2018-2019

12月21日 (金): 16:30-18:00    富士見校舎3階303教室

発表者:  平井俊行  (富山大学経済学部)

タイトル:  Farsighted Stability in Patent Licensing: An Abstract Game Approach (joint with Naoki Watanabe and Shigeo Muto)

概要 :

This paper analyzes the negotiations made by an external patent holder and potential licensee firms in a new model of patent licensing, assuming that they are all farsighted, and characterizes the symmetric farsighted stable sets. Given a net profit of each licensee firm, a set of outcomes is a symmetric farsighted stable set if and only if, at any outcome in the set, each licensee firm receives the net profit and the number of licensee firms maximizes the patent holder's profit provided that licensee firms obtain the net profits. We also show the close relationship between the symmetric farsighted stable sets and the relative interior of the core. Further, we confirm that our result is strong and roust by applying the notions of absolute maximality (Ray and Vohra, 2018) and history dependent strong rationality (Dutta and Vartiainen, 2017) to our model, respectively; the symmetric farsighted stable sets coincide with the absolutely maximal farsighted stable sets and with the history dependent strongly rational expectation farsighted stable set.  

1月18日 (金): 16:30-18:00    富士見校舎3階303教室

発表者:  西原 宏  (福岡大学経済学部)

タイトル:  Resolution of the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma by Kalai's Preplay Negotiation Procedure

概要 :

In this paper, we apply the preplay negotiation procedure proposed by Kalai (1981) to the n-person prisoners’ dilemma, and examine how it generates cooperation.  We analyze one preplay case and two preplay case, and show that, in both cases, there is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium (THPE) in which all players cooperate. Our results are generalization of Kalai (1981)’s which were obtained for 2-person case.