choose strict enforcement even when the media portrays it as weak, creating misperception equilibria. Furthermore, media-exaggerated crime risks increase political demand for punitive sanctions through majoritarian voting.
June 16, 2026 - 3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)
Winand Emons (University of Bern, Switzerland): Optional Fee-Shifting, co-authored with Severin Lenhard (University of St. Gallen, Switzerland) and Francesco Parisi (University of Minnesota, USA).
Abstract: We study settlement bargaining under three alternative fee-shifting rules: the American Rule, the English Rule, and an optional fee-shifting regime in which the defendant chooses whether the case will proceed under the American or the English Rule. The defendant knows whether his conduct gives rise to liability while the plaintiff only has a noisy signal. This two-sided asymmetric information creates scope for strategic misrepresentation: defendants who face liability may try to pass as if they do not, while plaintiffs with weak evidence may act as if they have a strong case. Optional fee-shifting has an information-generating function which, however, can be distorted by strategic efforts to send misleading signals. When litigation costs are similar for both parties, optional fee-shifting reduces litigation rates more effectively than either the American or the English Rule alone.
October 13, 2026 - 3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)
Rosa Ferrer (Pompeu Fabra University, Spain): Adversarial Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence on Lawyers’ Career Trajectories, co-authored with Danisz Okulicz (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany).
Abstract: New technologies--such as artificial intelligence--are making it less costly to verify lawyers’ court win rates as well as case characteristics. This paper theoretically and empirically examines lawyers’ career concerns incentives when court performance is observable for potential subsequent clients. Opposing lawyers’ in court have binary and negatively correlated performance outcomes, which results in their performance being jointly and imperfectly observed. We show that the resulting implicit incentives to exert effort decrease as the confrontation between the agents becomes closer. Introducing linear separability between effort and talent, we also show that such asymmetries lead to higher aggregate effort levels. Empirically, we use panel data on young lawyers’ career trajectories to analyze existing implicit incentives including early-career effort incentives of lawyers appearing in court.
December 08, 2026 - 3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)
Luigi Alberto Franzoni (University of Bologna, Italy): Contract Law for Disagreeing Parties, co-authored with Roy Baharad.
Abstract: Contracts are commonly understood as promises to perform, yet such promises are made in an uncertain world where external circumstances may render performance excessively costly and lead to breach. This paper studies optimal damages when contracting parties disagree about the likelihood of such circumstances. For example, a seller may view the risk of a supply-chain disruption as remote, whereas the buyer may regard it as substantial. We show that when parties disagree about the probability of performance, optimal damages deviate from expectation damages. Damages should exceed expectation damages when the buyer is relatively pessimistic about performance (her beliefs about performance costs first-order stochastically dominate the seller’s), and fall below expectation damages in the opposite case. We study two sources of relative pessimism: heterogeneous beliefs (non-common priors) and ambiguity aversion under shared but uncertain probabilities. The analysis extends to renegotiation and reliance and bears on contract doctrines such as liquidated damages, mistake, misrepresentation, and excuse.