December 08, 2026 - 3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)
Luigi Alberto Franzoni (University of Bologna, Italy): Contract Law for Disagreeing Parties, co-authored with Roy Baharad (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel).
Abstract: Contracts are commonly understood as promises to perform, yet such promises are made in an uncertain world where external circumstances may render performance excessively costly and lead to breach. This paper studies optimal damages when contracting parties disagree about the likelihood of such circumstances. For example, a seller may view the risk of a supply-chain disruption as remote, whereas the buyer may regard it as substantial. We show that when parties disagree about the probability of performance, optimal damages deviate from expectation damages. Damages should exceed expectation damages when the buyer is relatively pessimistic about performance (her beliefs about performance costs first-order stochastically dominate the seller’s), and fall below expectation damages in the opposite case. We study two sources of relative pessimism: heterogeneous beliefs (non-common priors) and ambiguity aversion under shared but uncertain probabilities. The analysis extends to renegotiation and reliance and bears on contract doctrines such as liquidated damages, mistake, misrepresentation, and excuse.