December 09, 2025 - 2:30 pm to 3:45 pm (Paris time)
Kathryn Spier (Harvard Law School, USA): The Mediator’s Proposal: Confidentiality and Social Welfare, co-authored with Xinyu Hua (Hong Kong University of Science & Technology).
Abstract: The mediator’s proposal” (“mediator’s offer”) is a well-known procedure used by mediators and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practitioners. The mediator proposes settlement terms and then each side communicates to the mediator whether they accept or reject the terms. The dispute is settled if both parties accept, but remains unresolved if either party rejects. This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of the mediator’s proposal, with a particular focus on the impact of confidentiality: With confidential mediation, the mediator does not reveal the parties’ responses to the proposal; with open mediation, the responses are revealed. Confidentiality raises the settlement rate (and increases social welfare) for two reasons: (1) parties are less concerned about being perceived as weak, and (2) each party can learn more about the other’s type only when accepting the mediator’s proposal. Confidential mediation may however intensify competition (and reduce social welfare) should settlement fail.
October 14, 2025 - 3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)
Urs Schweizer (University of Bonn, Germany): Damages Rules Implementing Socially Desired Outcomes.
Abstract: The economic analysis of tort law views damages rules as affecting the game being played. All kind of such rules have been shown to implement the social welfare maximizing outcome as a Nash equilibrium. The present paper examines tort relations where, for whatever reasons, social welfare differs from relational welfare. Damages rules are proposed, which implement socially desired outcomes, i.e., outcomes that maximize social welfare, even if these outcomes fail to maximize relational welfare. The proposed rules allow the plaintiff to claim disgorgement of the enrichment caused by the defendant's deviation from the desired outcome whenever this enrichment exceeds the harm caused by it. The paper considers both simultaneous as well as sequential action choice.
June 17, 2025 - 3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)
Massimo d'Antoni (University of Siena, Italy): The Law and Economics of Power: Making Sense of Inalienability Rules, co-authored with Edward Iacobucci (University of Toronto, Canada).
Abstract: Economic analysis views voluntary exchange as mutually beneficial, assuming that each party would not agree to a transaction unless it improved their welfare. However, this assumption often overlooks the role of power asymmetries, where one party has significant control over outcomes that disproportionately affect the other. In many such contexts, the law intervenes—not solely for moral reasons or to prevent externalities, but to address deeper economic concerns about the creation and exploitation of power. This paper explores the circumstances under which the law restricts voluntary exchanges due to concerns about power, even when those exchanges appear beneficial to the involved parties. We define power as arising when one party has decision-making authority that imposes limited consequences on themselves but profound consequences on a counterparty. While the creation of such power can be valuable—for example, in employment relationships where employers must have the discretion to terminate underperforming employees—its exploitation can undermine the very incentives that justify granting such discretion. This creates a paradox: power is both necessary and potentially dangerous. To resolve this tension, legal and institutional constraints often render certain entitlements inalienable. By introducing frictions to transactions, these constraints prevent the supervisor’s decision-making authority from being subverted by monetary or in-kind transfers, thereby preserving the integrity and purpose of the power relationship. This enables the creation of a power relation by limiting the types of agreements that can be struck in its shadow. We argue that the prohibition of monetary payments—and, in some cases, of specific in-kind transfers—is essential to the maintenance of socially valuable power structures. Yet such prohibitions are also costly, as they force parties to rely on less efficient forms of exchange or forego potentially welfare-enhancing agreements. We show how legal, contractual, and social rules cope with this tradeoff, and why seemingly inefficient restrictions are actually necessary to preserve the long-term benefits of power relationships. This analysis extends and refines existing accounts of power in economics, particularly in contexts of contract incompleteness and asymmetric decision-making authority. Unlike prior work, we highlight the role of inalienability and the prohibition of transfers—monetary or otherwise—as structural features that support, rather than limit, the exercise of socially valuable power.
March 25, 2025 - 3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)
Scott Baker (Washington University in Saint Louis, USA): Trademarks and Consumer Communication, co-authored with Kevin Collins (Washington University in Saint Louis, USA).
Abstract: Trademarks are conventionally framed as tools that help trademark owners communicate information about their goods to consumers. Yet, in the contemporary marketplace, consumers often use trademarks—a Harley Davidson t-shirt, a Red Bull cap, a University of Michigan hoodie, a Swiftie backpack—to communicate something about themselves to other consumers. These trademarks constitute consumer speech as much, if not more, than they constitute trademark-owner speech. The law governing trademarks has also evolved. Today, trademark owners prevail even when they evidence, at most, an attenuated link between the defendant’s actions and consumer confusion about source. Scholars uniformly deride this expansion as a give-away to producers at the expense of consumers. They do so because they assume only producers use trademarks to communicate. This Article shows that once this assumption is relaxed—once we recognize the reality that consumers use trademarks to communicate, too—the proper scope of trademark law becomes far less certain. More specifically, this Article makes two points. First, we argue that trademark protection can increase the precision of a trademark’s brand message and thus the clarity of the vocabulary that consumers have at their disposal to construct their identities. This precision is inversely correlated with the variation in the intensities with which consumers brandishing the mark subscribe to the brand message. By increasing price, the trademark owner restricts the set of consumers sporting a trademark to more passionate adopters, enabling a better, more targeted inferences by those who observe the display the mark—i.e., clearer consumer speech. Second, and more briefly, we query whether this increment of protection generates socially valuable incentives for producers to invest in expanding the number of brand-message bearing trademarks, and thereby increase the nuance that is possible from trademark-enabled consumer speech.