5月10日(金): 16:20-17:50 富士見校舎4階404教室
発表者： 多鹿 智哉 (日本大学経済学部)
タイトル：Evolution of Information Projection Bias through Costly Communication in Overlapping Generations Organizations (Joint with Kohei Daido)
概要：In organizations with overlapping generations, behavioral bias affects performance through promotion decisions. This study focuses on information projection bias and examines its effects on communication efforts and the overall performance of an organization adopting a performance-based promotion system to select the next-generation manager among current subordinates. We show that the bias generally disrupts communication between an incumbent manager and subordinates and that the expected overall performance is single-peaked with respect to the manager's bias. When considering the bias distribution among newly promoted managers, we find that a more biased group is likely to select a more biased manager. This trend becomes stronger over generations and the expected overall performance increases when the variety of the bias degree is restricted and communication efforts are complements. By contrast, in a competitive organization, the manager's bias diminishes over generations. Nonetheless, the overall performance decreases when the variety of the bias degree is sufficient. Our results contribute to the understanding of the effects of diversity in an organization on its performance.
6月7日(金): 16:20-17:50 富士見校舎4階404教室
発表者： 橘高 勇太 (一橋大学社会科学高等研究院)
タイトル：Behavioral Changes in Different Designs of Search Experiments (Joint with Ryo Mikami and Natsumi Shimada)
概要：While search experiments are available in various designs, growing experimental evidence suggests that individual search behavior depends on design details. We conduct an experiment providing the first categorization and comparison of several search experiment designs widely accepted in search studies. These designs can be categorized as passive, quasi-active, and active, according to the degree of flexibility in decision-making regarding the search. Despite the experimental designs being based on an identical model, we found significant differences in participants’ behavior across designs. The average number of searches was the highest and closest to the theory-predicted value in the active design. In contrast, participants searched significantly less in the quasi-active and passive designs compared with the active design. These results suggest that the widely accepted design, which requires participants to make decisions based on a given offer rather than choosing among potential alternatives themselves, may have unexpected effects on participants’ behavior. Furthermore, we found that participants’ risk aversion had a significant effect only in the passive design, implying that differences in out-of-model factors across designs (e.g., the timing of decision-making and recall settings) might influence behavior through risk preferences. We also provide other methodological implications for future experiments.
9月13日(金): 16:20-18:40 富士見校舎4階404教室
16:20-17:25
発表者1：津川 修一（龍谷大学経済学部）
タイトル：Voluntary provision of durable public goods under present bias and time inconsistency (Joint with Kazuki Kumashiro)
概要：We investigate the voluntary provision of durable public goods by time-inconsistent agents in three-period models. Our model considers the players with quasi-hyperbolic discount factors like O’donoghue and Rabin (2001). Concerning the timeline, in the first period, they contribute to the public goods from which they enjoy benefits except for the last period. Therefore, their decision-making is a one-shot about public goods. Our result shows that, at the equilibria, their contribution level is higher than the rational ones when they are more time-inconsistent. Moreover, their amount of provision becomes higher if they are sophisticated.
17:35-18:40
発表者2：中村 健正（一橋大学大学院経済学研究科修士課程）
タイトル：Relative-Fair Preference Aggregation (Joint with Leo Kurata)
概要：Social evaluations of policies or resource allocations are essentially context-dependent: for instance, they are affected by individuals’ preferences and technically feasible outcomes in that society. We axiomatically examine context-dependent social preferences under uncertainty and characterize what we call relative-fair rules, which can be viewed as compromises between relative utilitarianism and the Rawlsian maximin principle. The relative-fair rules are parameterized by a set of weights over individuals, and under these rules, the social planner evaluates each social alternative as follows: after normalizing each individual's utility level to the [0,1]-interval, the planner computes a weighted sum of normalized utility levels for each possible weight and then chooses the minimum value as the evaluation of that alternative. Our result reveals that the above inequality-averse attitudes are directly related to the planner's preference for hedging under risk.
