Films now address the existential issues once faced by theologians and philosophers: external reality vs internal perception, the relation of material sensation to thought, and the purpose of existence.

René Descartes, a 17^th century Jewish philosopher and mathematician, sought objective bases for human knowledge. “[I will continue] until I recognize something certain, or, if nothing else, until I at least recognize for certain that there is no certainty” (Descartes, 1641, Meditations I). He calls the senses into doubt because they are not one hundred percent reliable: sometimes they mislead. “But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once” (Descartes, 1641, Meditations I). Optical illusions, alternate states of consciousness, and the effects of medications are examples of how the senses cannot be trusted. Thomas Nagel builds on the misrepresentation of the senses, and questions shared realities in other minds: “How do you know that red things don’t look to your friend the way yellow things look to you?” (Nagel, 1987, p. 21). People perceive the world through their senses, but each perceives differently: one smells a pleasing perfume and another senses a nauseating odor.

Descartes explains that existence may be an elaborate realist dream that is identical to ordinary waking state sense perception. One never knows when they are dreaming, and is likely to be dreaming at all times (Descartes, 1641, Meditations I). Nagel reiterates this dilemma: “couldn’t all your experiences be like a giant dream with no external world outside of it?” (Nagel, 1987, p. 9). Therefore, any tools used to perceive whether a moment in time is a dream or the immediate reality will lose effect because they may also be part of the dream. (Descartes, 1641, Meditations I). Nagel gives an example: “If you knocked on the table or pinched yourself, you would hear the knock and feel the pinch, but that would be just one more thing going on inside your mind like everything else” (Nagel, 1987, p. 10). Technically, everything can be interpreted as part of a dream, and truth remains meaningless.

For a time Descartes doubts corporeal nature and mathematical truths, and hypothesizes that the perceived world may not even exist. An evil demon may exist who manipulates the content of one’s thoughts and creates the illusion that there are things external to oneself when they do not exist (Descartes, 1641, Meditations I).

Descartes inferred the mind’s existence from his experience of thinking, and he inferred the world’s existence from his conception of a perfect god. The mind exists with the Cogito: “... let him [the evil demon] deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something” (Descartes, 1641, Meditations II). The very thought “I do not exist” is a proof of existence, as the activity of thinking must connote the existence of the thing that is doing the thinking. Further, Descartes infers the world’s existence by rationalizing that a perfect god must exist, as existence is a part of the reason it is perfect. Descartes also rationalizes that god is good, as an evil god would lack goodness, and a real god lacks nothing. This all-powerful good god must be the only god, as it would not be all-powerful if there was an evil demon (a deceiving god) existing in parallel. The external world exists because this good god makes sure that one is not deceived.

Descartes’ Meditations stimulated generations of students, and his reasoning resonates even in our age. Reality for everyone depends on their perception: one person sees extreme human rights violations and another sees a necessary evil for a greater good; one sees entrenched forms of oppression and another sees the importance of maintaining traditions and the status quo.

The subjects of Descartes’ Meditations, along with traditional religious issues of reincarnation, salvation, and altruism, are brought to life by the film Groundhog Day. Bill Murray comes to Punxsutawney to cover the Groundhog Festival, but he disdains the locals and avoids relating to them, wishing to get home. He observes a different reality, and his reality disappears each morning as he wakes up to the same day.

On the third recurring day, Murray breaks a pencil on his nightstand before he goes to sleep as a tool to see if he is dreaming. When he awakes to another groundhog day, the pencil is whole. Murray finds that he is unable to parse dreams from reality. Even though Bill Murray tests the dream argument with a pencil, Descartes’ dream argument folds any attempt to use tools or other tricks to subvert the skepticism that one can get out of their dream.

Murray’s experience seems an endless dream: even suicide is transitory, passing by the next day. Each day, Murray seeks and fails to seduce his producer (Rita), and each new day he must begin anew.

Descartes’ philosophy is solipsistic: reality is derived from one’s inner thoughts. Groundhog Day links the unreality of Murray’s existence to his lack of empathy with those about him. Thomas Nagel, building on Descartes’ writings, says that we do not know the experiences of others, whose reality may differ from ours (Nagel, 1987). Groundhog Day links our reality to our empathy: if we cannot relate to those about us, our experiences are not real. Only when Murray learns to care for his fellows does he break the eternal cycle of repeated days and even win the love of Rita.

Groundhog Day conveys existential themes to audiences who might not listen to philosophical or religious messages. Empathy for one’s fellows is key to Buddhist Nirvana, Christian Salvation, and many theological creeds. The film removes the theological specifics and embeds existence in human relations. What faith and philosophy did for earlier generations, the film does for ours.

The last scene in the movie is pivotal, however. Even caring for one’s fellows may be interpreted differently by the involved parties. Bill Murray believes that his entire reality has returned rather than just his corporeal body. He awakes the day after groundhog day to find Rita next to him and says, “Today is tomorrow. It happened. You’re here!” (Groundhog Day, 1993, 01:36:24). According to Descartes, however, Murray may only be sure that his own body is “here” in corporeal existence, as he may be dreaming about everyone and everything else. The perfect god only removes the evil demon from existence; the Dream argument remains. But because Murray awakes the day after groundhog day, he believes that not only has his physical existence returned to reality, but that his dream has ended as well. He attempts a tool: he pinches Rita to see if she reacts. Rita says “ow,” and Murray believes this means that he is not dreaming (Groundhog Day, 1993, 01:35:23). Murray then attempts to rely on his senses, and looks out the window. The usual groundhog day crowd is gone, and Murray believes this means that his senses may be relied upon (Groundhog Day, 1993, 01:36:11). After believing that he is awake from his dream, and after believing in the truth of his senses, Murray tells Rita “You’re here!” He believes that not only he exists in corporeal reality, but that he can discern her existence as well (Groundhog Day, 1993, 01:36:24). Little does he know that there may be a sequel.

Nagel asks: “If you can’t prove that anything exists outside your own mind, is it all right to go on believing in the external world anyway?” (Nagel, 1987, p. 18).

Perfect empathy may be an ultimate goal, but even empathy has unshared meanings. Bill Murray may have broken the cycle of repeated days by looking at the world differently, but he can never be sure of his external reality. Ideologies are paradoxical and realities are complex. Perfect empathy is the understanding that all meanings are unshared, and involves the humility to accept this.

References

Campbell, K. (1970). Ch 2: How the mind-body problem arises. In Body and mind (pp. 14-40). Anchor Books.

Descartes, R. (1641). First meditation. In Meditations on First Philosophy.

Descartes, R. (1641). Second meditation. In Meditations on First Philosophy.

Nagel, T. (1987). Ch 2: How do we know anything. In What does it all mean?: a very short introduction to philosophy (pp. 8-18). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nagel, T. (1987). Ch 3: Other minds. In What does it all mean?: a very short introduction to philosophy (pp. 19-26). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nagel, T. (1987). Ch 4: The Mind-Body Problem. In What does it all mean?: a very short introduction to philosophy (pp. 27-37). Oxford: Oxford University Press.