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as weapons. Criminal organizations beyond the border possess well-established distribution networks within the United States developed by partnering with or coopting local criminal organizations in order to expand distribution capacity and capability. The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) outlines the Administration’s approach to interdiction beyond the borders, in the border regions, and inside the borders. The activities described in the NICCP should complement the actions below. A. Focus investigations on priority TCOs engaged in drug trafficking. (Agencies Involved: DOJ; DHS; USPIS) The Consolidated Priority Organizational Target (CPOT) and Regional Priority Organizational Target (RPOT) Lists, administered by OCDETF, represent the greatest transnational criminal threats to the United States. Departments and Agencies should evaluate how to use the full breadth of their authorities and capabilities to support enterprise investigations to disrupt and dismantle these priority organizations and their distribution networks within the United States. Agencies conducting interdictions should develop the capability to target interdictions against CPOTs and RPOTs and to assess the impacts of interdictions on CPOTs and RPOTs. All federal agencies should support targeted interdictions against CPOTs and RPOTS. The effectiveness of our limited interdiction, investigative, and prosecutorial resources should be evaluated and assessed through the lens of defeating these most deleterious organizations. ONDCP, in consultation with the interagency, will recommend funding priorities for initiatives that demonstrably disrupt and degrade CPOTs and RPOTs. B. Collaborate with the express consignment shipping industry and the U.S. Postal Service to deny drug traffickers success with those services. (Agencies involved: DHS/CBP; ICE; USPIS) Drug traffickers exploit the mail system and express consignment carriers to cheaply, efficiently, and reliably distribute illicit drugs, illicit cash, and other contraband across the nation. This includes delivering illicit drugs directly into the hands of those with SUDs. Addressing the use of the mail system and express consignment carriers by drug traffickers is therefore both a public safety and a public health imperative. Appropriate federal agency collaboration with express consignment carriers will enable analyses of large quantities of national data in order to develop and standardize algorithms for « « « « « « 82 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY identifying and interdicting suspect parcels while safeguarding individual privacy and proprietary carrier information. Principle 3: Improve assessments of supply reduction initiative effectiveness and efficiency and allocate resources accordingly. Evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of supply reduction efforts and policies will highlight what approaches are most impactful and enable a reprioritization of resources towards the most promising programs, policies, and innovations. We must collaboratively examine programs across our various international and domestic lines of effort, such as eradication of illicit coca and poppy plants, the raw materials for cocaine and heroin, respectively; initiatives to bolster interdiction capabilities in drug source and transit countries, whether the narcotics are moved by land, sea, or air; the results of programs designed to incentivize and strengthen licit economies within partner nations; measures to combat drug-related money laundering; and programs to combat drug sales on the internet. We must also use this process to assess new threats and future changes in the illicit drug market to ensure that programs and initiatives effectively and accurately combat the evolving threat. A. Strengthen assessments of supply reduction initiative outcomes against measurable goals. (Agencies Involved: DHS/CBP, ICE, USCG; DOD; DOJ/DEA, FBI, OCDETF; DOS; IC; Treasury/FINCEN, IRS, OFAC, TFFC) Supply reduction initiatives typically require substantial investments in personnel, funds, and material. Thorough and pragmatic assessment of the outcomes achieved by these initiatives is necessary to assess the extent to which investment of finite resources produces meaningful impacts. Intelligence Community and law enforcement information and analysis are vital to our understanding of the ‘start-to-finish’ drug production, movement, and international consumption processes, which is crucial to assessing effectiveness of supply reduction initiatives. The intelligence activities of the IC and federal law enforcement need to be well integrated with the work of select overseas Embassies, Combatant Commanders (especially US Indo-Pacific Command, US Northern Command and US Southern Command), state and local entities, HIDTAs, and other fusion centers. Federal agencies should further develop their capacity to critically assess the effectiveness of supply reduction initiatives and programs, in addition to monitoring activity performance. Resources should be prioritized for initiatives demonstrating strategic effects. B. Enhance supply reduction efficiency. (Agencies Involved: DHS/CBP, ICE, USCG; DOD; DOJ/DEA, FBI, OCDETF; DOS; IC; Treasury/FINCEN, IRS, OFAC, TFFC) We must ensure that we account for efficiency in our evaluation and selection of supply reduction efforts in addition to effectiveness, prioritizing demonstrably efficient efforts over 

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