9月24日(火): 16:20-18:40 富士見校舎3階302教室
16:20-16:50
発表者1：今村 悠里（東京理科大学経営学部）
タイトル：対称化過程による二項モデル近似
概要：本講演では、ある不連続な係数を持つ確率微分方程式の近似誤差に関する結果を報告する．ある時刻内においてある領域に滞在する拡散過程の分布関数は，対称化拡散過程の分布関数の組み合わせによって表現できることがわかっている．この問題はバリアーオプションの価値に対する数値計算手法と理解することができ，この近似は1オーダー，つまり近似誤差のラージオーダーが時間分割の数の-1乗であることが数値実験結果によって示された．一般的には不連続係数における確率微分方程式の近似誤差評価については未だ分かっていないことが多い．今回の講演ではドリフト付ブラウン運動モデルにおいてペイオフ関数が半区間上の指数関数的成長なC^2関数である二項近似は1オーダーであることを報告する．
本講演は赤堀次郎氏，Jie-Yen Fan 氏，Olivier Menoukeu Pamen 氏との共同研究である．
16:50-17:20
発表者2：野口怜（東京理科大学経営学部）
タイトル：Application of econometric methods in the medical field and potential of natural language processing in the economic field
概要：Japan has established one of the world's most excellent healthcare systems, and its universal healthcare system allows everyone to receive safe, high-quality medical services at low cost. On the other hand, coupled with an aging population and increasingly sophisticated medical technology, Japan's medical expenditure continues to increase steadily at a rate of about 1 trillion yen (2-4%) per year, putting pressure on public finances. Therefore, it is expected that theories and analytical methods in the field of economics will be applied to healthcare economics in order to formulate appropriate healthcare policies utilizing data and to optimize medical expenditure. In this presentation, I will introduce some examples of research that I have conducted so far, in which I have applied interrupted time-series analysis (ITS) to medical data, and will discuss its applicability to health economics and future research prospects. I will also introduce some examples of research on machine learning and text analysis conducted in the medical field and discuss the applicability of these techniques to the economic field.
17:30-18:40
発表者3：柏木 柚香（日本大学経済学部）
タイトル：The long-run impact of the reconstruction speed
概要：Post-disaster reconstruction often sparks significant debate over whether to prioritize the quality of recovery or the recovery speed. Although existing literature acknowledges the importance of both factors in Build Back Better, it also faces the challenges of measuring the aspects due to lack of data. In this paper, utilizing the variation in the timing of lifting the residence restriction in Fukushima prefecture after the 2011 nuclear powerplant accident, the characteristics of the rule of lifting restrictions, and the fact that the order is not correlated with the proximity to the nuclear power plant, we test the long-run impact of the delay in recovery on the population size. We conduct our analysis using 500m mesh data taken from national statistics and various spatial datasets on the disaster and hazard-risk information. We find that when the duration of the restriction is longer by 100 days, the population in 2020 drops by 3 percent. The results hold when accounting for spatial autocorrelation. We also explore the heterogeneity across the reconstruction process, the cause of the delay, and the environment of the economic activities. Further, additional analysis investigates the side effects of the migration on regional safety. The results suggest that the population size in all types of hazard zones decreased significantly or insignificantly.
10月4日(金): 16:20-18:40 富士見校舎4階404教室
16:20-17:25
発表者1：畠山哲太郎（慶應義塾大学経済学研究科博士課程）
タイトル：Who makes the cut? Endogenous priority design for heterogeneous groups of agents (joint with Onur Kesten and Morimitsu Kurino)
概要: Priorities over agents are crucial primitives in assignment problems of indivisible objects without monetary transfers. Motivated by the student assignment problem to exchange programs in Japan, we introduce the so-called prioritization problem: how does one go about allocating overdemanded goods when each agent possesses one of several attributes while priority orders are established only among agents sharing the same attribute. Other applications include rationing of medical supplies, elective surgery scheduling, visa assignment and affirmative action. We show that two types of assignment protocols stand out when basic fairness and efficiency requirements are pursued in a consistent manner when randomization is used only as a last resort.
17:35-18:40
発表者2：岡本実哲（明治学院大学経済学部）
タイトル：Accountable Voting (joint with Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Yoko Kawada, and Yuta Nakamura)
概要：We consider social decision-making situations where some voters may have a conflict of interest in some social alternatives/applicants to be ranked. When a subset of society, such as experts and referees, chooses an outcome that affects the entire society, the accountability of collective decision processes is essential. We extend the standard social welfare function to include the interest relationships between the voters of the social decision process and the alternatives/applicants. We introduce two accountability axioms: Exclusion of Interested Party Evaluations on the voters' individual preference manifests and the No-Power-Game property for changes in the interest relationships. While we obtain three impossibility theorems among the accountability axioms and the extensions of some standard axioms in voting theory, we also give two directions for remedies by constructing ranking rules with desirable properties.
10月25日(金): 16:20-18:40 富士見校舎4階404教室
16:20-17:25
発表者：岡田弦大（東京大学大学院経済学研究科修士課程）
タイトル：No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects (Joint with Shunya Noda)
概要: We study efficient mechanism design for allocating multiple heterogeneous objects. We aim to maximize the residual surplus, the total value generated from an allocation minus the costs for screening agents' values. We discover a robust trend indicating that no-screening mechanisms such as serial dictatorship with exogenous priority order tend to perform better as the variety of goods increases. We analyze the underlying reasons by characterizing efficient mechanisms in a stylized environment. We also apply an automated mechanism design approach to numerically derive efficient mechanisms and validate the trend in general environments. Building on this implication, we propose the register-invite-book system (RIB) as an efficient system for scheduling vaccination against pandemic diseases.
17:35-18:40
発表者：村上愛（東京大学大学院経済学研究科）
タイトル: A leader's voice in the evolution of conventions
概要: This paper introduces a leader who issues public announcements and examines their influence on the evolution of conventions within a symmetric two-player coordination game. Employing best response dynamics, the study investigates the formation of a stable convention. The interaction between the leader’s announcements and individuals’ belief updates results in a unique Nash equilibrium outcome.
11月22日(金): 16:20-18:40 富士見校舎4階404教室
16:20-17:25
発表者：釜賀浩平 (上智大学経済学部)
タイトル：Decisive coalitions and scoring rules (Joint with Walter Bossert and Susumu Cato)
概要: The structural properties of collections of decisive coalitions have a long standing as important tools in the analysis of collective decisions. Our primary objective is to explore the links between scoring rules and the class of symmetric conditional prefilters known from some of the earlier literature. In particular, we show that, for every symmetric conditional prefilter, there exists a scoring rule that has this symmetric conditional prefilter as its collection of decisive coalitions. Moreover, we show that the Borda rule occupies a special position within the class of scoring rules in that it is associated with the finest symmetric conditional prefilter. Although the plurality is not a member of our class of scoring rules because not all of the weights that it assigns to the alternatives’ ranks in an ordering, it can be analyzed in this setting as well. Our final observation illustrates that this rule shares the above-mentioned attribute of the Borda rule—its collection of decisive coalitions is also given by the finest symmetric conditional prefilter.
17:35-18:40
発表者：Walter Bossert (University of Montreal, Department of Economics)
タイトル: Intermediate Condorcet winners and losers (joint work with Salvador Barberà)
概要: The conditions of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency are, in essence, universally accepted as attractive criteria to evaluate the performance of social choice functions. However, there are many situations in which these conditions are silent because such winners and losers may not exist. Hence, weakening these desiderata in order to extend the domain of profiles where they apply is an appealing task. Yet, the often-proposed and accepted weak counterparts of these properties suffer from the shortcoming that a weak Condorcet winner can be a weak Condorcet loser at the same time, thus leading to contradictory recommendations regarding their use as normative criteria. After presenting evidence that this anomaly is pervasive, even in the presence of substantial and important domain restrictions, we propose new notions of Condorcet-type winners and losers that are between these two extremes: they share the intuitive appeal of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency and avoid the contradictory recommendations that would derive from the double identification of candidates as being weak Condorcet winners and losers at the same time. We prove that abiding to the new principles is compatible with various additional attractive normative criteria. Finally, we propose a class of social choice functions that are consistent with the recommendations of our new proposals and can be extended to the universal domain through the lexicographical use of complementary choice criteria, in the spirit of previous proposals by noted authors like Pierre Daunou and Duncan Black.
1月24日(金): 16:00-18:40 富士見校舎 4階404教室
16:00-17:15
発表者： 礫石恭伍（一橋大学大学院博士課程）
タイトル：Startup Non-competes in the Shadow of Acquihiring
概要：Non-compete agreements (NCAs) restrict employee mobility and often play important roles in startups, such as the prevention of the leakage of intellectual property. In this article, I propose an additional role of NCAs in startups as a potential countermeasure to acquihiring by developing a model of labor market competition between a potential acquirer and a startup. In the model, the potential acquirer has two options to hire the startup's employee, direct hiring (poaching) and acquihiring — the acquisition of a company to hire its talented employees. NCAs may either induce or prevent acquihiring by affecting the acquirer's profitability of the two hiring strategies. I identify the conditions under which NCAs prevent acquihiring and demonstrate that stricter NCA regulations may distort worker allocation and/or reduce worker welfare. This result indicates that, in the context of high-tech industries where acquihiring is relatively prevalent, increased regulation of NCAs could weaken startups, facilitate acquihiring by Big Tech firms, and ultimately reinforce their market power.
17:25-18:40
発表者：石原章史 (東京大学社会科学研究所)
タイトル: Wholesale Contracts and Exclusivity with Multi-homing
概要: This paper explores vertical relationships where a monopolistic content provider distributes content through downstream distributors to consumers who may access multiple distributors (i.e., multi-homing). Consistent with several recent digital streaming industries, depending on the form of wholesale fees, either (i) the content is available through both distributors, and no consumer multi-homes, or (ii) the content is supplied exclusively as a result of some consumers multi-homing. In the latter case, mandating non-exclusive supply for the content provider may harm social welfare due to the reduction of multi-homing consumers.